How would you fix the NNPP

[NukeLDO]

  I remember being in three section shiftwork and the cook's were supposed to feed us after our shift, but when we'd get up to crew's mess at the same time every day there'd  be no food, and they'd have some lame excuse.  Once they tried to tell the swing shift that they should come in an hour and a half early for an eleven hour shift if they wanted food.  Now, counter that with the cone doing attack centers and training up in control.  They can't get people on station, can't run scenarios on time so we shift lunch from 1100 to 1200 at around 1030 that morning to accommodate them, instead of saving plates because they can't do their jobs right.  Nukes get off a long shift and get no food, are unable to eat during because everyone is on watch, that's too bad.

Ahh...I remember this well.  I mean how hard can it be to figure out how much food to prepare for a three section captive audience?  As EMC, I got tired of my guys getting off watch only to have PB&J.  Told the cooks that as the head of PhLAP (PHILADELPHIA Light and Power), it was our job to provide them with electricity, and their job to provide us with food.  Until they could figure out how not to run out of food, I would run out of electricity.  Removed rack lights and starters from the entire MS division racks.  Within a week, we always had food, including dessert, when we got off watch. 

[Preciousblue1965]

Ahh...I remember this well.  I mean how hard can it be to figure out how much food to prepare for a three section captive audience?  As EMC, I got tired of my guys getting off watch only to have PB&J.  Told the cooks that as the head of PhLAP (PHILADELPHIA Light and Power), it was our job to provide them with electricity, and their job to provide us with food.  Until they could figure out how not to run out of food, I would run out of electricity.  Removed rack lights and starters from the entire MS division racks.  Within a week, we always had food, including dessert, when we got off watch. 

Unfortunately this is what has to happen on occasion to get your point across.  We had an overzealous CHENG on the carrier that insisted that Rx Dept run drills during GQ(even though we ran drills every night when everyone else was asleep).  Well since we had a dedicated Rx Plant drill team, we had to be the ones to run all the drills, which mean that we would be up for very, very long hours if we ran GQ drills. So we started running SLR from the Reboiler(this is what supplies hot water to all the ship effectively) which required it be shut down and restarted. This process took a while depending on who the Reboiler watch was.  Well after the first couple of times when there was no hot water for showers, we got told to secure from Rx Plant drills during GQ. 

[PapaBear765]

Ahh...I remember this well.  I mean how hard can it be to figure out how much food to prepare for a three section captive audience?  ...

This one very special MS3 once forgot the onions in the French onion soup.

[floyd_n]

Soft toilet paper might help this program...... I could sand an entire car with a roll of the stuff we have.

[deltarho]

Soft toilet paper might help this program...... I could sand an entire car with a roll of the stuff we have.

Don't use the ones that come in the box labeled: NAVS#$%PERS.  Those are the ones you are supposed to scrub the heads with.  Those Supply Corps Officers are probably pulling pranks on you like they did us.  Just insist that they pass the Charmin or certain staterooms will suffer a loss of potable water accident.


Modified for language by moderator.

[nucwarrant]

