Navy Nuc oops!

[Rad Sponge]

Wow, this was systemic lack of integrity up and down the chain of command. I highly suspect that RL div and O-training were not the only areas of deficiency.

I bet the rest of the boat went "Whewwwwwww" and then got drunk.

[StevenPeck]

When your recruitment pool is 5:4 instead of 5:1 (people to spots) there has to be some considerable drop in ability.  I have yet to hear about technical high schools in the USA graduating people more capable than in the 1970's.  In fact, the manuals and skill sets have become less comprehensive (over time) instead of more.

It would be very hard to spot and drop the integrity deficient nube when you have half a class of dismal failures waiting for you to pass them.

[number41]

Derek, Jason, I whole-heartedly concur that the problem was not simply due to a couple of sleazy ELT's.  However I still believe the reason the whole COC was jaded/lazy/stupid, whatever their problem was, could be a result of the way it's been done over the last 10 years.  Some engineer or CO or XO took that "I used to work at NAVSEA08 and this is what the manual means" attitude.  They continually enforce their INTERPRETATION of the manual as the intent when that's just not necessarily the case.  This gives the technical expert (ELT's in this case) no freedom to do his job within the guidlines of the rules.  He is forced into someone else's very specific interpretation of the rule and in my experience, this leads to a whole group of people who don't care about the requirements anymore because they know that someone is going to micromanage the whole program for them.  In fact, a big turn-around in this type of managment is happening right now.   NAVSEA has threatened action against commands that submit 85 page training summaries and 35 page short range training plans.  Commands have wasted so much time administering programs due to someone's interpretation of what TYCOM wants that they aren't effectively completing their mission.  It's in the same vein as the fleetwide ELT problems and finally the admiral is tired of it.  I hope they do actually put some power back in the hands of the technician on the deckplate.  Things will improve if they do this and adequately supervise the change.

[Ranger88]

The more things change the more they stay the same.
1985-1987 I was a staff instructor NPTU Ballston spa.  The CO said that if the students were smart enough to get through Nuke school then they were smart enough to get through NPTU and if they didn't it was due to a failure on our part, the instructors.  So our hands were tied.
The same was said about Nuke school, if they were smart enough to pass the NFQT then they were smart enough to pass Nuke Sch.

Lazy peapole with low integrity have been radioing logs since the beginning of time, to think otherwise is being naive.  I saw it less on SUBs than surface ships because you trusted your shipmates on watch to keep you safe and alive while you slept.  And on more than one occasion those we didn't trust got some very personal, motivational, counseling sessions.  On surface ships the attitude was more, hay if something happens, DIW, we will just go topside and have a coke and a smile, but we will live.

I think as the standards of our society go down so does the supply pool for the nuclear navy.  And yes they spend way too much time worrying about BS which is usually driven by the opinions of the HMFIC at the time which changes rapidly, i.e. the moving target/standard.

[JustinHEMI05]

Some light reading for us. 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/military/images/080308hampton.pdf

I sit here speechless and flabbergasted.

Justin

[Gamecock]

I can't believe all the stuff in that report!!! WoW!!!!!

[Loffy Muffin]

Yeah, but I bet you the boat was clean.

[Ranger88]

Just read the report Justin posted. "SMOKIN" or as Paris would say; "That's Hot!"  Looks like about 10 years and 10 boats worth of integrity violations stuffed into one CO's tour.  Quiet a feat even for a real XXXX CO.

Bottom line is the plant is over designed with some operator error factored in, such as chem OOS for a given period of time.  The Navy has always relied much more on design than on operators fro RX safety.  I know I would much rather rely on the design engineer dudes to save me than my shipmates.

I think the COM companies adopted this same design philosophy after the TMI "lets boil it dry thing".  I guess anybody can make an honest mistake right.

So what the lesser of 2 evils:
- A smart Vic Mackey operator who has a clue, or
- A middle of the road guy, high integrity, fully/legally qualified, that boils the core dry.

My Nuke SCH CMC briefed us when we arrived, he said that he would rather have a 2.5 student that put in mando 35 come to his SUB than a smart guy making a 3.5 with little effort an no mando time.  I must say I will take the smart guy anytime and work on the Vic Mackey part.  

