Navy Nukes overmanned?

[bigadam5]

So I leave for boot camp in May. After doing my research on the nuke field in the navy, and talking to recruiters I had one question. Is the nuke field in the navy currently overmanned?

[crusemm]

from the Navy Personnel Command website:
http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/EF874E40-3C46-431C-952E-F2CF9A32FDF2/0/NAV08263.txt
highlights:
B.  CREO CATEGORY:  CREO CATEGORIES LISTED REPRESENT COMBINED MALE
AND FEMALE MANNING LEVELS.  CREO CATEGORIES ARE PROVIDED BY PAY GRADE
(E1-4/E5/E6).
        (1) "CREO 1" = UNDERMANNED
        (2) "CREO 2" = MANNED AT DESIRED LEVELS
        (3) "CREO 3" = OVERMANNED
                   CREO
                CATEGORY           NOTES
RATING         E1-4/E5/E6         (PARA 6)

EM(SS-N)          1/1/1              3
EM(SW-N)          1/1/1
ET(SS-N)          1/1/1              3
ET(SW-N)          1/1/1
MM(SS-N)          1/1/1              3
MM(SW-N)          1/1/1
5.  CRITICAL SKILLS LIST
    A.  USN CRITICAL SKILLS NAVY ENLISTED CLASSIFICATIONS (NECS):
3353   3354   3355   3356    3359 3363   3364   3365   3366
also this link might be helpful:
http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/E5D7B316-A39A-40D1-AD01-6F0DF0475F86/47313/SubEnlistedCareerPath.pdf
as compared to this one:
http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/0EE7F547-F4E9-43F3-B260-4D4DD393E7C2/0/MMOTHcareerpath.doc

In the 20+  years that I have been in the Navies nuclear power program, we have never, and I mean never been OVERmanned.  Chronically, consistently, and sometimes criminally UNDERmanned, yes, but not overmanned.  What you are seeing now, with lowering SRB's and enlistment bonuses is a reflection of the economy and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and what that does to OVERALL Navy manning, of which the nuclear community is only a tiny part.  It becomes really hard for the services to say, OK we need to cut our budgets, get rid of 1000 sailors, drop two obsolete ships, but this really tiny special group needs a lot more money.  Does not generally happen.  So, for now, and for the way forseeable future, the Navy will need lots and lots of young nucyalar cannon fodder (that would be you) to feed in to the pipeline filters pumps.
Thanks in advance for your service, welcome to Nukeworker, hope this helps
Peace-Matt

[JsonD13]

You would think that it is possible to cut more in some areas while increasing money to other areas.  It's called budgeting.  However, since big Navy doesn't tend to listen to the lower ranking personnel that are usually complaining the most about it, and the mission is being accomplished, there is no reason to give more money (hence the logic to lower bonuses in this economy).

If I were a smart man (and in the position to do so), I would increase the bonuses for nukes at this very time, in this economy.  It would raise the quantity and quality of qualified applicants at the same time.


Jason

[Fermi2]

You would think that it is possible to cut more in some areas while increasing money to other areas.  It's called budgeting.  However, since big Navy doesn't tend to listen to the lower ranking personnel that are usually complaining the most about it, and the mission is being accomplished, there is no reason to give more money (hence the logic to lower bonuses in this economy).

If I were a smart man (and in the position to do so), I would increase the bonuses for nukes at this very time, in this economy.  It would raise the quantity and quality of qualified applicants at the same time.


Jason

No it wouldn't, the bonuses have gone up 20 fold since I left the Navy and the quality of Navy Nukes has gone down far more than that.

Mike

[HydroDave63]

Restoring the draft to keep the system warm for 100,000 draftees/year would reduce the need for bonuses, increase readiness and manning wouldn't be a problem

[JsonD13]

Mike I would think that is more of a product of the training pipeline rather than the entrance process but I am sure there is someone on here who is more knowledgeable than me on the subject.

At least it would help manning levels with the college grads and dropouts that cant get jobs, and give them something more attractive than what is there now.

