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Offline Pirate Bob

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #375 on: Dec 07, 2008, 04:52 »
*edited*  Sometimes I just need to learn to keep quiet.  I guess that makes one more faux pas for me.
« Last Edit: Dec 13, 2008, 02:40 by Pirate Bob »

JustinHEMI05

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #376 on: Dec 07, 2008, 06:04 »
Your concerns are understandable, but there is a truth you are going to learn very soon. That being that you learn the important stuff that you need to know on watch and through experience. Sure, anyone can memorize a list of facts about something, but it doesn't really lend anything to true understand. The whole qual path in prototype is BS, and you are seeing what it is really like. They just want you on watch. You can't test or learn instinct and experience in a book or a checkout. You don't need to be able to classify a bunch of pumps or spout off a memorize paragraph about why water is a good moderator to stand watch, and that is why they are being liberal with the pen. You will see, trust me.

Justin

PS It should be noted that rather refreshingly, the commercial world has yet to require me to memorize useless things like the classification of the bilge pump.
« Last Edit: Dec 07, 2008, 06:06 by JustinHEMI »

Offline deltarho

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #377 on: Dec 08, 2008, 04:24 »
I haven't looked at all the past posts on this topic, so please forgive me if I'm repeating anything here.

When I was in prototype (NY), things seemed to be a little bit more difficult.  Yes, there were some sigs that got blazed, but I really did have to know at least the basics (and sometimes, a very deep understanding) for most of the checkouts.  It was ESPECIALLY difficult for End-of-Cards.  I'm not whining about that, though.  I actually learned a lot.

Now, I have been on the ship for a little over a week, and I have really only had one sig not blazed, while all of the rest of it (more than 3/4ths of the qual sheet) had some hot pens working.  I almost feel cheated.  I really do want to learn this stuff, and some of the sigs did include some of the senior guys teaching me what I was supposed to be telling them, but overall the feeling is that I just give my card to people so they can sign and then I'm on my own for board.  Why not just have people have to put in a few hours in the plant and then go to board when they feel ready?

I feel that I learned more in prototype, but I haven't been out here long enough to say too much.  Maybe the learning will be crammed in right before my board.  *shrugs*  I sure as hell don't know how people get dinq here.

Only a little jaded here, that's all.  ::)

The EDM (Engineering Department Manual) delineates what, as a minimum, shall be required for qualifications. Each watch station qualification card has to contain these requirements or there is a "finding" during audits. The manual even shows what types of questions and the weighting compared to those supplemental questions not required by the EDM for watch standing qualification tests.

I am not sure when these requirements were first created, but they cover all bases from the bottom--up so that if an outside agency were to audit the program it would be considered sound.

Many believe the requirements they are graping are perfunctionary, just getting in the way of what you "really need to know" to stand watch. Hopefully, the sigs that were blazed were those items that you should be able to pick up on as you go. It does one a disservice when items like "Draw the BFPL curve. Show all..." are signed. Items like this is not a gimme and prototype should have taught you enough for you to know what you should be learning on the ship.

My best recommendation is to find someone about 3 months ahead of you in arriving time--same rate. This person can keep you 80% clued in to what you will run into. I also recommend finding someone out of rate for the same reason, for the cross-rate systems. You will never go wrong learning drawings and locations. Ask for the EDM and have someone show you where the knowledge requirements are so that you can write them down as homemade TGOs (Topical Guide Objectives). You will be the "heavy" and gain respect.

Always use your watchstanding time to your advantage. If you are the phone talker not actively taking logs or in a casualty response mode put on the sound powered phones and walk over to the EO, RO, Throttleman and get some systems training from the panels. Study notes. Pull out RPMs and SPMs and study. It is always nice to shoot the breeze about the movie you saw on AFRTS last night, but that won't keep you in line with your qualification curve.

Hope this helps...

deltarho
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PapaBear765

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #378 on: Dec 08, 2008, 06:32 »
I haven't looked at all the past posts on this topic, so please forgive me if I'm repeating anything here.

When I was in prototype (NY), things seemed to be a little bit more difficult.  Yes, there were some sigs that got blazed, but I really did have to know at least the basics (and sometimes, a very deep understanding) for most of the checkouts.  It was ESPECIALLY difficult for End-of-Cards.  I'm not whining about that, though.  I actually learned a lot.

Now, I have been on the ship for a little over a week, and I have really only had one sig not blazed, while all of the rest of it (more than 3/4ths of the qual sheet) had some hot pens working.  I almost feel cheated.  I really do want to learn this stuff, and some of the sigs did include some of the senior guys teaching me what I was supposed to be telling them, but overall the feeling is that I just give my card to people so they can sign and then I'm on my own for board.  Why not just have people have to put in a few hours in the plant and then go to board when they feel ready?