[JustinHEMI05]

I didn't post it.

Justin

[taterhead]

I sit here speechless and flabbergasted.

Justin

I popped some popcorn and enjoyed every last word and black mark.

[JustinHEMI05]

I popped some popcorn and enjoyed every last word and black mark.

Oh I enjoyed it. But after what I know happened on the hartford, I didn't think it could get much worse. I guess thats naivety on my part. That whole 30 page report just goes to prove a lot of things.

Justin

[tonynuke]

I dont doubt that this could happen, i just feel fortunate that it didnt happen to us,  call  it a lack of training, whatever your want, i just know that a diluted talent pool leads to diluted talent.  I know i couldnt wait to leave, and good replacements....well....nough said.

[Already Gone]

Maybe I missed it, but where are all the retractions from everyone who jumped on the assumption that the whole incident was lazy ELT's blowing off entire daily primary samples for months?

What we find when we hear the whole story is a picture of widespread integrity violations, which also included several ELT's blowing off or recording false values for ONE analysis that they seem to have been unable to do properly.  It seems pretty obvious here that nobody on that boat was willing to admit that they had a problem for fear of being berated by a CO with an ego problem.

I'm spewing milk out of my nose at all the former O-gangers here who claim to have consistently busted the ELT's on their BS.  Brother, you only caught the easy ones.  Every ELT has a bad day once in awhile, but the ratio of times that you threw the flag to the number of times that they put one right past you would require scientific notation to fit on this screen.  There was a reason we called you Zeroes.

I used to "love" those times when some JO decided to change the S/G additions by 10 grams, when we consistently added 50 grams "for the pot" anyway.  Those nomographs said one thing, but we knew how much to really add to get the numbers we wanted.  No Lt. (j.g.) with a ruler and a 5th generation Xerox copy of the nomograph was ever going to change that.  My favorite instance was when a smirking EOOW told Barry Jackson that he had changed his calculation.  Barry's answer told the whole story:  "It doesn't matter, I'm going to add what I want anyway."

Only once did I ever alter my addition because an officer told me to.  I did it to spite him.  The dumbass wouldn't listen, so I did what he told me to do.  The hideout return was ridiculous on a boat that old, and the resulting blowdowns called much attention to the ill-advised addition of chemicals just before shutting down.  He never changed my calculations again.

Integrity didn't even come into play.  We did what we knew to keep the plant in shape and the numbers in spec - sometimes despite the guidance we got from the khaki-klad-klub.

I don't know what the hell a "pink" analysis is, but it is obviously not a daily requirement.  There were a few like that when I was an ELT.  Chlorides and Oxygen were rarely analyzed, and it almost always took a couple of tries to get them right.  In my day, they both required a messy procedure and a color change that was barely perceptible as well as different from that of an identical analisys of S/G water.  Anyway, it was common to screw these up and have to do them over a couple of times.  On a boat where it doesn't seem to matter, the temptation to just blow it off is probably just too hard to pass up.

[Marlin]

Nuclear phenomenon, and PFM were generally understood by most to the O-gangers on my boats. Once in a while a Junior officer would be a little nervous or overly factitious, this was very annoying and we did not let them off the hook easily. The more senior the EOOW on watch the better, as there was a lot more practical understanding and lot less "what if?". This little dust up looks like a break down in a normally good system. The Navy does still have the best nuclear safety record in the world.

[rumrunner]

Integrity didn't even come into play.  We did what we knew to keep the plant in shape and the numbers in spec - sometimes despite the guidance we got from the khaki-klad-klub.

Be wary Beercourt.  I admitted to doing the same thing a few days ago and some members here implied that my parents were never married.   

An ELT who never did the same thing must have had a lot of red circles on their logs.  I worked in both all-volatile and tri/di plants, and regardless, you always had to "finesse" the chem add to get the desired results - which technically meant the log entries were not true.  But at least my plant chemistry was in spec. 

The Hampton affair sounds more like a Captain Queeg deal than it does a bunch of lazy ELTs blowing off the daily primary.

I wonder if the Captain in question liked strawberries?
 