If someone put me in charge to fix the manning issue and I had cart blanche authority here's what I would do:
All aspects of Navy nuclear power fall under the ED community.
There is no separation between submarine and surface. Officers and enlisted can get detailed to either. Your primary job is as an engineer specializing in nuclear propulsion. If you want to go URL later in your career (O-4 and above) then you apply at that time. You can qualify as an OOD but your primary job on the ship is in the engine room.
Enlisted structure
Initial enlistment is only a 4-year term.
There is only one enlisted rate - nuclear propulsion technician
Initial training for an enlisted person consists of a one-year hybrid of machinist mate and electrician mate skills (valve operation/repair, into to air compressors, heat exchangers, breaker/motor/generator PMS, etc) plus basic steam plant systems/operation and danger tag procedures. Don’t go deep into nuclear theory. Just hit the big picture. Give them a one-week course on radcon that introduces them to the various contamination &/radiation postings/concepts.
After school they go to the fleet and fill propulsion plant watch stations that do not affect reactivity. At the ship they’ll do OJT training in radcon so they can address spills, stand control point, etc. They’ll so their DC quals and submarine/ESWS quals. At the end of 4 years the goal is to be a proficient watch stander with the senior watch station being electrical distribution panel operator. Reenlistment options are 4-years which consist of two years at a nuclear support shore duty job then back to sea for two years or; six-year reenlistments where you’ll get 18 months of training consisting of nuclear power school/prototype (after which you’ll be qualified to stand the watch stations that do affect reactivity such as reactor operator, feed station, throttleman, etc.). You’ll get preliminary leadership training to be an engineering watch supervisor and specialized training in either electronics (so you can do testing/maintenance on reactor instrumentation) or chemistry (ELTs). The Navy works with academic institutions (why not the Naval Academy?) so that sailors at this level receive an AS degree in nuclear engineering technology. After this training they return to the fleet for 2-3 years and the final two years of the six-year enlistment is at a shore nuclear support job or 18 months to finish a BS degree in Engineering. The degree option would mean signing on for more time in the Navy either as enlisted or go to OCS and stay in the nuclear ED community. Now at the very least you have a sailor at the 10 year point with an AS degree who either wants to make it a career or get out with marketable skills.
Officer structure
Nuclear officers consist of a mix of EDs and LDO/CWO. An LDO/CWO who completes a 4-year engineering or technical degree can do a direct transfer to ED (W-2 or O-2, W-3/4 to 0-3, W-5 to 0-4). These are the fleet’s nuclear division officers, engineering deptartment heads, submarine chief engineers, EOOWs and Reactor Officers on CVNs. LDOs and CWOs can request to test for the NR PNEO exam but it’s not a requirement (passing PNEO allows them to fill the senior supervisory watch function or department head billets). While the requirement should be to get their EDO dolphins and/or surface equivalent, they won’t be prohibited from getting the URL version. Post-grad school options are restricted to a Masters in Engineering or Engineering Management.
In both cases, officer and enlisted, shore duty is limited to positions that directly support nuclear power. Such as shipyards, NR, NAVSEA design groups, prototypes, etc.

[Gamecock]

Nucwarrant,

Great first post.  Welcome to nukeworker.com.

Cheers,
GC

[HydroDave63]

nucwarrant, awesome! to ya!

I'd only add the following: swing the NNPP spoolpiece back from "pump" to "filter". Change the logo at Power School to "Fleet Needs More A-Gang". When the sections see a few Warcraft warriors take that stroll down Washout Lane, it will get the attention warranted. Perma-nubs in the fleet...go play unrep/vertrep/painting detail.

[NukeLDO]

OK Warrant.  Who's going to tear down and fix the machinery when it breaks?  While your proposal sounds nice, I'm not sure it keeps ships and submarines on station.  Although its headed more towards a "plug and play" design, if the TG isn't generating, you need that EM who can troubleshoot down to the component level. My experience is that it is the 1st and 2nd class petty officers, led by a competent chief, that make the difference between continuing the mission or pulling in for repairs.
So, what percentage of folks on a submarine are in that first four year timespan?  Alot of those 2nd classes who I'm counting on to fix what ever it is thats broken.  I firmly believe we need that detailed in-rate training.  Who else is going to figure out that the reason the hydrogen burner isn't burning is because the 25 cent thermocouple isn't putting out the right millivolt signal?
Oh, and welcome to the site.

[deltarho]

Don't use the ones that come in the box labeled: NAVS#$%PERS.

Modified for language by moderator.

Mr./Mrs. Graphite, why didn't you at least leave the "t" at the end? I thought the whole Navyese spelling of toilet paper would fly, but you could have at least kept the "t"??!!

How about NAV$#!+PERS?  Very obliquely similar--yet the 13-year olds that frequent the site should not be offended.

[deltarho]

If someone put me in charge to fix the manning issue and I had cart blanche authority here's what I would do:
All aspects of Navy nuclear power fall under the ED community.
  An LDO/CWO who completes a 4-year engineering or technical degree can do a direct transfer to ED (W-2 or O-2, W-3/4 to 0-3, W-5 to 0-4).

This is a very critical piece--very well thought out.  Seems a lot like the theory of evolution, though.  There is no link--no middle.  How do we get the LDO/WO population?  For the most part, (I think we all have met a CWO who made it so that he will get surfaced, thereby making the submariners sleep easier) LDOs and CWO are subject matter experts (SME).  How will you breed these under your plan? I think that the Navy should offer to do what they did when they brought back the battleships--they reinstated those with 16" gun experience.  I had a CMC with 42 fargin' years. Did 30==>retired; put 15 years in as a detective==> retired, Came back as a SME and was in his 13th year of trying for his second 30!