I feel that I learned more in prototype, but I haven't been out here long enough to say too much.  Maybe the learning will be crammed in right before my board.  *shrugs*  I sure as hell don't know how people get dinq here.

Only a little jaded here, that's all.  ::)

Yeah, that's how it was for me too.  Checkouts were legitimate at ptype, and far from it on my boat.  Usually the treatment that you're describing (unless you're exaggerating) is reserved for sea-returnees: their cards get signed to keep them ahead of the curve but it's on their a** to be ready for board.

Don't let it keep you from learning about your plant, though.


I used to be in the group that said "what you really need know" but I've found more common ground.  There are a lot of pointless checkouts at ptype, stuff that's too detailed to be required knowledge for a student who barely grasps how his panel works let alone the Support & Services Systems.  So, the ptype qual card could stand to have its fat trimmed drastically.  But in the fleet, on the boat that you're assigned to for ~4 yrs, on which you'll be standing watch as the sole person responsible for X...you should probably know as much as you can about the plant.

It's why people look down their nose at those who graduate from a trade school vice a research university—the graduates from college know more than the guy from the trade school who only knows "what he needs to know."  I guess you can argue that to operate a naval plant you don't need to know some things, but then there are those times that you do need to know them, the times that are unpredictable.

I was the forward watch stander this year for our yearly reactor accident drill, the accident was on my MTS while I was on watch.  Without getting into the details, because I knew the classification of the recirc pump I was able to thwart their drill scenario.  They had to tell us to "ignore that" and continue as they had planned for us.  Sure reactor accidents are the most unlikely situation, and I don't ever expect one to happen, but it shows that in those unpredictable situations having some "not required" or "superfluous" knowledge can make a difference.  More reasons why I don't like the perspective that when a ptype student passes his final board that means he's ready to stand watch.

PapaBear765

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #379 on: Dec 08, 2008, 06:35 »
The EDM (Engineering Department Manual) delineates what, as a minimum, shall be required for qualifications. Each watch station qualification card has to contain these requirements or there is a "finding" during audits. The manual even shows what types of questions and the weighting compared to those supplemental questions not required by the EDM for watch standing qualification tests.

I am not sure when these requirements were first created, but they cover all bases from the bottom--up so that if an outside agency were to audit the program it would be considered sound.

...

deltarho

The EDM was on Rev. 4 when I left for the good life at ptype, and it's been rev'd a couple times since.  I don't remember it being that specific.  I remember having to create/revise our department instruction that was essentially the ptype Volume I.  Has the EDM become as specific as you describe?
« Last Edit: Dec 09, 2008, 05:16 by PapaBear765 »

Cycoticpenguin

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #380 on: Dec 08, 2008, 11:14 »
I haven't looked at all the past posts on this topic, so please forgive me if I'm repeating anything here.

When I was in prototype (NY), things seemed to be a little bit more difficult.  Yes, there were some sigs that got blazed, but I really did have to know at least the basics (and sometimes, a very deep understanding) for most of the checkouts.  It was ESPECIALLY difficult for End-of-Cards.  I'm not whining about that, though.  I actually learned a lot.

Now, I have been on the ship for a little over a week, and I have really only had one sig not blazed, while all of the rest of it (more than 3/4ths of the qual sheet) had some hot pens working.  I almost feel cheated.  I really do want to learn this stuff, and some of the sigs did include some of the senior guys teaching me what I was supposed to be telling them, but overall the feeling is that I just give my card to people so they can sign and then I'm on my own for board.  Why not just have people have to put in a few hours in the plant and then go to board when they feel ready?

I feel that I learned more in prototype, but I haven't been out here long enough to say too much.  Maybe the learning will be crammed in right before my board.  *shrugs*  I sure as hell don't know how people get dinq here.

Only a little jaded here, that's all.  ::)


qual cards get filled out quickly... good luck on your boards if you think they are going to be easy. Keep in mind your PA, and ultimately the RO and Captain have to sign your qual cards. if you think they are going to blaze your card, you are in for a rude awakening.

once you start getting in the plant, you will realize how LITTLE you do know.

edit : as far as blazing quals, that one's completely up to you. You should be able to distinguish between someone who will give you a real checkout and someone who will just sign your card. both have their place, but dont "complain" that your RAR tour got "blazed" off. Also, if you get stuck on boards for bneq, start bugging RT for a LR qual card and start on that while you wait.

« Last Edit: Dec 08, 2008, 11:18 by Nuclear Janitor »

Offline Preciousblue1965

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #381 on: Dec 08, 2008, 12:49 »
As far as cards getting blazed off, I agree that sometimes it is not a big deal because the item being signed is something that almost never happens or is not really applicable because of the way things are operated.  Most people that sign your card will usually tell you when this is the case, sometimes they will even tell you the right answer too(this is why it is good to find "salty" types to sign your cards, they really do know a lot). 