[Gamecock]

I'm spewing milk out of my nose at all the former O-gangers here who claim to have consistently busted the ELT's on their BS.  Brother, you only caught the easy ones.  Every ELT has a bad day once in awhile, but the ratio of times that you threw the flag to the number of times that they put one right past you would require scientific notation to fit on this screen.  There was a reason we called you Zeroes.

I used to "love" those times when some JO decided to change the S/G additions by 10 grams, when we consistently added 50 grams "for the pot" anyway.  Those nomographs said one thing, but we knew how much to really add to get the numbers we wanted.  No Lt. (j.g.) with a ruler and a 5th generation Xerox copy of the nomograph was ever going to change that.  My favorite instance was when a smirking EOOW told Barry Jackson that he had changed his calculation.  Barry's answer told the whole story:  "It doesn't matter, I'm going to add what I want anyway."

My problem with stories like this is twofold.

First, integrity is one of the principles of the program.  You guys hide behind "I'm smarter then the watch officer and I therefore know better" persona if you want to make yourself feel better....but I openly question your integrity.  You guys chose the easy way out vice doing your job properly.  All nukes, officer and enlisted, are called upon to ask questions when they arise.  Instead of thinking the watch officer is an idiot or a jackass, take the time to show him why he's wrong and your right.  If he still disagrees, use your chain of command.....LPO, LCPO, DIVO.   There again, this is watchteam back-up, another principle of the program.  Blatantly disregarding an order from a senior is wrong, wrong, wrong!!!!

Second, there are lots of nuke wanna-be's and junior nukes who read these posts.  You openly advocate "getting one by" the watch officer.   These young guys are going to take that advice to heart and think that is the way things get done in the fleet.   Your are advocating actions that are contrary to the collective good.  Shame on you!!!

Oh, if Barry Jackson or any other watch stander, officer or enlisted had told me he was going to do whatever he wanted vice what I said as the EOOW, we would have issues.  I would have called RL Div LPO, LCPO, and CRA to the box and we all would have had a discussion in regards to formality, compliance with procedures, and disrespect prior to me authorizing the add.

Before you slam on me for not understanding what I speak of, I was enlisted for eight+ years prior to getting commissioned, so I have walked a mile in your shoes.

[ddklbl]

I think we've come to the determination that integrity has been a problem in the the navy for quite some time. 

Some boats are better.  Some not so much.

No new lessons learned.

[HydroDave63]

So in this alternate universe of science-fiction, consider: The dog-eared Xeroxed nomogram comes from NAVSEA08, and isn't updated constantly, yet the ELT knows from experience and RL div turnovers that hideout returns and other recent experience that a certain amount of +/- bandwidth is merited. Is the LtJG really going to listen to the explanation and debate how many angels dance on the head of a pin, or simply say the ELT is being insubordinate and go do it my way or else?!? Who is going to fetch the RL divO at 0315? Should the ELT bring all data from the last 20 samples? Or,perhaps if said LtJG demands such precision, why didn't LtJG review all of the ELT data , Rx Divs last couple long-form pre-crits and maybe brush height on the TGs prior to taking the watch??? There were two bowls of strawberries left....


BTW, I do concur, Barry Jackson should not have said it aloud, and with the caveat that his math and prior chem results on the boat better have supported his add (which I suspect they did)

[DDMurray]

I think we're seeing the different ways people look at integrity.  WRT the discussion on secondary chemistry, there is a source document that provides an avenue to discuss or recommend changes to the WCM/RPM.  We saw this on S6W.  After providing logs for review, the technical agency revised the source document so the amount of chemicals to add were changed.  After several months of data, the numbers were tweaked again.  Also, we now use a program to calculate most of our adds so the nomographs are not necessarily needed.  You can't follow it blindly, but when used properly it makes the ELTs' (and EOOW/EWS) job easier.  I'm sure plenty of ex-ELTs (or current ELTs) will disagree.  In the case of the Hampton, they logged analysis results for a sample they didn't analyze for (actual one analysis that's part of a sample) and they forged the CO's signature on more than one occasion.  In both of these cases, there were procedures in place to cover these situations; however, the command climate made doing the right thing too hard for these guys (or they perceived it to be too hard).  The integrity problems with the CTP were found while pulling the string on the other events.
   Integrity is much more complicated than doing the right thing even while nobody is watching (more or less the litmus test used when I first qualified at NPTU in 1985).  The program is trying to teach integrity in a non-zero defect mentality.  By the time a nuke goes in-hull at NPTU his training on integrity has transitioned to the fleet expectation and he/she's expected to fully understand the standard.  Again, plenty of you may disagree, but this is what I was recently briefed on.

