Career Path > Safety
Safety
mostlyharmless:
I agree, most of us have the tools. Most of us have the basic desire not to get hurt.Most of us will evaluate a condition OR action and accept risk,possible outcomes vs.desired outcomes,up to some point were the possible outcome is to much. Each individual must decide for him/herself. But rather than a culture developing on its own through a collectivised will , I believe management has the broader reach and the responsibility to effect or influence the overall attitude towards safety. If you talk about BBS a lot and talk about the numbers and make observations part of you eval. and tie it to an annual raise then its all about BBS and not safety. You cannot crush someone for a mistake but through thorough examination of human performance and motivation you can begin to establish a culture that values safety for its on sake. I don't care about the stats. I care about preventing you from getting hurt,overexposed,etc. Please forgive me, I'm a little rusty with expressing myself and I feel I'm beginning to drift. What have you seen that works? I do not wish only to question but to figure this out. I want to bring something back to the folks I work with. Am I making sense? We are not running around killing each other at srs but we could be better. MH
Already Gone:
People have three competing motivational centers which control every decision, and the behavior which results from those decisions.
The body -- do it because it feels good.
The ego -- do it because it looks good.
The soul (or conscience) -- do it because it is good.
The effective manager eliminates the body and the ego from the process OR uses them to guide behavior in the desired direction.
It feels good to get the job over and get to the relaxation that comes after. It feels bad to have to go all the way back to the tool crib to get the harness (correct tool, ladder, welding goggles, ... etc. ) that you should have brought to the job. So, we encourage them to do it the right way the first time because shortcuts will inevitably result in more work because they won't be allowed.
It looks good to get done on schedule. Refer to the do-over described above. It looks bad to get scolded for cheating on the safety rules. It looks bad to miss a scheduled completion time because you got sent back to get the right gear or had a job shut down for safety reasons.
Those who act on their conscience need no external stimulus to reshape their behavior. We give them positive recognition and reward, but they don't really need it.
Anyone can be under the influence of any of the three motivational forces at any given time. We reinforce safe behavior and react negatively to unsafe behavior. That way, all three bases are covered.
The reinforcement, both positive and negative, must come from the leadership. It doesn't work if the safety staff does all the right things and the management ignores or contradicts the message. Managers are people too. So their behavior has to be influenced as well. We reward management for supporting safe work by giving them the schedule and budget successes that come from safe performance. We give them negative reinforcement (condition reports, fines, work stoppages, bad performance reviews... etc.) when they fail to make safe decisions.
In any case, as long as we can make safe behavior easier, more efficient (meaning that they take fewer man-hours overall) cheaper, and more rewarding than unsafe behaviors, people at all levels will make safe choices that lead to safe behavior.
Wearing a hardhat is never stylish or comfortable, for example. People don't like wearing them. But, if it is an ingrained habit, we wear them without a second thought. We develop that habit because we were atn some point convinced that we were better off wearing them than not. It's just that simple and just that complicated at the same time.
co60slr:
--- Quote from: mutant on Mar 27, 2010, 08:55 ---That sounds like something that a freshman would read in Chapter 3 of a Psych 101 textbook used at any of 10,000 community colleges around the country. While the three motivators listed may influence some decisions and therefore behaviors, the list is certainly not all-inclusive.
Here are a few scenarios that do not fit the b-s-e list of decision influencers – unfortunately there are many others.
A laborer made a poor decision to enter a confined space without reading and understanding the entry permit, ensuring a confined space attendant was present, or verifying that the atmosphere was monitored for acceptable entry conditions. This unsafe behavior resulted in a fatality. Did he decide to enter the confined space because it felt good (body)? No. Because he thought it looked good (ego)? No. He certainly didn’t make the decision because it was good (conscience). He entered the confined space because his boss told him to. Neither individual had the training or knowledge to recognize right from wrong.
A traveling carpenter supporting a refueling outage was erecting scaffolding 35’ above the deck and although she was not protected from falling, she decided not to employ a fall protection system. She had been properly trained and fully understood that the site procedure required her to use a fall protection system under these working conditions. Why did she make this poor decision? Not because it made her look good, feel good, or because it was good. She made a poor decision to work unsafely because she needs money to feed her kids. Her perception (and perception in this case is reality) that a female traveler who brought up safety issues would be penciled in on the first lay-off list was the foundation of her decision making process.
--- End quote ---
The two scenarios are somewhat simplified and from them I can make no causal analysis as to why the workers did what they did. However, Scenario #1 suggests the supervisor is 100% accountable for the lack of safety. What actions does management take at this hypothetical facility when a supervisor endangers his/her workers? If nothing, than management is to blame. When was the last time that facility's corporate office sent a VP to the site to question management on their safety culture shortcomings? If never, than the CEO is to blame. It's all about Leadership.
In Scenario #2, was there fall protection available and she consciously decided not to use it? If so, she not only endangered her own life but the lives of her coworkers. How will she be held accountable? However...did she and her supervisor discuss the job, but not safety factors? Is it difficult to check out the required fall protection at this facility? Was she even trained on how to use all PPE required for her job? Etc, etc.
If ANY nuclear worker thinks that his/her job is in jeopardy if a safety concern is raised, then the General Manager of that facility is to blame, along with the culture that person has allowed to persist in that environment. There are surely more problems in such a nuclear organization than the lack of fall protection. Most nuclear organizations have programs in place to acknowledge anonymous workers and their concerns. If not, there are always outside organizations willing to listen to a truckload of worker complaints.
co60slr:
--- Quote from: mutant on Mar 27, 2010, 10:59 ---The VP at DCPP participates in the investigation of recordables (house and contractor) and visits the site where the event occurred. Other sites have the same level of oversight.
--- End quote ---
And my point is that the organizations that I have witnessed to have successful safety programs (i.e., Zero Deaths) are ones where senior management frequents job sites BEFORE the recordable. If not on the jobsite, than I have heard their consistent message daily at meetings: "Safety is #1".
I'll concede that there is no secret formula for this, other than top down leadership. For those Safety Managers that do not have the support of their senior management, I salute you, sir/madam. You have a difficult uphill road ahead.
mostlyharmless:
This also is my opinion. For management to say "we give you the tools,now its up to you", is just lip service. You have to get out in the field and reinforce the culture. It bothers me to use terms like safety culture, I hear it so much from management types, but it works. What bothers me more is to have management expectations come down like edicts and then get promptly ignored by line management. Now, to follow the rules to the letter,to the point where you begin to tediously repeat things , and folks begin to tune it out is not healthy either. But you can cover what needs to be covered succinctly. As an example,pre-plans/pre-job discussions: there are things you have to cover and often there are several crafts involved or there are multiple hazards to discuss.With us the pre plan is proceduralized. Not completely, but there are things you have to cover and check off that you did. Things like the rwp,relevant ops procedures, criticality guidelines if necessary,etc. I have heard management expectations, been in the same room with managers listening to this and nodding their heads,"this is what we expect you to do". Then they don't do it, or they do it for a while then it goes away. A field presence can correct this. I believe the attitude in aggregate is set largely by top down management. This does not mean you have to swallow everything ,but it should bring down the recordables. And thats another subject,recordables vs. actually recorded.
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