I realize those that come back may be rusty, but leadership and mentorship is priceless!

[NukeLDO]

As an LDO, why would I want to convert to ED? 

.

After school they go to the fleet and fill propulsion plant watch stations that do not affect reactivity. At the ship they’ll do OJT training in radcon so they can address spills, stand control point, etc. They’ll so their DC quals and submarine/ESWS quals. At the end of 4 years the goal is to be a proficient watch stander with the senior watch station being electrical distribution panel operator. Reenlistment options are 4-years which consist of two years at a nuclear support shore duty job then back to sea for two years or; six-year reenlistments where you’ll get 18 months of training consisting of nuclear power school/prototype (after which you’ll be qualified to stand the watch stations that do affect reactivity such as reactor operator, feed station, throttleman, etc.).

And in a submarine, what watchstations don't affect reactivity?  AEA and ?Everyone else, including Lower Level Louie, can screw you.  And on VA class, there are even fewer watchstanders, all with the ability to muster the rods on the bottom.

[nucwarrant]

Some people have commented on my post.  I’d like to respond.

Question - Who's going to tear down and fix the machinery when it breaks?

Answer - The sailors who get the initial hybrid MM/EM training will be introduced to the engineering fundamentals, use of technical manuals and troubleshooting before they go to their ships much as they do now.  The ones that decide to reenlist for nuke school will be trained to a deeper level.  They’ll be the ones who’ll lead on major underway repairs and direct the junior people.  The thing a lot of us overlook is that the engineers behind the scenes at NAVSEA really do a great job.  First, they design a nuclear plant that 20 year old kids can operate and can take the routine transients we put on them.  How many major underway engineering equipment failure that put you dead in the water does the fleet really experience?  I experienced one, maybe two, in 20 years.  Second, if you take the time to look at the NAVSEA equipment manuals you’ll find them for the most part to be very well written with just about all the technical information you need to troubleshoot/repair.

Question - what percentage of folks on a submarine are in that first four year timespan?

Answer - that depends on the number of watch station billets there are to fill at this level. I've been retired long enough that the submarine engineering watch station manning I knew has probably changed a little.

Question - How do we get the LDO/WO population?

Answer - That’s the easy part.  The good people are out there.  There’s a large number of qualified candidates that aren’t selected every year because the number of openings are limited.  If the Navy adjusted the number so that you had 1-2 full time LDO/CWOs EOOWs on submarines and 75% of the Engineering/Reactor Division Officers on CVNs were LDO/CWOs (the rest coming from the ED community) it would take about 3 years to establish the manning levels.  Once established, these people flow into the shore billets at shipyards, NAVSEA, prototypes, etc.

Question - For the most part, (I think we all have met a CWO who made it so that he will get surfaced, thereby making the submariners sleep easier) LDOs and CWO are subject matter experts (SME). How will you breed these under your plan?

Answer - First off, I have never met a CWO who “made it so that he will get surfaced”.  The selection process is too tight.  If you’re not technically competent and don't show the right leadership characteristics then you’re not going to get selected.  There may have been people you didn’t like for personality reasons who got selected that you place in this category but that’s another issue.  If a person who’s a real butt head makes CWO, trust me, we dealt with that when he/she tried to act that way in our community.  You want to wear the “blue breaks” in your gold then you better have your shit together or we’ll cut you out of the heard.  Same thing goes for LDOs.  I’ve seen E-6/7s with a cocky attitude when they put on their bars get chewed up as an ensign and not survive.   

How will we breed them?  My whole approach to the change deals with the mental shift in the Navy organization that being a nuclear operator/engineer in the Navy is a profession.  Go back 100 years and the Navy had a prominent, separate engineering branch.  It may be time to reinstate that organization structure starting with nuclear.  Remember “It’s not just a job”?  Well it is just a job.  But, it’s a very good, specialized job where you can learn a lot, have a good career and make a very good living for yourself and your family. 

