Date Established: 1952

Present Mission:

Primary - Management of large quantities of plutonium (special nuclear material) remaining at RFETS.

Secondary - Site cleanup from nuclear weapons production.

Size: 384 acres (0.6 square miles) located on a 6,262 acre reserve (10.2 square miles).

Employees: 296 Department of Energy (DOE) and 3,642 contractor personnel (as of September 1996).

Annual Budget: $613.4 million for fiscal year 1996, and $580 million each year for fiscal years 1997 and 1998.

Cognizant Secretarial Officer: Assistant Secretary for Environ mental Management (EM); principal EM offices -- Office of Western Waste Management Operations (EM-35), Office of Southwestern Area Programs (EM-45), Rocky Flats Office (EM-64).

Responsible Operations/Area Office: DOE Rocky Flats Field Office (RFFO).

Integrating Contractor: Kaiser-Hill (Kaiser Engineering/CH2M Hill)

Subcontractors:DynCorp of Colorado, Inc.

Rocky Mountain Remediation Services

Safe Sites of Colorado

Wackenhut Services, Inc.

Fissile Material: 12.9 metric tons of plutonium (in various forms) and 47.0 kg of plutonium waste (as of February 6, 1996). There is also 6.7 metric tons of highly enriched uranium present.

The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) is situated on a 6,262 acre reserve (10.2 square miles) located 16 miles northwest of Denver, Colorado. The portion of the site where facilities are located and work is performed consists of 384 acres and has controlled access. The remaining 10 square miles serves as a buffer zone.

For nearly 40 years, the Rocky Flats Plant was a key part of the Federal government's nationwide complex for nuclear weapons research, development, and production. Rocky Flats provided unique processing capabilities for the fabrication of weapons components from plutonium, uranium, beryllium, and stainless steel. The Rocky Flats nuclear production mission was curtailed in 1989. As a legacy from past operations, RFETS has 12.9 metric tons of plutonium in the form of metals, oxides, solutions, and scrap/residue.

The current mission of RFETS is special nuclear material (SNM) management, site cleanup, environmental restoration, deactiva tion, and preparation for decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of facilities. The current site goal is to achieve interim site closure within ten years.

The Department of Energy (DOE) Rocky Flats Field Office (RFFO) oversees RFETS contractor activities with approximately 300 Federal employees (as of September 1996). Under the current strategic alignment plan, this number is expected to decrease by seven percent over the next five years.

Kaiser-Hill (a partnership between Kaiser Engineering and CH2M Hill) assumed responsibility as the integrating management contractor on July 1, 1995. Kaiser-Hill acts as the integrating contractor and manages subcontractors at RFETS. Major subcon tractors and their general responsibilities include: (1) Rocky Mountain Remediation Services (waste operations, D&D, environ mental restoration); (2) Safe Sites of Colorado (plutonium stabilization, repackaging, consoli dation, accountability of SNM, highly enriched uranium shipments, classified parts man agement); (3) Wackenhut Services, Inc. (security); and (4) DynCorp of Colorado, Inc. (building management, maintenance, medical, and emergency preparedness). There were 3,644 integrating contractor personnel at Rocky Flats as of September 1996.

The Kaiser-Hill contract was awarded in April 1995 for the period July 1, 1995, through June 30, 2000. The projected budget for the contract is approximately $3.75 billion over the five-year period. The contract, one of the first under the contract reform initiative, requires Kaiser-Hill to act as an integrating management contractor with principal sub contractors performing specific tasks under the general contract. The contract provides strong incentives for Kaiser-Hill and the principal subcontractors to perform quality work on time and within budget, grants flexibility in daily management of work activi ties, and assigns contractors a greater share of risks and responsibilities. The contract provides for establishment of fee-bearing performance measures (approved by RFFO) that will be used to reward and track performance.

A large portion of the plutonium inventory at RFETS is stored in forms or packaging and at locations unsuitable for safe interim or longer term storage. These large quantities and forms of plutonium create several vulnerabili ties and hazards.