[ddklbl]

This is such horse s#@$.

You cannot tell me that any of you old dogs think that what you did, in completely undermining the authority of the watchofficer, was the right thing to do.  Yes you may have been right, but you are obligated to get the EOOW on board with why he is wrong and why your way is better.  If he won't listen to you, then you go to his boss, and have it explained to the EOOW from the top down, vice bottom up. 

The watch team cannot keep secrets from each other.  Disrespect, like the chain of command, goes up and down.  An underlying culture like that (of complete disrespect for authority, up and down) culminates in the same results as the hampton.   

The nuclear navy is unique in that the juniorest of men can stop an evolution if it is wrong.  No where does that responsibility give him the right to give the finger to his EOOW and completely ignore an order and do it his way regardless.  If the order is wrong then you stop and get it straightend out; including "adds for Grandma" to the pot.  Get a good order and carry on. 

It just really bothers me that Moderators and other established members of this forum would condone and advocate this behavior, to do what you think is better, counter to established regulation.  You follow the rules.  If you don't like them, fight to change them.  But you follow them until then.  I just can't believe I'm hearing this s#$%, coming from an older generation, who tells us the navy isn't what it used to be; how the program has slid.  From what I read here you are just as much to blame as anyone.  All of us have blood on our hands.

And for what it's worth, past chemistry, precrits and visual inspections of all generating equipment are supposed to be part of the EOOW's prewatch tour.  Whether or not he looks at those items is on him.


edited for language by pwhoppe

[rumrunner]

Well, dd...your excrement disbelief aside, the fact is that "doing the right thing" your way wouldn't get it at 0315 when the primary was isolated in the bomb.  I can't see the chain of command solemnly entering maneuvering to debate a generator add - at least not in my "old" Navy.  We "did the right thing" by keeping things in spec by doing what we needed to do.  By the way...that is the way I was taught at prototype - both by Navy and GE personnel.  If that offends you then all I can say is tango sierra.  My generators on the Nimitz were inspected in 1984 and all they found were a few marble-sized balls of black stuff.  Otherwise they looked almost new.  I am proud of that.

>>All of us have blood on our hands.<<

Oh please.  Herman Goering had blood on his hands.  To use that metaphor with regard to NAVSEA08 is really going over the top.

[rumrunner]

there are lots of nuke wanna-be's and junior nukes who read these posts.  You openly advocate "getting one by" the watch officer.   These young guys are going to take that advice to heart and think that is the way things get done in the fleet.   Your are advocating actions that are contrary to the collective good.  Shame on you!!! 

Don't overestimate the readership of this board.  I seriously doubt the whole nuclear fleet will collapse into ruin because of what we post here.

What I am posting is the reality of nuclear fleet life almost 30 years ago. 

[JsonD13]

I can say this about the situation, as a person that has a life, I want to go home at the end of my day.  When the collective Navy COC brings in TSO's, Nuc Notes, and etc., on top of the NAVSEA instructions and tech manuals, in most cases it takes much longer to get things done (if you have seen it take over a day to get S/G chemistry back in spec with just one b/d and add, you know what im talking about).  It is one thing to bicker about integrity and whether anyone has it or not (which I believe we all do to a degree), but when you are pushed and pushed day in and day out to get stuff done on time so you and/or your shipmates and COC can go home, you feel that stress on you.  Most of the time, you are the only one alone in the "integrity fight", trying to do what's right. I fought that fight for a long time, and I've had it.  It is my personal belief that the program has gotten too political, with our zero-defect mentality (trust me its there), and the addition of rules upon rules (especially when there is a critique or incident) for it to work with 100% integrity.  The answer lies not in adding more requirements, but relaxing them a bit, and training operators to have the knowledge to do what is needed. 
Now as far as a JO telling you (with the enlisted person having years more experience in most cases) that you are wrong, sometimes it takes an attitude like that previously mentioned to do things right.  How many of you would have called in your COC from at home to yell at a JO for not approving a S/G add correctly?  How many of your Chiefs, DIVO's, etc. would have told you to man up on it?  If the watch officer had a question about this, they "should" have the knowledge to do the calculation themselves and they should be involved enough with the situation (the guy was qualified right?  he should have seen an add before) to know if the nomographs are wrong.  What was mentioned was obviously an example of someone that needed to feel more control over their life. 