The junior enlisted nukes would be much like the new non-licensed equipment operators in the civilian plants.  They get preliminary fundamental training, there’s a lot of on-the job-training, they start doing the job and continue to learn.  After several years they may want to go for that next step as a reactor operator and can even see becoming an EOOW in their future.  The whole time they’re learning more about their profession and progressing.  For example, you’re an E-3 in initial training.  you start by learning about different types of valves (check, globe, gate, etc.), their characteristics and applications.  Then learning how to repair each type.  Flash forward 8 years and your learning about obsolescence management and how to select the proper replacement for a certain valve that’s no longer available.  Finally, our E-3 is an O-3 working at NAVSEA designing a fresh water system and figuring out what the combined head loss of the system will be based on the valves he’s selected.

This is the future we could map out and present to some kid coming out of high school.  A lot of the pieces are already in place but there are too many barriers in the Navy right now to make it flow smoothly to where you could really sell it.  Rice bowls and politics are tough things to overcome.

[deltarho]

Question - For the most part, (I think we all have met a CWO who made it so that he will get surfaced, thereby making the submariners sleep easier) LDOs and CWO are subject matter experts (SME). How will you breed these under your plan?

Answer - First off, I have never met a CWO who “made it so that he will get surfaced”.  The selection process is too tight.  If you’re not technically competent and don't show the right leadership characteristics then you’re not going to get selected.  There may have been people you didn’t like for personality reasons who got selected that you place in this category but that’s another issue.  If a person who’s a real butt head makes CWO, trust me, we dealt with that when he/she tried to act that way in our community.  You want to wear the “blue breaks” in your gold then you better have your shit together or we’ll cut you out of the heard.  Same thing goes for LDOs.  I’ve seen E-6/7s with a cocky attitude when they put on their bars get chewed up as an ensign and not survive.  

I hope that when you said that you never met a CWO who made it so that he will get surfaced, that you were not insinuating that this never once happened.  You would be correct; I know that it happened twice.  Truth travels from below just like it does when you get a new Electrical Officer that used to be the MPA on another ship.  Time in grade, he should be up for Engineer, but instead is on a Get Well Tour--verifiable, whether you like him or not.  Or how about the Ensign that gets transferred from coast to coast, way before his periodicity.  I suppose we could never find out that he was targeting West Pac Widows (enlisted) and was transfered for his personal safety--verifiable, whether you like him or not.

As for the cocky LDOs and CWOs, they faced their doom while standing watch in the box.  MMs are like sharks that smell blood...

I will point out that I attempted to preface my comment by saying "For the most part, LDOs and CWO are subject matter experts (SME).

That said, you have a plan to infuse the initial increased demand, but down the road, when the baby nukes are not getting the experience in the time frame they are now, who will be in line as the initial ones retire?

[Preciousblue1965]

Well I must say that this thread has returned from the grave to be once again lively and kicking.

Didn't deal too much with CWOs, although we did have a MPTA that was a CWO.  He used to be a Chief that taught at NFAS(he actually was the guy to show us how to operate a NASH Compressor).  He was a Sub guy and really good at his job.  We also had some LDOs that were sub guys, and they too were pretty decent PPWOs. 

[DDMurray]

From Navy Nuke > Getting In:

I know ... I know.  I stand guilty.  Please don't use the wet noodle on me.  I'll do anything to avoid the penalty that makes keel-hauling look like a game of patty-cake! 

I am not accusing anyone specifically.  They thought (the brainy ones ... to which I don't claim to be) that they could make the program more cost effective.  Just like the rest of Corporate America at the time.  Lean and Mean!  You know?  It didn't work.  But, of course this policy will not get the required attention because it is the cost of doing business today.

But, no one is giving the policy a second look because they now accept it as standard operating practice.

So, many more manning/staffing issues will manifest along the way also.  Retention is going to be an issue ... hold it it already is.  Military bearing issues will continue to be a problem ... hold it they just got worse.  The quality of life will remain at the bottom of the sea ... hold it this has happened before.

In total the decisions that were made to reduce the training cost are part of the acceptable parameters considered for its use.  Unless someone causes an incident or accident this will not change.  And, to top it off it will be to late to correct it even then.