During 1996, progress on risk reduction activities associated with SNM increased significantly. Accomplishments included repackaging of over 1,100 plutonium metal items, the thermal stabilization of 80 percent of generated oxides, completion of hydrogen sampling and venting for actinide tanks in Buildings 771 and 371, low-level tank draining in Building 771, and draining of highly enriched uranyl nitrate (HEUN) solution from tanks in Building 886. DNFSB 94-1, the RFCA, and the Rocky Flats Residue Consent Order are major drivers for these activities.

There is an extensive maintenance backlog at RFETS, including the maintenance of vital safety systems. Contributing to this backlog are inadequate staffing, spare parts acquisition problems, challengeable program priorities, and funding levels. The fiscal year 1995 maintenance budgets for several facilities did not include needed funding to reduce or eliminate the maintenance backlog on vital safety systems. The lack of emphasis on maintenance budgets, shifting funding priorities, and lack of a defined authorization basis have resulted in essential safety systems in numerous buildings being in poor condition.

Operations at Rocky Flats were curtailed in December 1989 to address suspected safety concerns. Immediately after the curtailment, contractors changed. The new contractor (EG&G) initiated plans for resumption of weapons production; however, these plans were changed to address limited resumption activities in Buildings 559 and 707 only, because the production contingency mission was eliminated. The resumption activities, designed to upgrade the facilities and improve the safety culture, took several years and involved significant monetary and management resources. The mentoring, upgrade programs, and conduct of operations principles that were implemented at the resumption facilities were not, however, implemented at the other facilities with the same rigor, resulting in inconsistencies and general deficiencies in safety culture across non-resumption facilities. Recent incidents indicate that deficiencies in the RFETS safety culture persist. In March 1996, the contractor directed a sitewide stand-down from operations. The stand-down was taken in response to identified performance problems in the area of conduct of operations and procedural compliance.

Structural integrity concerns associated with former operational events, spills, or use of corrosive materials have been identified with various RFETS buildings. Buildings 707, 776, 777, and 779 have areas of corrosion on the concrete floors due to contact with Kathene (LiCl). The LiCl spills were associated with operation of Kathabar dehumidifiers. Building 771 has areas of corrosion on the concrete floors as a result of past contact with hydro chloric acid through spills and seepage. Cracking was also identified in horizontal concrete girders in room 245 of Building 771.

Although improvements to the criticality safety program are under way, program imple mentation is hampered by an increasing trend in criticality safety infractions and deficiencies in the safety basis of criticality safety evalua tions. Criticality safety program implementa tion deficiencies described in 1995 EH reviews by the DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) included concerns in criticality engineering staffing levels, organiza tional independence, reliance on adminis trative controls, and untimely resolution of longstanding criticality safety issues.

A number of incidents during 1996 were indicative of a breakdown of work controls in radiological control program implementation. These incidents involved failure to comply with controls and requirements established in the controlling radiation work permits, failure to perform appropriate monitoring, and deficiencies in radiological area access control and personnel monitoring. The integrating contractor initially failed to recognize the significance of these recurring incidents, even when RFFO formally highlighted their concerns.

KEY FACILITIES

Buildings 371 and 374, Plutonium and Waste Treatment Complex

Building 371, built in 1975, is used for interim storage of SNM and low-level waste processing. Recovery operations originally conducted in the building were terminated due to inadequacies in process performance and poor inventory control reflecting process design deficiencies. Operation of the Caustic Waste Treatment System is planned for late 1996 to support liquid stabilization. Preparations and upgrades for solid residue processing are ongoing. Analytical laboratory activities and standards development are ongoing. Efforts are under way to determine the suitability and preparation needed for interim storage of most of the SNM remaining at RFETS in Building 371.

Building 374, built in 1980, treats (1) low-level radioactive liquid process wastes, such as nitric acid and sodium hydroxide solutions; and (2) low-level radioactive liquids, such as laundry waste and process cooling and steam condensate. The final products are dry sludge, salt, and distilled water.