[G-reg]

I've been holding off on posting here, but since I start my own terminal leave in a few days (McLovin' beat me by a week), here goes nothin'...

I understand and acknowledge what Gamecock & dd are saying.  Professionalism, formality, and integrity are all cornerstones of the Navy Nuclear program.  Everyone should strive to live up to these principles.

But the bad news is that we live in an imperfect world.  There are people running around in various chains of command with anchors, bars, and oak leaves on their collars who simply don't deserve to wear them.  And sometimes, these particular people even make it to the top of the food chain (and from time to time, these people even get fired).  Granted, these particular people do make up the minority of leadership.  But sometimes (as the Hampton illustrates in a very over-the-top manner), the chain of command itself makes problems worse.  The chain of command usually DOES work most of the time in most of the places, but that certainly doesn't mean it works every time, everywhere.  I'm pretty sure all of us know of commands where the chain was dysfunctional in one way or another.

And also, there are times in this imperfect world when you get caught between a rock and a hard place - when there just simply isn't any "right" answer.  For example, let's say that there are two instructions for a certain ELT record, and these two instructions tell you to perform a certain calculation in exactly opposite ways.  Whichever method you chose to go along with, you are VIOLATING the requirements of the other instruction.  And then let's say you actually do go up the chain all the way to the ivory tower itself, and the people there say that it isn't worth the money it would cost to revise one instruction or the other, so the two conflicting requirements both end up standing as written.  How can there be a right answer when either way you go, a higher-authority requirement tells you that you are doing it the wrong way?  (By the way, this particular example isn't just a hypothetical thought-problem.)  In most cases, a "correct" answer can be found (or at least figured out), but there are still some true dilemmas which exist and simply have no "correct" answers.

It would be truly great if the chain of command always solved problems, but the people in the chain of command are only human, and are therefore prone to be imperfect.  But even with our imperfections, when we gather together in numbers, we usually come up with the right answer.  Usually.

Professionalism, formality, and integrity should be practiced to the utmost every day.  And when faced with a situation where there is no right answer, all you can do is the best that you can do.  In a system which has imperfections built right into it, and which cannot possibly foresee every situation that does arise in real life, sometimes the rules fail us.  If you find yourself in one of those unfortunate situations, just do the very best that you can based on your own professionalism, formality, and integrity; I cannot ask more from you than that.

My own humble thoughts.

And if anyone is looking for a 100% Go-Navy website, I recommend www.navy.com.

Peace, everyone.

[Preciousblue1965]

Well I can tell you right now that the Navy only practices what it preaches when it is beneficial to do so.  Case in point.  The pipeline.  3 Years at Protohell and I saw 2 people get dropped for accademics.  I personally got reamed up one hole and out the other for giving a kid a 2.3 on his final board as a mechanic.  The knucklehead didn't know how a bearing worked or the oil flow through them.  I got reamed for giving "too hard" of checkouts just because I would throw people out if they hadn't even been down to look at the system.  The Navy has found that it is easier to replace their nukes than retain them.  They keep enough to man the higher ranks but few of those are the best we can find. 

Face it, we all either had highly "directed" study sheets for CTE's or used watch team backup to get through an MTT exam at some point.  Does it mean we didn't know what we were doing. NO.  It meant that we didn't memorize the most obscure nuiance in a 400 page book or memorize a 6 page procedure that we wouldn't attempt to do without the book anyway.  The tests nukes are giving are overly rediculous to begin with.  Instead of someone saying, hey what the ham sandwich and making them closer to real life LOK, we just make our way through and sacrifice the NUB to the ORSE gods to appease for our sins.

Sorry O-Gang but your enlisted guys are the experts.  Prior enlisted Officers are better than most but I swear something happens when you put on Khaki in that all of a sudden you expect everything to work out the way you were taught.  Well I shall step down from my soap box now.  Thank you.