Aviation has seen the same loss of competence due to the needs of the industry.  It will always come down to the cost!  No matter the cost in the end.  Today it looks good.  But if and when this blows up in some ones face it can be blamed on the somebody that instituted it years ago.  Even though it was your command and you didn't complain you now get to right the ship you just run aground.  And, that normally means more money but doesn't mean more responsibility.  Does any of this sound familiar?  It looks good on paper and the cost savings are wonderful.  But, the side effects will cost you more money in hidden costs and over-runs.  Sound familiar?  No one will complain because we can just print more paper.  Sound familiar?  It should it is history repeating itself.

When you don't ex-communicate the drift-wood from the program early on things kind of happen.  And, these problems never go away.

We had a 3.95 MM in my section at NNPS.  On the day before comp he was removed for non-academic reasons.  He violated a direct order from our SA.  That sounds bad right?  Not really.  At least to him.  He had good reasons.  He had been living off base with a girl.  He was late for the class day before comp by 3 minutes (approximately).  He even confessed his sins to the SA in hopes of saving himself because he was a 3.95 student you know.  He didn't even get to come back to class and say good-bye.  Gone to the conventional surface with a used to be 3.95 avg at power school.  We all tried to get him to not stay off base.  But, would always tell us that we were suckers and losers (we didn't have a 3.95 avg you know) for following orders and what not. 

Now you let a chump like this into the fleet as a Nuke and see what trouble you get as a result.  He had good grades you know!  He was a drift-wood that would sink a ship and kill his shipmates with his attitude.  He got caught just like all the rest when we went through.  Supply an under-age person with al'key and you were gone.  As they also.  Try to run from SP and you were gone inside of an hour.  Etc.   

Did we have problems?  Yes.  Did we have retention issues?  Yes.  Did we go to sea a lot?  Yes.

So much for doing the right thing.  The navy had better be looking at this in the regards as a big problem.  With serious outcomes that could be manifested due to there own policies.

I hope and pray they do.

Let me get this straight.  You're saying that if we're going to have retention problems anyway, why not cut our losses early and keep those who can make the grade and maintain an acceptable level of military bearing?  I like it. 

My guess is that your 3.95 student was late more than that one time.  When I was a student at Orlando NNPS and later staff there, there was a sign that said words to the effect that the smartest students have to work as hard as the weaker students.  I think one of the problems with keeping the academic or military problem children is the fact that the staff should be working to make our good Sailors great.  Most of the people are good, but many students are not challenged because the staff spends so much time on the problem students.

DM

[NukeLDO]

So to summarize in the form of a question:
  Are we sacrificing competence for compliance?

[HydroDave63]

So to summarize in the form of a question:
  Are we sacrificing competence for compliance?

Considering the recent training compromises, radioed radiochemistry, sub collisions with slow moving fishing vessels and undersea mounts.... I'd say that BOTH were sacrificed , starting in the Ahab & Jezebel days (early 90s)....

[Smooth Operator]

Speaking of radiochemistry.....

One of my favorite stories, when I was a nub-spu was when my LELT told this from his LELT stint on the Alabama...

"My junior ELT was in his LOK interview with the ORSE board member when asked: explain to me radiochemistry"

The junior ELT when very quiet and nervous and responded to the interviewer,

"Sir, we don't do that here."

[HydroDave63]

Fail them early and Fail them often.  Only then will the strong survive.

Success begets Success.

FNMA

Fleet Needs More A-gang

[withroaj]

Sounds like both if you are asking me. 

1st,  the training isn't as rigorous: Just look at the pass rate.
2nd, the compliance is to pass substandard sailors if I'm reading the posts correctly: And, the verification is the fleet's performance.

So, it seems ... at least to me ... that we have some work to do at a higher level than the chief/blue-shirt area ... that really means from the CNO down.  Fail them early and Fail them often.  Only then will the strong survive.

Success begets Success.

Seems to me that we'd have to downsize the nuclear fleet in order to achieve the attrition rate you're looking for.  I'm all about scaling back U.S. military operations to the Western Hemisphere ( IMO our global military presence is financially unsustainable -- but that's a topic for another section), but that doesn't seem to be on anybody's agenda any time soon. 

Our nuclear powered ships are the keystone of our maritime strategy, and we need people to fill the positions to keep the ships steaming.  As it is now it feels like new nukes for the fleet are on back-order, and the curriculum in the pipeline consists of a lot of binge-and-purge systems and procedures.  That leaves the boats to teach them from the ground up no matter what.  As long as new guys show up to the boat with a good attitude and a decent grasp on fundamentals and theory, I couldn't care less about their GPA.  We need people.