In 1993, DOE proposed moving most of the RFETS SNM inventory into Building 371 for interim storage until final disposition. Building 371 is the newest of the plutonium buildings and was considered to be the most structurally sound building at RFETS. In 1994, the DNFSB concluded that activities under way to prepare Building 371 for its extended role in storage of plutonium were not logically structured and were not comprehensive enough in either detail or scope to assure adequate protection of safety and health. As a result, the DNFSB issued Recommendation 94-3, Rocky Flats Seismic and System Safety. RFFO has established an implementation plan to address this recommendation. RFFO activities to support the plan have included investigating and analyzing the seismic adequacy of Building 371 operations, and evaluating other options for interim SNM storage. Seismic improve ments have been made and additional upgrades are planned in accordance with the 94-3 Implementation Plan. The site is also evaluating two other options for interim plutonium disposition. One option involves sending Category I and II material to the DOE Savannah River Site. A second option, featured in the current draft ten-year plan, involves the construction of a new passive storage vault at RFETS. The site is continuing with development activities asso ciated with this option (i.e., conceptual design, cost projections); a final decision on the new vault option is anticipated by fiscal year 1998.

Building 559, Plutonium Analytical Lab

Building 559 was built in 1968 as an analytical laboratory to support plutonium processing operations. Its principal mission was analyz ing gaseous, liquid, and solid samples to quantify major components, including isotopes, alloying agents, and impurities. Building 559 is a fully operational analytical laboratory providing identification, character ization, and analysis of process-related waste forms generated at RFETS. In addition, the lab provides analytical support to SNM management projects.

Building 707/707A, Plutonium Production

Building 707, built in 1970, was originally a manufacturing facility for casting, fabricating, and assembling finished plutonium parts (as well as parts made of other materials) into nuclear weapons components. Operations were suspended in 1989. Building 707A was added as part of a 1972 modification. The current mission for Building 707/707A is thermal stabilization, inspection, brushing, and repackaging of plutonium. Plutonium is stored in the building on an interim basis. Glovebox deactivation activities are ongoing. Preparations and upgrades for solid residue processing are ongoing.

Building 771 and 774, Plutonium Recovery and Liquid Waste Treatment Building

Building 771 was built in 1951 and designed for plutonium recovery from scrap/residue materials. Recovery operations were termi nated in 1989. The facility is now used for: the interim storage of large quantities of SNM and waste; laboratory analysis; HEPA filter counting; low specific activity counting; and conduct of risk reduction activities (low-level tank draining, bottle venting). The building also solidifies ion-exchange resins through cementation and utilizes microwave vitrifica tion for solid residue treatment. Building 774, also built in 1951, is used for low-level liquid waste treatment operations.

Building 776 and 777, Plutonium Manufacturing and Assembly Complex

The Building 776/777 complex was built in 1957, and until Building 707 became operational in 1970 was the major plutonium fabrication and assembly facility. Operations in the building were shut down for several months in 1969 after a major fire, and production operations remain shut down. Large amounts of plutonium are currently stored at the facility. Waste operations (initiated in 1969 to support disposition of both equipment damaged by fire, and waste generated in the cleanup efforts) are ongoing. The Supercompactor and size-reduction facilities have been used to minimize the total volume of radioactive waste at the complex. Building 776 houses drums containing plutonium residue and supports drum venting activities to prevent the buildup of hydrogen gas. Building 777 has been designated as a packaging, storage, and shipping facility. Structural integrity concerns have been identified in Buildings 776/777 associated with the former operation of Kathabar dehumidifiers.

Building 779, Plutonium Development Building

Building 779, built in 1965, was constructed for plutonium research activities involving process chemistry technology, physical metal lurgy, machining and gauging, joining tech nology, and hydrating operations. All activities were terminated in 1989. The facility is used for storing SNM and waste. Glovebox activities in support of plutonium storage include inspection, metal brushing, and repackaging. Limited laboratory activities include waste characterization and minimiza tion, stockpile reliability evaluations, and surface analysis. The building has been cleared of Category I and II SNM.

Building 886, Critical Mass Laboratory

Building 886, constructed in 1965, contains a critical mass laboratory that had been used to conduct criticality experiments in support of process operations. Most experiments were conducted using highly concentrated and enriched uranyl nitrate solutions. Solid uranium and plutonium were also used. Criticality experiments were conducted until 1987. The facility was shut down in 1989. Currently there are no active operations in Building 886.