However, I will attest to the fact that no matter how difficult or easy your checkout and qualification process is,  you will not know anything until you stand the watch, on your own, for at least a dozen times.  Even then you will not learn much until you do the start ups and shut down and drills.  It is only in a dynamic plant do you really get to see how things work together.  Steady State steaming will teach you how to take your logs efficiently and that is about it.  Drills are your friend for learning your watch.  You will know when you have truly mastered your watchstation when you no longer fear drills, could effectively(though not recommended) start up your equipment with no procedure, and you have trained a few people that are new on how something works.  Oh and throw in some infrequent maintenance procedures on your equipment for good measure. 

Once you have mastered all those watches for your rate, then you can move on to supervisory watches such as ERS, CMO, CRW, EWS, PPWS, etc. 
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Offline arduousartifice

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #382 on: Dec 11, 2008, 06:15 »
On a different subject:  I think perhaps the phrase "one crew, one screw" is used too much.  To preface this post, I am not impartial on this subject, much of what I discuss frustrates me greatly, and I am seeking a bit of perspective on it from those who have a better perspective than I.

Anyway, it seems to me that many people do not get out of the Navy because they don't like nuclear power, or because they don't like going underway, but because it is somehow one of the most frustrating experiences they encounter in their life (to that point at least).  I am not referring to the host of work controls and procedures, they have their place, but to the inane and ridiculous things commands do to solve perceived problems.

Examples:
1.  One day the squadron's shipyard representative and the COB were touring through berthing and they lifted a rack pan and a found partially crushed soda can someone had used as a spitter.  I agree that is disgusting and wrong, and the responsible party should be punished appropriately.  However, I do not believe the whole crew was responsible, or that the command response was appropriate (ban cans and dip, whole crew field day aft berthing at 1830) and productive for a boat trying to come out of overhaul.
2.  The day before Thanksgiving much of the crew spent the morning and early afternoon without any real guidance on what to do to get out, the command had put a ban on PMS greater than weekly so nothing would break before fast cruise/sea trials, so most divisions did not have much work to do.  Round 1500 we were mustered topside and given a sizable list of things to finish before anyone could go home.  We ended up finishing the work day around 1800, but we could have been done by 1500 if the command, who knew what needed to be done, had put it out to people at morning quarters.
3.  Another time the command decided to ban all portable electronics that play music.  The reasoning, as near as I can determine is as follows:  We caught an electrician charging an Ipod in maneuvering, he refused to surrender the Ipod to the Eng (problem).  Electrician relieved from watchstanding pending punishment (immediate corrective action).  Why was Ipod being charged in maneuvering?  Because there are no power strips in berthing, so he can't charge it in his rack, and there is some turd who likes to burgle people on board until he's caught and TDU'd.  Possible solutions:  Put power strips in berthing and try to find the thief, or ban electronics.  Solution:  Ban electronics, mast electrician for article 92 (failure to obey lawful order), EMI for other maneuvering area watchstanders.

I stopped at three, but could go on.  The point is, many times the problem is isolated to an individual, or a small group, or no one, but everyone suffers for it.  I think the "one crew, one screw," "the shaft's back aft" mentality is highly detrimental to the Navy, in retention and moral.  I remember being in three section shiftwork and the cook's were supposed to feed us after our shift, but when we'd get up to crew's mess at the same time every day there'd  be no food, and they'd have some lame excuse.  Once they tried to tell the swing shift that they should come in an hour and a half early for an eleven hour shift if they wanted food.  Now, counter that with the cone doing attack centers and training up in control.  They can't get people on station, can't run scenarios on time so we shift lunch from 1100 to 1200 at around 1030 that morning to accommodate them, instead of saving plates because they can't do their jobs right.  Nukes get off a long shift and get no food, are unable to eat during because everyone is on watch, that's too bad.

Anyway, I know that sometimes it is just an individual who sucks, but after seeing a full command change out and the same crap continue, I'm beginning to think its a problem inherent in the Navy's way of thinking.  I wish I had some solution, some brilliant philosophical or practical insight I could contribute, but I don't.  Instead all I have to say is that there are a few things which seem very important: planning, execution, delegation, perspective, moderation.  Planning not just the overall ship's schedule, but also the day's work.  I have seen failure to plan/poor planning coupled with stubbornness on command level, department level, and divisional level, and questioning the plan seems to always be treated as heresy.  Execution and delegation seem to fail simultaneously.  When there is a plan it goes like this:  item X will happen, then we can do Y, which allows Z, go.  Then nothing happens because no one was delegated to execute the plan.  Perspective and moderation also go hand in hand.  So often the command seems to respond in a knee jerk, choosing a poor response to a perceived crisis that was only a problem, then, unwilling to retract their knee jerk (for fear of undermining command authority?) they keep on their flawed path, to the frustration of all.  So perspective seems needed in making decisions, or at least a couple deep breaths, and a sense of moderation, rather than rushing to an extreme (this is now banned because we found one where it shouldn't be) immediately.

That's my thoughts, I know from where I am I don't always see things the way they actually are, but perception is reality (man, are the people in charge fond of quoting that one), so for me that is reality.  I find it disturbing that as nukes we are trained to know the why, to always analyze trends, to do all this critical thinking about the plant.  They train us for it, then when we use that training to examine command decisions, they suddenly want us to just accept it and do as we're told.  I know its a military way of thinking, but a military way of thinking was also once "let's line up in a large field across from each other and shoot each other, then we can charge and get some good hand to hand combat in."  Different situations call for different solutions.  Finally, someone can only be told what is effectively "we own you, so do what you're told or else" before they realize they're only owned for X amount of time longer and decide not to make that time any longer.
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PapaBear765

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #383 on: Dec 11, 2008, 06:36 »

I think the "one crew, one screw," "the shaft's back aft" mentality is highly detrimental to the Navy, in retention and moral.


Yes.  I, too, could supply similar scenarios.  In fact, it sounds like you're describing my old boat.


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Avoid over-coordination. We have all observed months-long delays caused by an effort to bring all activities into complete agreement with a proposed policy or procedure. While the coordinating machinery is slowly grinding away, the original purpose is often lost. The essence of the proposals is being worn down as the persons most concerned impatiently await the decision. The process has been aptly called coordinating to death.

The problem with the navy is the military side of it...


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1. More than ambition, more than ability, it is rules that limit contribution; rules are the lowest common denominator of human behavior. They are a substitute for rational thought.

2. Sit down before fact with an open mind. Be prepared to give up every preconceived notion. Follow humbly wherever and to whatever abyss Nature leads, or you learn nothing. Don't push out figures when facts are going in the opposite direction.

3. Free discussion requires an atmosphere unembarrassed by any suggesion of authority or even respect. If a subordinate always agrees with his superior he is a useless part of the organization. In this connection there is a story of Admiral Sims when he was on duty in London in World War I. He called a conscientious hard-working officer in to him to explain why he was dissatisfied with the officer's work. The officer blushed and stammered when Sims pointed out that in all the time they had been working together the officer had never once disagreed with Sims.

4. All men are by nature conservative but conservatism in the military profession is a source of danger to the country. One must be ready to change his line sharply and suddenly, with no concern for the prejudices and memories of what was yesterday. To rest upon formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means death.

5. Success teaches us nothing; only failure teaches.

6. Do not regard loyalty as a personal matter. A greater loyalty is one to the Navy or to the Country. When you know you are absolutely right, and when you are unable to do anything about it, complete military subordination to rules becomes a form of cowardice.

7. To doubt one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized man. Don't defend past actions; what is right today may be wrong tomorrow. Don't be consistent; consistency is the refuge of fools.

8. Thoughts arising from practical experience may be a bridle or a spur.

9. Optimism and stupidity are nearly synonymous.

10. A system under which it takes three men to check what one is doing is not control; it is systematic strangulation.

11. A man, by working 24 hours a day, could multiply himself 3 times. To multiply himself more than 3 times the only recourse is to train others to take over some of his work.

Why do we need the military bearing factor while standing watch?  There's a seminar given to all students at NPTU that explicitly demonstrates that reactor safety is a higher priority than following the orders of a superior rank.
« Last Edit: Dec 11, 2008, 06:49 by PapaBear765 »

JsonD13

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #384 on: Dec 11, 2008, 08:57 »
After looking at this topic quite a few times, I am wondering, why couldnt the Navy bother to emulate civilian plants and design them to operate with the same personnel on shift that  they do?  From a first glance, this would lower personnel requirements, give people more time off, and create a higher morale.  Possible downsides include more personal responsibility for junior personnel, a higher LOK required.  Has anyone ever done a cost benefit analysis on this?  I'm sure to be able to operate most everything from the control room has one hell of an initial price, but the savings would probably be mirrored in recruitment and retention. 

This would probably require a rating merger and/or a creation of a nuclear rating, longer initial training (in hours per week), and a tour would potentially involve either being operation personnel or maintenance personnel (so every few years you could switch what you were doing).

Food for thought.

Jason

JustinHEMI05

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #385 on: Dec 11, 2008, 11:00 »
After looking at this topic quite a few times, I am wondering, why couldnt the Navy bother to emulate civilian plants and design them to operate with the same personnel on shift that  they do?  From a first glance, this would lower personnel requirements, give people more time off, and create a higher morale.  Possible downsides include more personal responsibility for junior personnel, a higher LOK required.  Has anyone ever done a cost benefit analysis on this?  I'm sure to be able to operate most everything from the control room has one hell of an initial price, but the savings would probably be mirrored in recruitment and retention. 

This would probably require a rating merger and/or a creation of a nuclear rating, longer initial training (in hours per week), and a tour would potentially involve either being operation personnel or maintenance personnel (so every few years you could switch what you were doing).

Food for thought.

Jason

Well first you have to get the Navy to stop saying silly things like "Commercial plants strive to do things like us." I bet that is harder than it sounds. Secondly, I think the whole point of the Navy nuke design is to be idiot proof.

Justin

PS Just as a funny side not, last week I experiences some of the navular BS that we are all used to, here at my plant. My license class scored well above average on last weeks exam, which has traditionally been a low scorer for classes. So now there are questions being asked as to why we did so well.  ::) It couldn't be the 20+ hours each of us put in studying.  >:(
« Last Edit: Dec 11, 2008, 11:18 by JustinHEMI »

Offline Preciousblue1965

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #386 on: Dec 12, 2008, 11:21 »
I think that a lot of those problems can be attributed to the perceived need to have commands bring down the hammer on themselves least an outside organization do it.  While I fully support the need for outside monitoring of our actions and transparency, there should be an understanding that the commands will police themselves effectively in the way they best see fit.  An outside organization won't known that ET3 Scmukatelly is constant screwup, yet when he gets caught goofing off in Manuevering during a SRO watch, NRRO is going to assume it is somehow universal thoughout the Nuke department.  Therefore, the COC has to have the kneejerk reaction for the entire department because it has this innane fear that if they don't NRRO is going to start relieving the boat of its keys and its command personnel.  That reaction is tough at first and overly rediculous most of the time, yet after a while it becomes easier to work with, and that is why it is never un-implemented.  However after about a dozen knee jerkers, you get a climate where everything is so bound down in double/triple checks, paperwork, oversight, and whatnot that you get an inefficient system.  That inefficiency leads to longer work days, which breeds contempt for the proper way things are supposed to be done, which leads to guys short cutting as much as they can in order to reduce the work time, which inevitably leads to more mistakes, thus repeating the cycle. 

The NNPP needs to evaluate the fact that a singular person can and will screw up.  That person should be upgraded.  This does not mean that the ENTIRE department needs an upgrade, UNLESS it becomes a common occurance.  NRRO needs to learn that the level of corrective action they expect may not be the best action depending on the command. 

<brushes off soapbox>  Ok who's next?
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Offline G-reg

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #387 on: Dec 12, 2008, 01:35 »
... why couldn't the Navy bother to emulate civilian plants ...

One of the main reasons is that it's really hard to compare Navy vs. commercial is that it's difficult to build a sea-going vessel which exists (for all practical intents) in only two states: S/D or 100% power.

Commercial plants never take their reactor plants under the ice, where lives depend on keeping the plant running.

Commercial plants aren't built to ever do a surface transit through a busy shipping lane, where the ability to rapidly and repeatedly change power is a MUST.

A question I have is how you view "personnel".  How many HP's are at your plant?  How many Chemists & Chemistry Technicians?  My last submarine had only six ELT's, and those six people alone fielded all the Navy-equivalent HP/Chem jobs & routines.  Sure, there's only one HP Tech and one Chem Tech on shift at any given time in a commercial plant, but that doesn't mean that the plant's entire HP/Chem manning is only 2.  And on a wild guess, I would speculate that the number of PEO's alone at your plant is larger than the whole Nuke department on a submarine.

(Carriers are a whole 'nother animal, so I'm not gonna go there  :P...)

Just some point/counterpoint, is all.  No flaming was intended.

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Offline Marlin

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #388 on: Dec 12, 2008, 02:29 »
Commercial plants never take their reactor plants under the ice, where lives depend on keeping the plant running.

Commercial plants aren't built to ever do a surface transit through a busy shipping lane, where the ability to rapidly and repeatedly change power is a MUST.
Peace,
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Nor are they built to withstand depth charges or collision (such as with an underwater mountain or another vessel).  ;)

JsonD13

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #389 on: Dec 12, 2008, 03:37 »
The design characteristics of a plant to be resistant to shock and temperature stresses do not really play into how many people you need to operate a plant.  This is a personnel issue, most of your valves and switches that are operated on station could be rigged to be operated out of the control room.  Less supervision than is now required in the Navy, hell right now for someone to operate a primary valve, you need to have at least 4-5 people involved.  This can substantially be lowered with a change in thought process (on the Navy's part) to streamline things and make things a lil more cost effective.

As far as variable power, every nuclear power plant has to gradually increase power to get to that 100%, and is subject to those same temperature and pressure stresses, albeit that they do not occur that often, but the design is still there.  Most of these commercial plants are also operating just as long as a Navy nuke plant too.  If you rig most of your valves with motors (or hydraulics) and switches to be operated from the control room, it shouldnt be too much of an issue.  The big thing I foresee would be ensuring the wiring and motors operate in a flooding or shock scenario, and since the Navy has this technology, it should be able to be implemented. 

As for your question, I view personnel from a departmental/divsional standpoint.  If you took those 6 guys, added the 10 mechanics that you should have on a sub (just a guess cause I'm on a carrier), trained those mechanics on how to cover a job and do chem analysis, and split them up between the ONE mecahical operator, and ONE chem tech on shift, you would easily have an increase in time off for those other personnel, because your manning requirements stay the same, however your watch requirements decrease.    Better yet, if you have one nuclear rating, everyone has to learn everyone elses job (and you cant tell me that it cant happen or else how could someone qualify EWS/PPWS?) Oh yeah, on my carrier there are roughly 25 ELT's, myself being one. ;-)

One of the things that would have to change for this to work is the training structure of the pipeline.  It would have to become more rigorous.

Not out of the Navy yet, but darn close ;-), and the BWR that I'm going to has about 10 HP techs.

I love a good intellectual debate, thanks for not getting flamed over it, Greg.

Jason

AskewDivergent

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #390 on: Dec 12, 2008, 04:30 »
"IMHO"

As I was reading this long and involving thread, I was enlightened with something that I wanted to toss into the mix. It may have been brought up already because I was 80% finished reading through before I skipped to my reply. (80% being the magical made up number for statistics)

I've read through some of the nub-bashing, both inter-generational and intra-... I agree too that the quality has declined through the pipeline. You should have met some of the nicely packaged turds we had shipped in on our boat right before I left. Frankly, I was glad that some of them got de-nuked, regardless of how much pain and suffering they endured. I KNOW that we weren't the only sub/carrier that got them, so does that mean that we are just recruiting the turds who are promoting laziness, incompetence, disregard for rules and integrity, etc.? Where's the common variable?

I think we need to stop telling these kids right from the get-go that they are the "cream of the cream of the crop", the "top 10% of the Navy's intelligence", etc. They get it in their heads at the recruiting station and from the MEPS classifiers. Heads become further inflated at NFAS, straight off the plane from RTC (they did it 9 years ago, I'm sure they still do). This feeling of invincibility and superb-ness is bred into our replacements by ourselves, and we sit here and wonder why we catch them blazing logs, being dink, blah blah.

PapaBear765

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #391 on: Dec 12, 2008, 04:41 »
JsonD13,

Good ideas.  I've thought for a while now that having the different ratings is pointless, that there should be just one "nuclear operator" rating.

You'll have to contend with the counterpoint that even now with 4-5 people involved in operating one primary valve that that valve doesn't always get returned to its proper position, i.e. mistakes are still made even with so many people involved.

I don't buy that rationale.  When I was taking physics in college, the teacher kept making the exams easier and easier, trying to preclude students from failing.  Got to where he was telling us that the 10 questions for the exam would be selected from the 15 questions of the homework assignment.  People still failed the exam.  I think that if you make some things too easy, it has the opposite effect in that people stop trying.  So because there's no many people involved with that one valve operation, no one feels a sense of ownership and feels like someone else will catch a mistake.

And that's what happens during critiques, everyone tries to avoid the truth: they failed to pay attention, they failed to care about what they were doing.  Hence all of the new policies, instructions, revisions, etc.  When you say the navy has realize that only a single person may be the sole root cause to something happening, you're assuming that that guy fessed up to his mistake during the critique and didn't try to partially blame something else.

Offline G-reg

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #392 on: Dec 13, 2008, 09:52 »
The idea of a single "Nuclear" rating is intriguing.

At first, I was daunted by the prospect of adding a ton of extra qual cards to nubs who already have an uphill battle to stay off the Dink list.  To illustrate this, I showed up on my first boat as a brand new ELT and was given about 6.022x1023 blank qual cards I had to complete.  Now imagine piling on even MORE qual cards on top of that for AEA, SEO, RT, EO, RO, SRO, Throttleman, etc.  Egads!!!

However, with the one-rating nuclear program, AEA and SEO would be dissolved and incorporated into the other watchstations.  That's just one example; a lot of other quals/watchstations could be merged and restructured.

Casualty response becomes another sticking point.  Many casualties (such as fire and flooding) require the instantaneous application of a ton of manpower.  How can you automate firefighting, for example?  If you only put one or two people in the EngineRoom - to cover the entire EngineRoom - then you could find yourself severely hamstrung when the poop hits the fan.  When a submarine is on-station and completely steady state doing "knots to nowhere", you could probably get away with just three people outside Maneuvering (one upstairs, one downstairs, and one EWS) and three people inside Maneuvering (RO, EO, and EOOW, with either the RO or the EO covering Throttles).  Again, for steady-state low-risk situations, that's probably fine.  And while S/D in port, one person in the spaces and one in the box is fine; if a casualty gets out-of-hand in port, there's always the "muster on the pier/burn, baby, burn" option.

And one final point on automating casualty response.  Any casualty action or indication which is remote or automated MUST - absolutely - positively - MUST - be kept in tip top working condition at all times.  Lives could depend on it.  Think about all the things you'd have to automate in order for casualty response to be literally at the tips of your fingers.  Now, take all of those things that you just automated and basically put the full spectrum of "Remote Op" controls on every one of them, just as if each one of those new controls was its own RCLIV.  Remember, the lives of all hands on the boat may depend on that automated/remote piece of equipment.  Suddenly, cutting back on the number of underway watchstanders doesn't look like such a big reduction in manpower anymore...  We could probably trim down a few watchstations, but I don't see a wholesale revamping in my crystal ball.  (Of course, my crystal ball is a lying bitch sometimes...)

And I don't mean to get pissy (well, maybe just a little bit on this part) but it took the better part of a week to go from 10% to 100% PRx after the last outage here.  That rate of power change isn't exactly going to support "Stop the Shaft" or "Emergency Deep".  10% to 100% PRx on AIIIC is properly measured with a stopwatch, not a calendar.  Saying that a commercial plant does transients too is like me going up to Ahhhhhnold and saying, "Yeah, I lift weights".

[Sorry, but that part really did stick in my throat for some reason.  Maybe I forgot to take my medicine or something...]

But you are dead-on regarding the overmanagement point.  It's almost like at every critique, the top brass ends up thinking "This would have never happened if I had been there supervising it, so obviously we need more supervision applied here".  What they really need to be doing instead is their own f'ing job and making sure that their operators are people who are properly and adequately trained to do the things they are supposed to do (such that they don't REQUIRE twenty-seven layers of oversight to touch a valve or a switch).  Needing frequent additional layers of supervision is simply an admission that the training program has not produced reliable plant operators.  Why can't Big Navy see that?


OK, I'm just about typed out for now, so I'll step down from the soap box before I get going on another "rant branch"... :P

 - Greg
"But that's just my opinion - I could be wrong."
  -  Dennis Miller

Offline deltarho

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #393 on: Dec 13, 2008, 09:56 »
The EDM was on Rev. 4 when I left for the good life at ptype, and it's been rev'd a couple times since.  I don't remember it being that specific.  I remember having to create/revise our department instruction that was essentially the ptype Volume I.  Has the EDM become as specific as you describe?

I'll have to admit that I was going by what I used in 1988 while the Training Department LPO on board the Tommy T.
The above has nothing to do with any real  or imagined person(s).  Moreover, any referenced biped(s) simulating real or imagined persons--with a pulse or not--is coincidental, as far as you know.

Offline DDMurray

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #394 on: Dec 14, 2008, 06:52 »
All,
I'll weigh in on this more after 31DEC, but you should know there are studies being done to design plants with 4 total watchstanders in the ER (2 in man, 2 roving). 

774 class eliminated one MM and combined RT and AEA into one watchstander. 

DM
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PapaBear765

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #395 on: Dec 14, 2008, 08:55 »
G-reg,

Good stuff, but I don't think that if the navy made it to the point of combining all of the rates that they wouldn't also have changed some other things along the way.  Like the watch stations: combining them would be a must, to which Derek has alluded.

Also, I don't think the remote op level of work control would/should be applied to all of those other systems.  Flood control is there to save lives, as well as fire extinguishers, but neither have remote op level of work control.  Moreover, the remote op requirements are silly.  If guys would just employ the standard litany of controls that are already in place for everything else (without skipping steps), then we'd never have a loss of remote op.  Also, from the testimonies of my fellow surface co-workers remote op isn't a big deal.



...What they really need to be doing instead is their own f'ing job and making sure that their operators are people who are properly and adequately trained to do the things they are supposed to do...

 - Greg

The deckplate is properly and adequately trained.  The guys there just don't do what they're trained to do.  They don't do what they're trained to do because they think it's unnecessary or unimportant—they don't care.  They don't care because of all of the negative quality of life issues we've already gone over.  The navy needs to improve the quality of life in order for the plant to be operated correctly...thereby restoring the margin to thermal limits.
« Last Edit: Dec 14, 2008, 08:57 by PapaBear765 »

withroaj

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #396 on: Dec 14, 2008, 12:34 »
For what it's worth ADM Rickover had his philosophy on management that takes into account trusting guys to do the right thing, inspiring ownership in their duties.  If you haven't read this speech he gave at Colombia University, check it out.

http://www.govleaders.org/rickover.htm

He might have been a tyrant, but his philosophy seems sound.  I think his words and intentions have been twisted since his death.  Bummer.
« Last Edit: Dec 14, 2008, 12:41 by withroaj »

PapaBear765

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #397 on: Dec 14, 2008, 03:02 »
It would be worth it for every nuke to read "The Rickover Effect." 

Offline G-reg

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #398 on: Dec 14, 2008, 11:55 »
PapaBear,

True, I exaggerated about the scope of additional work controls (mainly in order to make a point).  Flood control would have been a better analogy than remote op.

One thing to keep in mind is the redundancy and backup built into already-existing casualty control equipment.  Even flood control has backups - manual hydraulic valve operation & EMBT blow, for instance.  Additional controls for fire extinguishers aren't as extensive, because we have several of them on board (ie, lots of backup); if one of them doesn't work, it isn't a show-stopper.  Automating tons of casualty control actions [whether you throw in extra backup relays/actuators/etc. for everything, or whether you make one-and-only actuating equipment that you have to baby-sit] just strikes me as a marginal manpower savings.  You'd spend a lot of your newly found off-watch time inspecting, maintaining, and repairing those hundreds of additional pieces of equipment throughout the plant (which freed up all of that watchstanding time in the first place).  Automating the EngineRoom just strikes me as more of a manpower tradeoff than a manpower savings.  Mebbe I'm wrong, I dunno...  I am interested in hearing about the 4-person watchteam.

The deckplate is properly and adequately trained.
From the "pump vs. filter" discussions on this thread, I'm not 100% sure I can buy stock in this.

The guys there just don't do what they're trained to do.  They don't do what they're trained to do because they think it's unnecessary or unimportant - they don't care.
Much of this I agree with.  As to why they don't care, I don't think your explanation is wrong, but perhaps it is incomplete.  Part of it certainly IS due to QOL.  But another part of it is that they don't care because, quite frankly, they have been trained that they don't HAVE to care (again I refer to the "pump vs. filter" discussions).  I know I'm sounding like a broken record, but accountability used to be a huge, recurring part of the training program.  If you didn't meet the bar (be it in the classroom, on watch, doing maintenance, or whatever), you were DONE.  And now, student attrition rates are more important than student accountability, and the students learn this.  They have been trained to this, and have seen it reinforced through the experiences of students around them (and possibly even through their own experiences).  As longs as the gods of attrition come down from the mountain and declare that a body in a billet is more important than accountability to a standard, then I don't know how anybody could take accountability in the NNPP seriously.  God bless the people that have enough of their own personal accountability to overcome that.

Clearly not all training comes from a system drawing or a procedure, and the accountability portion of the training program has atrophied to almost nothing.  This is also true in the fleet, whereby command supervision will keep deadwood aboard simply because there is no immediate replacement available.  Which, in the eyes of the beholders on the deckplates, simply becomes more reinforcement of said training.  We don't need to be totally draconian, where we're bringing in the full firing squad for every single offense (because that old-school style of "accountability training" is/was just as dysfunctional), but this particular pendulum really needs to swing closer back to the center.

So I think one of the big reasons why people don't care (but certainly not the only reason) is the "you don't have to care" training they receive, along with a healthy smattering of relevant theory to practice data to support it.  You CAN train people (most people, anyway) to care, but it requires the existence of an integrated training program.  Having a few good people say "You should care because..." does little good when the rest of the program says (and lives) the exact opposite.

 - Greg

"But that's just my opinion - I could be wrong."
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PapaBear765

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Re: How would you fix the NNPP
« Reply #399 on: Dec 15, 2008, 05:25 »
You're right about the complaints of the Pumped Students vice the Filtered Students showing how untrained they are.  I should have been more specific.  I mean that the knowledge requirements haven't changed.  ETs and EMs still have the same 5 mechanical drawings they are required to draw from memory now as they did at the other p-type when I was a student.  The problem is what you've identified: accountability.  No one is expecting an ET to draw any of these systems at their final board, or at any other time prior.

*Why* they should care is my little piece of the making-things-better pie.  It's what I emphasize at every training event and every checkout.

Going back through this discussion you can find examples of the Attrition Police exercising their full authority at thwarting the removal of unworthy students from the program.  But I contend that more students would be removed if the staff would do their job and document the ITRs appropriately.  Every student (about 3) that I had on-crew who was a dirtbag (the worst achieving -20% prior to mast) was disenrolled due to what I logged in their ITRs.  Staff who write "Should never be allowed near a reactor" are not helping the command justify to NRRO that the student should be removed.
« Last Edit: Dec 15, 2008, 05:27 by PapaBear765 »

 


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