How the next US nuclear accident could happen

[Marlin]

How the next US nuclear accident could happen

http://thebulletin.org/how-next-us-nuclear-accident-could-happen8441

[Rerun]

Wouldn't happen at an NRC licensed site

[Bonds 25]

With 170+ Security Officers currently employed, enough razor wire to make a Supermax Prison look like Disney World and massive concrete blocks surrounding the entire owner controlled area......I highly doubt we are at risk for a Terrorist attack (let alone a Hippy attack). The only possible attack would be via plane.....and even then, WHY? Why crash a plane into a Nuclear Power Plant when you can crash it into a building....or dam.....or petroleum refinery? Terrorists are smart, which is exactly why Nuclear Power Plants are safe from their wrath.

Commercial Nuclear Power Plants are NOT Nuclear Weapons Facilities 

Chernobyl, TMI, Fukushima.......none caused by sabotage or a terrorist attack (unless you wanna call Mother Nature a Terrorist)

[Marlin]

With 170+ Security Officers currently employed, enough razor wire to make a Supermax Prison look like Disney World and massive concrete blocks surrounding the entire owner controlled area......I highly doubt we are at risk for a Terrorist attack (let alone a Hippy attack). The only possible attack would be via plane.....and even then, WHY? Why crash a plane into a Nuclear Power Plant when you can crash it into a building....or dam.....or petroleum refinery? Terrorists are smart, which is exactly why Nuclear Power Plants are safe from their wrath.

Commercial Nuclear Power Plants are NOT Nuclear Weapons Facilities  

Chernobyl, TMI, Fukushima.......none caused by sabotage or a terrorist attack (unless you wanna call Mother Nature a Terrorist)

Having worked at Y-12 a number of times for several companies I need to be careful how I answer this. The security force at Y-12 has always been very professional when I have dealt with them, the building in question did not need the outer perimeter fences to safeguard the materials inside. The authors reason for projecting this may be off the mark for most facilities but is fundamentally sound for those who work on safety basis no matter what the industry. His reference to the Korean pilots is something I have read about before and deals with culture of operations this can apply to security, operations, or any other group. He mentions nurses ignoring alarms because of the frequency of false alarms something in common with Y-12s security but could equally apply to anyone. The author is an anthropologist primarily focused on the culture in weapons infrastructure world wide but he does include Chernobyl as an example of working culture. Security at a National Nuclear Security Administration site is very different than commercial sites but I would bet the material to be protected is better secured than a power plant but involve a much larger area. Intrusions into an owner controlled area at a commercial plant would not mean there was any real threat to the plant, intrusions into outer boundaries of a DOE/NNSA site is not much different. When you consider the culture of any facility the same problems arise whether DOE or NRC and not just from a fence intrusion. The 170 people you mention seem to pale when compared to a security force much larger and equiped with armored vehicles with miniguns mounted in torrets on top of them and inside much more physical security than you mentioned for the power plants. Probably not a lot of concern for a building that looks like a castle and designed to stand alone, probably why there was not a lot of concern when the area was violated. There was so little concern that the guard who arrived broke bread with the nun, that is part of the culture the author was talking about.







I am rather glad the guard broke bread with the nun rather than call up backup.   Did cost him his job though.

[Chimera]

I don't know . . . the author of the article seems more concerned about a nuclear "on purpose" rather than a nuclear accident.

[Ksheed]

With 170+ Security Officers currently employed, enough razor wire to make a Supermax Prison look like Disney World and massive concrete blocks surrounding the entire owner controlled area......I highly doubt we are at risk for a Terrorist attack (let alone a Hippy attack). The only possible attack would be via plane.....and even then, WHY? Why crash a plane into a Nuclear Power Plant when you can crash it into a building....or dam.....or petroleum refinery? Terrorists are smart, which is exactly why Nuclear Power Plants are safe from their wrath.

Commercial Nuclear Power Plants are NOT Nuclear Weapons Facilities 

Chernobyl, TMI, Fukushima.......none caused by sabotage or a terrorist attack (unless you wanna call Mother Nature a Terrorist)

Personally, I'm not super impressed by the majority of the Guards that I know. If the smelly stuff ever hit the rotational object, I'm not sure how many would stand and fight vs. how many would run and hide.

Still, the idea that a physical threat could actually penetrate far enough into the vital areas to cause a serious accident seems pretty far fetched to me.

"It might happen. Cha! And monkeys might fly out of my butt!" - Wayne Campbell

[radglo]

Since security is not the issue, I believe it would be a mechanical/maintenance or another operations error. My brother was a metallurgical engineer at a few plants, including my first...VY.
He was emphatic about stainless not being contaminated with tooling that had been used on carbon containing materials. I have been to many BWRs recently that have exhibited rust on stainless, mainly near or on welds and joints. The carbon contamination may cause micro fractures and when combined with internal corrosion, a greater possibility of failure. There was a period in the 80's and 90's where there was a required amount of piping to be checked for corrosion / wall thickness. I haven't seen as much in recent years though. Through complacency, lack of vigilance, or "cost effectiveness" these programs have been dismissed. It also seems for quite some time, if things are screwed up or "don't seem right", nobody really wants to hear about concerns, really. Sure there are "concerns" programs, ran by the companies you're working at. Do they really take concerns to heart? Sometimes perhaps. I will bet the concerns I have pointed out, through the years, ever got fixed. A few of these were on safety systems. The plants really just don't care....  "Button 'er up and pull the rods", until the next time. But I digress....

[Ksheed]

Since security is not the issue, I believe it would be a mechanical/maintenance or another operations error. My brother was a metallurgical engineer at a few plants, including my first...VY.
He was emphatic about stainless not being contaminated with tooling that had been used on carbon containing materials. I have been to many BWRs recently that have exhibited rust on stainless, mainly near or on welds and joints. The carbon contamination may cause micro fractures and when combined with internal corrosion, a greater possibility of failure. There was a period in the 80's and 90's where there was a required amount of piping to be checked for corrosion / wall thickness. I haven't seen as much in recent years though. Through complacency, lack of vigilance, or "cost effectiveness" these programs have been dismissed. It also seems for quite some time, if things are screwed up or "don't seem right", nobody really wants to hear about concerns, really. Sure there are "concerns" programs, ran by the companies you're working at. Do they really take concerns to heart? Sometimes perhaps. I will bet the concerns I have pointed out, through the years, ever got fixed. A few of these were on safety systems. The plants really just don't care....  "Button 'er up and pull the rods", until the next time. But I digress....

IMO, the plants that I am familiar with (which isn't a great number) are diligent in their FAC program and have groups of personnel dedicated to tracking erosion/corrosion specific to the piping systems. I would guess that they have spent in the 9-digit range testing, tracking, patching, and replacing degraded piping of both small bore and large bore, underground and above ground.

[Bonds 25]

IMO, the plants that I am familiar with (which isn't a great number) are diligent in their FAC program and have groups of personnel dedicated to tracking erosion/corrosion specific to the piping systems. I would guess that they have spent in the 9-digit range testing, tracking, patching, and replacing degraded piping of both small bore and large bore, underground and above ground.

We just spent god knows how much $$$, extended our outage almost a week and 30+ REM replacing RWCU piping in our RWCU Hx Room due to FAC.