So to summarize in the form of a question:
  Are we sacrificing competence for compliance?

Sir, that is one of the better questions a person can ask about the program.  I can tell you that sometimes it feels like we blue shirts aren't allowed to think at work.  We have procedures in place for everything we are allowed to do, and if we hit a point in corrective maintenance or equipment troubleshooting that isn't covered in a procedure we aren't allowed to proceed until we have a procedure written to address the matter.

Under most circumstances this doesn't cause too much trouble since we have trusty old plant designs that have pretty much experienced everything you can do to 'em (though I remember some times in EOH in which it felt like we were the first submarine ever to undergo an overhaul).  The problems arise with the new gear we are getting.  If we encounter a problem we aren't allowed to think through it, and we can't even directly contact the prime contractor for advice.  We have to play through the middle man (nothing against the good folks at RPCO -- they are good people), which turns a two hour fix into a two week fix.

When we're locked into procedures without the option to provide feedback or consider methods to streamline our process it begins to discourage thought into the process.  The terrible thing is that I consider myself to be a pretty good operator just because I can open the book to the correct procedure in less than a few seconds to do just about anything (and because I've been known to SMOKE an ORSE LOK interview or two).  Now that you bring up your question it makes me wonder if I'm actually an incompetent, but compliant operator.

[HydroDave63]

Buttery Johnson's cinnamon roll Karma to ya!

Seems to me that we'd have to downsize the nuclear fleet in order to achieve the attrition rate you're looking for. 

A whole lot of nuke billets go away with the decommissioning of CVN-65 in 2013 (planned) , so running the timeline back a bit, NAVSEA08 should make some big decisions NOW on whether they want their nuclear propulsion program of the 21st century to look more like Rickover or more like JAG: The Next Generation. Once they cowboy up and decide to start adding more bleach to the gene pool, staffing should still meet needs.

[NukeLDO]

There are procedures for providing feedback on procedures that don't work. 
However, being able to perform a procedure as written does not imbue the operator with competence.  Understanding why the procedure is executed in the specific manner it is sequenced and what to expect as a result of each action performed, and the overall affect on the rest of the plant is competence.  It also helps the operator to diagnose problems.
The other side of this coin is that just because something is written down in a procedure doesn't necessarily mean it is right or will work.  This is particularly true of some of this new gear you've seen your bretheren RC Divver's deal with.  When I toured SEAWOLF during new construction, the RPM was full of yellow stickies!  That's why the 6G RPM has over a thousand revs to it, and your beloved Water Chem manual is more yellow paper than white.  A true operator recognizes the instruction doesn't make sense and raises the question until it is resolved to his satisfaction.
They used to issue wallet cards upon graduation from prototype.  I don't think they do that any more, but here's what it said:
  Nuclear Propulsion Plant Operator:  Tough-minded, skeptical, sometimes even cantankerous.  Always thinking WHAT IF?  He makes the difference between safe and effective power plant operation and unacceptable risk.

[G-reg]

... it makes me wonder if I'm actually an incompetent, but compliant operator.

The above statement puzzles me.

An individual who:
 - Knows the procedure,
 - Can/does USE the procedure,
 - Knows what to do when the procedure doesn't work,
 - Has the proper mindset to actually stop until the procedure gets fixed (instead of saying, "Yeah the procedure says such-and-such, but I know THIS will work"),
 - Possesses sufficient understanding to formulate (if not individually authorize) a viable remedy for recovering from a mess,
is the closest thing to an IDEAL operator that I can come up with.

[BuddyThePug]

I think we need to stop telling these kids right from the get-go that they are the "cream of the cream of the crop", the "top 10% of the Navy's intelligence", etc. They get it in their heads at the recruiting station and from the MEPS classifiers. Heads become further inflated at NFAS, straight off the plane from RTC (they did it 9 years ago, I'm sure they still do). This feeling of invincibility and superb-ness is bred into our replacements by ourselves, and we sit here and wonder why we catch them blazing logs, being dink, blah blah.

NO doubt! Here is the speech they need to hear when they get to Power School: