Experience or Theory?

[Neutron Whisperer]

What's everyone's take on which is more important: knowing all the theory stuff from Power School or knowing how to operate the plant and do maintenance?

[withroaj]

Yes.

[Gamecock]

What's everyone's take on which is more important: knowing all the theory stuff from Power School or knowing how to operate the plant and do maintenance?

There is no substitute for operational experience.  However, knowing the theory allows you to anticipate plant response, which in turn makes you a better operator.  The best nukes are heavy on theory, and also experienced operators.

So, in agreement with Withroaj....the answer to your question is.....yes

[Fermi2]

Absolutely

[JustinHEMI05]

I concur with the others.

Absolutely yes.   

Cool user name BTW!!!

Justin

[Fermi2]

DANG I forgot to compliment the name!! Excellent Choice!

[Marlin]

Ditto, yes and absolutely.

[Wanna Know Mom]

I'm not a Nuke and don't work in the nuclear power field, but I agree with the previous posters.  In my field of expertise (med/surg nursing) the best nurses are those that understand and apply nursing theory as well as perform the technical aspects of their job.  We too are constantly vigilant about monitoring our patients (as you do your power plant) 24/7 for abnormals and trends that could indicate an unwanted outcome......hmmm good subject for a comparative essay.    

Kathy VPNM

[Neutron Whisperer]

I posed the question because there's a push at the prototypes to upgrade the staff level of knowledge on theory; even make them take an exam and send them back to the fleet if they fail it.  But there's been dozens of mishaps by the staff due to them not knowing how to plan for and execute maintenance and plant operations.  So shouldn't the push be for making the staff read Vol. IV of the RPM rather than the T-Manuals?

[S3GLMS]

When Port Nuc Instrumentation burns up the power supply at 0130, powers down, a scram occurs and there is no indication of pressurizer level, you need both if you want to get out of it with an intact set of fuel rods.  Real casualty and real recovery experience on D2G plant.  Absolutely used both, the theory and years of operating experience to maintain plant parameters while repairing the equipment.

[Fermi2]

I posed the question because there's a push at the prototypes to upgrade the staff level of knowledge on theory; even make them take an exam and send them back to the fleet if they fail it.  But there's been dozens of mishaps by the staff due to them not knowing how to plan for and execute maintenance and plant operations.  So shouldn't the push be for making the staff Vol. IV of the RPM rather than the T-Manuals?

If you don't understand theory how can you realistically plan and execute maintenance?

Mike

[Neutron Whisperer]

Seems like most of you are talking about the "theory" in "theory-to-practice".  Not what I mean.  I'm referring to the seemingly unimportant stuff like slowing-down length and the neutron life cycle.  Should prototype staff be crapped on for not being able to answer questions about these things rather than not being able to know how many SGWL detectors you need on-service?

I'm with you on the importance of knowing your plant's relationship between temperature change to level change, why there's a -1/3 DPM, why you need to be more careful when shimming out at high powers vice lower power levels, etc.  That stuff helps with operations, but there's a lot of theory stuff that doesn't.  And that's the stuff that is being stressed now.

[JustinHEMI05]

Seems like most of you are talking about the "theory" in "theory-to-practice".  Not what I mean.  I'm referring to the seemingly unimportant stuff like slowing-down length and the neutron life cycle.  Should prototype staff be crapped on for not being able to answer questions about these things rather than not being able to know how many SGWL detectors you need on-service?

I'm with you on the importance of knowing your plant's relationship between temperature change to level change, why there's a -1/3 DPM, why you need to be more careful when shimming out at high powers vice lower power levels, etc.  That stuff helps with operations, but there's a lot of theory stuff that doesn't.  And that's the stuff that is being stressed now.

I see what you are saying but sometimes, you have to get back to the fundamentals. If what I am hearing is true about where I think you are, there is something majorly wrong. You gotta start somewhere to fix the problem when all else fails, and that would be back to basics. I submit though, that had they been trained properly from the get go, you wouldn't have this problem. This all leads back to the PUMP reputation and the How would you fix the NNPP thread, because I bet that right about now is when you would start seeing people that were pumped through back at NPTU.  Just an opinion and educated guess with not real facts to prove it. That said, do I think they should be as harsh as sending them back to see if they don't know how fission works? I don't know, if you ask me, that is the last place I would want them.

How is it again? "Reap what you sow."

Justin

[Fermi2]

Seems like most of you are talking about the "theory" in "theory-to-practice".  Not what I mean.  I'm referring to the seemingly unimportant stuff like slowing-down length and the neutron life cycle.  Should prototype staff be crapped on for not being able to answer questions about these things rather than not being able to know how many SGWL detectors you need on-service?

I'm with you on the importance of knowing your plant's relationship between temperature change to level change, why there's a -1/3 DPM, why you need to be more careful when shimming out at high powers vice lower power levels, etc.  That stuff helps with operations, but there's a lot of theory stuff that doesn't.  And that's the stuff that is being stressed now.

Back when the Nuclear Navy still had high standards no instructor would be whining about having to know this type of stuff. YES it's important.

[NukeLDO]

BZ nails it.  If you want to be an instructor, you've got to know more than your average sailor.  I learned more about "how things work" during my instructor tours than any other time in the Navy.  There's nothing like having to stand up in front of a classroom of 30 people with a bunch of questions to make you learn the material.

[Gamecock]

I learned more about "how things work" during my instructor tours than any other time in the Navy.  There's nothing like having to stand up in front of a classroom of 30 people with a bunch of questions to make you learn the material.

I can testify that NukeLDO knows more about Naval Nuclear Power then anyone I've ever met.

[Preciousblue1965]

To go along with what Justin was saying, we had one NUB that got pushed through even though the entire crew knew he wouldn't make a good operator.  He didn't do bad on tests, but he just couldn't run a plant to save his life.  I got an email from a buddy that is STILL there and he said that he saw the prospective gains list come out with this guy on it as coming back to NPTU as a Staff.  I fully agree that a lot of the ones that are starting to come back now are the ones that were pushed through to begin with.  It is now that the civilians are experiencing what we sailors experienced out on the ship.  Bad operators are more of a headache than any benefit you get out of them for qualifying them. 

I say that if the Navy is really REALLY interested in getting some of that lost theory back into the minds of its fleet sailors, I would recommend that every so often(say 5 years or so) that anyone going back to any training command essentially go through a power school refresher course.  Make it similar to the regular power school, but realize that these are seasoned operators.  At the very least it would give guys a 6 month break from operations(assuming you consider sitting in class a break).

[Fermi2]

When I was a Staff Instructor I viewed my job as having to know everything regardless of rate or theory.

Mike

[Neutron Whisperer]

I agree with all of you that it's embarrassing that we're even discussing this.  Sailors sit around and do a lot of nothing, and then complain about failing a CTE because it was too hard.

Yes, we're instructors and by that simple fact I concur that we have to know more than the bare minimum.  But like one of you said, the instructors of today are "Pumped" nukes and therefore don't have the innate sense to take it upon themselves to keep the theory fresh in their heads like the "Filtered" nukes of the past.

So if this new theory-push is an attempt to reconfigure the pumped nukes into filtered nukes, then that's fine.  But what I'm talking about is: should the push be to learn the theory--at prototype--and not how to read a PMS card and know where/how to select the correct manometer for a calorimetric?  (Yes, these are issues.)  I mean, if you're going to decide to upgrade your men, then why not start with the most important stuff first: like how to run the plant at a place where nukes run a plant...then train them up on theory.

It seems to me like they're trying to install a supercharger on a car with bald tires.

[Marlin]

I agree with all of you that it's embarrassing that we're even discussing this.  Sailors sit around and do a lot of nothing, and then complain about failing a CTE because it was too hard.

Yes, we're instructors and by that simple fact I concur that we have to know more than the bare minimum.  But like one of you said, the instructors of today are "Pumped" nukes and therefore don't have the innate sense to take it upon themselves to keep the theory fresh in their heads like the "Filtered" nukes of the past.

So if the this new theory push is an attempt to reconfigure the pumped nukes into filtered nukes, then that's fine.  But what I'm talking about is: should the push be to learn the theory--at prototype--and not how to read a PMS card and know where how to select the correct manometer for a calorimetric?  (Yes, these are issues.)  I mean, if you're going to decide to upgrade your men, then why not start with the most important stuff first: like how to run the plant at a place where nukes run a plant...then train them up on theory.

It seems to me like they're trying to install a supercharger on a car with bald tires.

   Most of this has been aimed at operators. But in the nuclear field in general whether you turn a valve, flip a switch or read a meter the results should be what you expect. This could be experience but no one has experienced everything. Theory is a tough thing to nail down as to what is applicable and what is not, but it frequently requires a theoretical knowledge beyond a practical daily knowledge to fill in a workable theoretical knowledge. I don't know what level is being taught today but the exercise of learning should be part of the experience. I hope that the Navy has not slid so far from Rickover's philosophy's that it has compromised the program. We had a sign at the entrance to the Mare Island school that stated the "smartest must work as hard". We had a graded system that fed section one just what they needed to get by and and section twelve a full load of the curriculum. We had a pump and a filter but the net effect was the overall health of the program. Prototype was heavy on operations as I am sure it is now but the oral exams and walk throughs dipped into the applicable theory.
  As with any training program it should revise itself based on feedback and mission. If it is changing is that a bad thing?

[NukeLDO]

A recent task force put together some ideas on how to revise prototype operations.  Recommendations include an exam for staff when they report for duty and a two week course to bone up on the weaknesses, limiting class size until the true "capacity" of the prototypes is truly understood (demands on staff time with maintenance, watchstanding, training, and IDE operations), raising the bar for fleet returnee requirements to become an instructor, and teaching actual instructor techniques at BIT school.  SO, there is a pretty exhaustive self-recriminating look in progress.  However, as with everything, change takes time.

[G-reg]

I have often told people (especially during pre-job briefs back in my Navy days) that trained orangutans could do 80% of our jobs.  Then I tell them that there are two primary things that separate "operators" from "trained monkeys"; and those two things are understanding and anticipation.  Theory and fundamentals won't get any work done in a day, but without them you're little more than a trained monkey, just going through various motions of money-see/monkey-do.  Understanding and anticipation during each and every step you're going through is the reason that your boss doesn't pay you with bananas. [End of motivational section of the pre-job brief. ]

Just for clarification, you don't have to be an ace on theory in order to be a good operator.  I really don't care if the guy standing Feed Station for a startup can dissect the StartUp Rate equation into a million pieces, as long as he understands that YES HE CAN cause a positive reactivity excursion with that Feed Reg Valve switch he's holding.

So theory is important - VERY important.  But when it comes to an operator's knowledge of theory: some is good, more is better, but there still comes a point when too much is just too much.  Unfortunately, there are people around who always see fit to take it to extremes (and usually, it's the people who don't actually operate any equipment themselves).

My own two cents...

 - Greg

[Preciousblue1965]

A recent task force put together some ideas on how to revise prototype operations.  Recommendations include an exam for staff when they report for duty and a two week course to bone up on the weaknesses, limiting class size until the true "capacity" of the prototypes is truly understood (demands on staff time with maintenance, watchstanding, training, and IDE operations), raising the bar for fleet returnee requirements to become an instructor, and teaching actual instructor techniques at BIT school.  SO, there is a pretty exhaustive self-recriminating look in progress.  However, as with everything, change takes time.

Does the Navy really think that they will be able to man the prototypes fully if they implement that?  They are having a hard enough time trying to coerce guy/gals to go teach there as it is, let alone trying to find the "cream of the crop" to go back.  While I fully encourage the concept of trying to get better instructors at NPTU and that there are/were NPTU instructors that were less that intelligent in all things nuclear power(most often they ended up getting put in some position in which they could not adversely affect the plant, yet was considered a desirable job to others such as Pro-phase, OCTG, etc.), I also understand that if you set the bar where it probably needs to be, you are going to be even more undermanned than they already are. 

I frequently thought that there should be a Maintenance Division for the prototypes.  One for each rate, about 8 or 9 guys/gals per division.  All they do is do the PMS that is required and needed.  They don't train students, they don't stand watch, they do maintenance.  They write the tag-outs and WAFs for shutdowns, order the parts, do the work, get the boat to work again.  That takes a CONSIDERABLE load off of the training staff, especially during shutdowns to devote more time to training or heaven forbid maybe an extra day off.  You would have to maintain the current manning levels for training staff(since I know the Navy loves to do more with less and would be tempted to drop the levels to bare minimum to man the watch bill).  The reason this works is that you would be able to have two different billets for P-type, one for training and one for maintenance.  I would be willing to wager that more people would volunteer for P-type if they knew they only had to do maintenance.  Of course you give them less pro-pay and give them the option of going to the training side of the house if they cut the mustard with LOK.

Come to think of it, isn't there an industry that seperates out maintenance vs operations vs training?  I am pretty sure they are doing much better as far as morale and recruiting than the Prototypes.  If only I knew what industry that was.  

[mlslstephens]

I frequently thought that there should be a Maintenance Division for the prototypes.  One for each rate, about 8 or 9 guys/gals per division.  All they do is do the PMS that is required and needed.  They don't train students, they don't stand watch, they do maintenance.  They write the tag-outs and WAFs for shutdowns, order the parts, do the work, get the boat to work again.  That takes a CONSIDERABLE load off of the training staff, especially during shutdowns to devote more time to training or heaven forbid maybe an extra day off. 

Interesting point.  After you left p-type, we went to something very similar to this on the 626.  I had my MO run all the maintenance with his "beefed up" off-hull divisions.  Only small maintenance was performed by the crew so they could concentrate on training students and their own qualifications.  My STO was able to concentrate on tougher drill for staff because they weren't worried about the staff being ready for staff drills...the maintenance was being handled by the ODs.
Now, my manning wasn't IAW the PTM but with enough smoke and mirrors, we were able to keep NRRO off our backs.    Okay, the real truth is that I worked with some great NRRO guys who wanted the best for the MTS so it seemed as though they looked the other way when it came to PTM manning.

[Neutron Whisperer]

A recent task force put together some ideas on how to revise prototype operations.  ...  SO, there is a pretty exhaustive self-recriminating look in progress.  However, as with everything, change takes time.

The crews didn't even know about the task force.

[NukeLDO]

Does the Navy really think that they will be able to man the prototypes fully if they implement that?  They are having a hard enough time trying to coerce guy/gals to go teach there as it is, let alone trying to find the "cream of the crop" to go back.  While I fully encourage the concept of trying to get better instructors at NPTU and that there are/were NPTU instructors that were less that intelligent in all things nuclear power(most often they ended up getting put in some position in which they could not adversely affect the plant, yet was considered a desirable job to others such as Pro-phase, OCTG, etc.), I also understand that if you set the bar where it probably needs to be, you are going to be even more undermanned than they already are. 

The thought in the proposal is that the bar for NFAS/NPS duty is higher than that for p-type.  Make p-type duty a pre-requisite for NFAS/NPS.  Then, fully man the p-types to handle the actual demand signal (once that's actually known).
If you were fully manned, would the duty be so bad?  No back-to-back watches, etc.

[Creeker]

To address the issue of lowering level of theory knowledge....  I was always fairly proud of the electronics knowledge that nuke ET's had coming out of the pipeline, and developed further in the fleet...  I was a target rider, but on my first tour back at NFAS, I heard plenty of stories from sub colleagues about who fixed stuff for the coners..  The nukes, of course.  Who could figure it out, and troubleshoot down to the component level, when there were no more black boxes to swap out?  The nukes could.  And then, when NFAS moved from Orlando to Charleston, we changed the curriculum to get rid of radar, and replace it with I&C trainers.  There was tremendous pressure to alter our level of instruction to only troubleshoot to the board level, then swap and be done.  We managed to somehow keep troubleshooting to the compenent level, and I think it's crucial!  How many times in fleet roubleshooting will we have to do this?  Maybe not all that often, but that theory of how things work, down to component level, can be crucial in determining whats wrong on the macro scale.  I think this basic concept applies to electrical, mechanical, and Rx theory as well.

[bdhoe]

I rarely pipe in but, as everyone as has said it is very important to know both.  You will never know what situations are given to you down the road, and during one major evolution I became the mechanical pressure watch.  The brief for all of this evolution(mucho mucho briefs) would consist of questions to the RO and myself, and needless to say, nothing is cooler for a mechanic then telling the RO that "I now have pressure control of the reactor"..and to make it worse I was a SMAG..but I knew exactly what was going on and was in complete communications with the RO at the time and we operated perfectly in tune and had no problems.  Knowing all the theory I did, is why I was placed there, as well as knowing the plant I was on..so strive to be the best at both and don't stereotype yourself down to your rate.
Just follow the old golden rule and learn at least one thing new about the plant you operate each day..and good luck!

[Preciousblue1965]

The thought in the proposal is that the bar for NFAS/NPS duty is higher than that for p-type.  Make p-type duty a pre-requisite for NFAS/NPS.  Then, fully man the p-types to handle the actual demand signal (once that's actually known).
If you were fully manned, would the duty be so bad?  No back-to-back watches, etc.

There would still be things to complain about, but it would definitely help morale for a while.  There was nothing worse than having 6 watchbill slots to fill and having only 6 guys in the division.  The cube would have to start watch relief almost a full hour prior to regular watch relief just so the "daisy chain" could be done before the end of shift.  Most guys got just enough time to run over to the barge, smoke one if they smoked, and eat whatever they could find in the vending machines and get back down to relieve the next guy, all in the span of about 8 minutes.  The lucky guy was whoever had cube for second half because they usually ended up only doing 2 hours of cube duty. 

However I fully believe that if you could give guys almost no back to back watches, life would be much better.  You could even have the "maintenance" guys qualify initially, maintain proficiency, and then if they wanted to, go from maintenance to training and the other way around.  It would be a little dicey at times, but it would still be a break from 3 solid years of taking young minds and warping shaping them into nuclear operators.

[Preciousblue1965]

Interesting point.  After you left p-type, we went to something very similar to this on the 626.  I had my MO run all the maintenance with his "beefed up" off-hull divisions.  Only small maintenance was performed by the crew so they could concentrate on training students and their own qualifications.  My STO was able to concentrate on tougher drill for staff because they weren't worried about the staff being ready for staff drills...the maintenance was being handled by the ODs.
Now, my manning wasn't IAW the PTM but with enough smoke and mirrors, we were able to keep NRRO off our backs.    Okay, the real truth is that I worked with some great NRRO guys who wanted the best for the MTS so it seemed as though they looked the other way when it came to PTM manning.

Oh sure, do stuff the easy way after I leave.  I wonder if they ever implemented my continuous improvement that I actually won money for. 

[goobs22xx]

Interesting point.  After you left p-type, we went to something very similar to this on the 626.  I had my MO run all the maintenance with his "beefed up" off-hull divisions.  Only small maintenance was performed by the crew so they could concentrate on training students and their own qualifications.  My STO was able to concentrate on tougher drill for staff because they weren't worried about the staff being ready for staff drills...the maintenance was being handled by the ODs.
Now, my manning wasn't IAW the PTM but with enough smoke and mirrors, we were able to keep NRRO off our backs.    Okay, the real truth is that I worked with some great NRRO guys who wanted the best for the MTS so it seemed as though they looked the other way when it came to PTM manning.

And it was great while it worked, but has since failed from two distinct ends.

First, the smoke and mirrors have been obliterated. The issue got brought up that we were manning not IAW the PTM and there has been backlash from that. They're supposed to be collapsing down the ODs to PTM mandated levels and sending the 3 or 4 "superfluous" guys back to crew. Now we're supposed to have crew level RPPOs as well as dealing with the things that the DCA used to take care of. This part really pisses me off because the system was working when it was used as intended.

However, the above mentioned backlash has no effect on the current shutdown, yet the crews are getting stabbed with levels of maintenance that only gets worse every shutdown. We dropped down to only having 1 extra guy each half and he is always doing maintenance. Most days the cube is getting secured because the ODs want us to take care of something. I guess I should throw out there that I am a mechanic and my perspective is rather limited to the divisional level.

The real issue here is that on the divisional level we lack the ability to prioritize anything. It's always seems to be a rush to get something done right away, be it getting maintenance done or getting students ahead of the curve. If we weren't such extremists in our thought process, we could get our job done much more efficiently. I think that, as was mentioned earlier, if we had people allocated to perform a single aspect of the job of running prototype that we would be doing much better overall.

But what do I know? I'm just a dirty SPU who does what he's told...

[Preciousblue1965]

Well when I was there I saw the 626 got from

Having a DCA who coordinated all the DC maintenance.  It was usually a SPU during Tweek.  Worked good because it was easy maintenance, got the SPUs some experience reading PMS cards, and well.......lets face it, sea returnees weren't going to do it when we could leave early. 

Then, they got rid of the DCA and shifted all DC maintenance to the crews.  Each crew had a DC LPO to basically coordinate the crews share of the DC maintenance.  I was Crew D, and somehow ended up being the only one that really worked on the DC maintenance.  I eventually turned over when I got ready to leave the Nav.  The guy I turned over to eventually went on to become the DCA when they reinstated it after I left.  I guess that is when the ODs got overmanned and everything shifted. 

It only figures that when we find something that really works, that someone would throw a fit because it isn't how some Yahoo that sits behind a desk and never had to deal with maintenance dreamed it up when he wrote the PTM.  Frickin Frackin' DUMB Civilian Prototype staff.

[NukeLDO]

It only figures that when we find something that really works, that someone would throw a fit because it isn't how some Yahoo that sits behind a desk and never had to deal with maintenance dreamed it up when he wrote the PTM.  Frickin Frackin' DUMB Civilian Prototype staff.

What makes you think it was written by the contractor?
And, yes, it will have to be revised to implement some of the proposed changes to how the p-types do business.  But that's not impossible.  Why else would there be more than 1000 revisions to the current S6G RPM?
I don't know about you, but I rubbed elbows with some pretty impressive contractor personnel during my 2 p-type tours.

[mlslstephens]

I don't know about you, but I rubbed elbows with some pretty impressive contractor personnel during my 2 p-type tours.

I couldn't agree with you more about that.  I met so many very impressive civilians during my prototype tour and so many of them were extremely willing to help me in my endeavors.  It is true, however, that many of the civilians that helped me the most were priors. 

Looking back on the whole p-type experience I can now see things a tad bit more clearly than when I was in the ring of fire.  When I arrived, I was told that the corner office was the enemy and that I should never seek their help in anything..."only give them what they ask for", and "there is no such thing as a free look".  However, this was not my experience.  I had a great relationship with NRRO.  Of course they have a few jerks working with them as well as the jerks I had working with me.  [I would never post the name of the biggest jerk in the office on an open forum; but the motel owner in the 1960's movie Psycho is a hint]

So how does all this tie into the topic?  The guys who helped me the most were the ones who had an abundance of technical theory knowledge but who also had that operational background.  That is what the good guys at NRRO brought to the table.

[Preciousblue1965]

What makes you think it was written by the contractor?
And, yes, it will have to be revised to implement some of the proposed changes to how the p-types do business.  But that's not impossible.  Why else would there be more than 1000 revisions to the current S6G RPM?
I don't know about you, but I rubbed elbows with some pretty impressive contractor personnel during my 2 p-type tours.

Ok fair enough, I guess I kinda "hit the governor" on that one.  I knew some pretty impressive people too when I worked there, but I also meet some of the most hard headed civilians that couldn't see past their own nose.  Most of the latter where the ones in higher positions of power.  From my short experience, the general mindset of the civilan arm of NPTU was all training and very little of anything else.  While I fully understand that that is their job, that mind set isn't conducive to when it comes to trying to get all the maintenance done that needs to be done.  This usually ends up becoming a wrestling match between the Civilians and the ODs on what takes precedence with the crew guys stuck in the middle. 

As far as the NRRO guys, I never really had too much problem with most, but there were definitely some that would easily rhyme with the word "ticks"  However "comma" towards the end it was pretty good since I knew one of the guys from my old ship.  One of the guys from my crew went on to be NR after I left. 

[NukeLDO]

Of course they're worried about training...that's what the civilians at MTS are contracted to do.  Unlike NY where they are contracted for operations and the Navy worries about training.  Granted, cooperation is required to achieve the desired end state.

[DLGN25]

This is an amazing thread for an old salt who has been out of the Navy longer then most who now serve have lived.  I remember while attending school at Mare Island, the guys who were in training for PBR duty (That's Patrol Boat River) during their PT would march by the barracks and the cadence call would go something like this "If I had a high IQ, I could be a NUKKY-PO".  That was in 1967.  At that time there was a war and the draft.  RO's then came from the top 5% of the ET's, and almost all had some college.  They all were trained in electronics school to the component level, and well versed in transistor theory (state of the art then) as well as in vacuum tubes.  (Have any of you seen one of them?).  Anyway, without electronics theory, you cannot be a good technician, without nuclear and engineering theory you cannot be a good operator. 

Case in point.  Once while in Subic Bay, I visited a high school buddy, then an E-5 MM on a conventional frigate tied along side us.  He took me on a tour of his ship's engine room and told me about how they could not keep vacuum on their turbine generators.  I took me about one minute to find the problem.  The warm-up recircs where open, in fact they were nearly frozen open.  I explained the theory to him, and with glazed eyes he nodded.  Later, he sent a letter thanking me, because the problem was the always open recircs, now he was the hot MM on his ship. 

Anyway, back to Nukes.  Not all RO ET's were able to ply their trade, in fact, on Bainbridge there was not enough technician work for the number of ET's in engineering.  While I was there, there were perhaps maybe four or five who did the bulk of the maintenance and repair work, and it usually went to the non-operator qualified guys to do, or to those interested enough to volunteer.  The game in our division was to qualify as soon as you could so you could to get out of things like maintenance.

Back to the point, the difference between an accountant and a bookkeeper, is the understanding of business theory and general accounting principles.  The difference between a Nuke ET, MM, or EM, and non-nuke ratings, is the nukes understand the theory behind everything they are doing.  To down play the importance of theory, is to jeopardize the ship and her mission, like my buddy's ship, the one who could not keep their generators on line in warm waters because they did not understand, or care about the underlying theory of how the machine worked.

I am also sadden to hear that civilians are now used in training.  Back in the day, instructor duty was a reward and considered prime duty, even in Idaho.

[JustinHEMI05]

Excellent post! One of the best I have read around here in a long time. Thank you for sharing that perspective.

Justin