Maybe a strong advertising program would help too, I dont see too many Navy commercials on the TV anymore.  I suppose if they advertised that there was a job that would give them great training and set them up for a life of making plenty of cash, it probably would help.  Heck, there's plenty of people who would give them real life examples of how good they have it compared to before they got in.

New slogan for Navy Nukes could be, Accelerate your life, and your paycheck! And in the fine print, (6 year delay could apply).

Jason

[Fermi2]

It's a product of BOTH and do you honestly believe the Navy is going to turn away people who meet the academic requirements? And once in actually flunk someone out? If so you're naive and I have a bridge or two I'd love to sell you. It won't work, they've already tried it and it's a failure.

[JsonD13]

I saw it happen only once in the two years I was a SPU (and I tried more than once), and one guy in my power school class failed out.

But yep, on the whole I'll agree with ya Mike. 

I still like my slogan though.

Jason

[crusemm]

It's a product of BOTH and do you honestly believe the Navy is going to turn away people who meet the academic requirements? And once in actually flunk someone out? If so you're naive and I have a bridge or two I'd love to sell you. It won't work, they've already tried it and it's a failure.

I agree, the pipeline has become a pump, i.e. pass them at all costs, and if they can't pass it must be the instructors/program at fault for not adequately teaching them, not the sailors fault for failing to adequately learn.  I remember when (cue picture of old shaky man with cane and white hair) the program used to pride themselves on having a 50% attrition rate, beginning to end.  It used to be point of pride (at least it seemed to us students) with some instructors on exceeding that goal.  But, I digress from the original topic, and I still stand by my earlier post that the nuclear program is undermanned and will stay that way.  There are too many issues with work conditions and quality of life, and the caliber of personnel needed is such that they will always realize (sooner or later) that they can put their talents to better use somewhere else for it to be any other way.

[Fermi2]

I wasn't taking issue with your post. You hit it dead on, as you usually tend to do. My issue was with someone else's proposed misguided solution. The bonus solution never is a real solution. If the infrastructure is rotten putting a nice pretty coat of paint on won't change the date of it's eventual collapse.

[JsonD13]

I agree that the bonus is not a real solution, however, it is what gets them in the door (I know it got my broke, in debt butt in).  All I was trying to state in my original post in this thread was that this is not the time to be reducing bonuses, it is the time for aggressive recruiting (where all you really have is advertising and bonuses, right?).  I was in no way trying to say that money would fix the program, but can help with initial accessions.

I was just disagreeing with the thought that since the Navy is cutting back and cutting personnel, that it is a valid reasoning for cutting a bonus to one of the severly undermanned ratings the Navy has. 

I'd be curious to know what the SEAL bonus is doing as well, since most of them are usually CREO 1 (or at least was while I was in).

I left the Navy for a reason as well, and NO amount of money would have kept me in. 

Maybe I just overstepped my bounds in thinking that for increasing the number of applicants (which more money should do), you would increase the number of qualified individuals (a proportion of applicants), and also increase (not by the same proportion) the number of quality individuals.

Jason

[Fermi2]

So if you wanted people to paint your house and you a 100 dollar bonus to every painter who met the qualifications do you really think you're house would look worth a darn in the end?

[JsonD13]

Good analogy.  No, I dont think my house would necessarily look good (thank the lord for vinyl siding).  But this depends on many factors, including my intial standards, as well as any training I might send them through prior to actually painting my house.  They might even practice painting under the guidance of a master painter on a practice house and perform to a specific standard prior to painting my house.  But the training program would have to adhere to strict standards and have excellent supervisory oversight in order to ensure that the job would be completed with some predictability.  Also, standard of living would have to be adequate by middle class standards to ensure there would be enough painters to paint my neighbors house after I'm done.

But if I had a good program to weed out the truly qualified from the applicants (which the Navy does not have at the moment), I would find a really good set of painters for my $100 per person that I paid extra.  If I had some past performance to measure this off of, I might be able to say that the extra $100 made a difference since I was able to provide X many qualified painters, even though I had to decline XXX many applicants and fail out XX candidates throughout the training.

Part of the training process is to weed out the ones who will not perform predictably from those who will.  Since the Navy incurs a cost to bring these candidates in, maybe the reason why they really went to the mindset that if they are initially qualified that it is the instructor's fault when someone is recommended to fail, is to ensure that they minimize the financial loss they incur when someone fails.

This may not be the best analogy, but it may apply.  If you imagine SRO training, and the process that goes into hiring, training, and qualifying through the SRO pipeline.  I believe some time back that it was said that a good percentage (especially those instants straight from the Navy) fail out of the program.  So why would a company incur costs to fly someone out to interview, pay a good chunk of money (I believe my company paid over $1000 for me just to interview in person) to do so, just to have them fail out of the position they were qualified to train for a year or so later?  Did the company get much of anything useful out of them while they were training?  I believe that this is a part of the process that our companies expect and plan for because they have stringent standards that must be followed.

The same thought process used to exist for the Navy, the mindset was changed to not allow for failure.  It should be brought back along with higher bonuses.

I could be totally wrong on this, just trying to show my thought process.

Jason

[spekkio]

I don't think raising bonuses would achieve the results you seek regarding more interest and better quality.

People enlist in the military for many reasons, but very few enlist in the military for the money, let alone volunteer for submarine duty.

The conditions that turn people off from subs, and thus being nukes, are long periods of time underwater, cramped quarters, spartan living conditions, inability to contact ones family.

The conditions that cause Sailors to turn down reenlistment (based on a survey in the mid 90s) are being treated like meat by the command, feeling like they don't have an impact on the organization, not having enough responsibility/not feeling trusted, extended periods of time away from wife/children, extremely long working hours...there are a couple more I forget off the top of my head before you start to hit money.

Big Navy is slowly starting to get it, but they aren't quite there yet. In the end, though, there's not much you can do about the fact that submariners must go to sea in a 300x35' tube that smells funky for months on end, that there's really no recourse against shitty leadership, and that you can't fit enough people on board to significantly reduce working hours.

[Fermi2]

The trouble is, the Navy Nuclear Program training, and operationally doesn't have good standards, it doesn't even have average ones. Those standards it does have, it rarely adheres to. I don't buy your analogy for SRO Training. I've said dozens of times I do NOT agree with hiring SRO's directly out of the Navy. They simply for the most part do not have what it takes. The major difference between us and the Navy, outside our training programs are to the Nth degree harder, is we actually drop people from the program and those who make it through usually end up being dang fine operators.

Mike

[spekkio]

I don't know how things work in the civilian world, but theoretically you wouldn't need very bright people to operate Naval plants at all.

The nuclear Navy has a procedure that specifically details what to do for almost every feesible circumstance... "Turn this" "Turn this, aye" "Turning this" "Turning this, aye" "This is turned" "This is turned aye." If it doesn't specifically detail the procedure, then you need to ask someone with 10-20+ years of experience (eg, the edmc, eng, or the captain) what to do. It really doesn't take a genious to read a procedure, do it, repeat. Most of the incident reports arise from people failing to live up to this strict adherence, like when a qualified PVO operator suddeny decides radcon isn't important when removing a primary valve cap.

The smarts come in when it comes to having a theoretical understanding of the entire plant and how it operates, which is a standard that was implemented by Rickover with the founding of nuclear power. It's that theoretical knowledge that can help get a job in civvy land after the Navy or get an advanced degree, but knowing how to derive the reactor kinetics equations really doesn't help people operate the plant.

So I'm curious how you think that raising the standards of theoretical knowledge in the training pipeline is going to do to prevent operators from choosing to disregard procedures? I mean, you're talking about taking the brightest of the bright people, putting them through rigorous training, and then telling them that after all that they can't do a darn thing unless they read it out of a book first while being supervised by at least two people, no matter how many times they've done it before.

There's also the fact that the Navy doesn't take its pool of enlisted Sailors from college graduates. It has to operate on the lowest common denominator, which is a 17 year old high school graduate who probably has very little work experience and comes from a public education system that is way behind the power curve compared to our industrialized counterparts. If you wish to raise the standards that high, you're talking about attracting college graduates...and while the bonuses are nice, a college graduate with a technical degree can get out of college and earn an average salary of over $55k a year as a starting salary...without working 80 hour weeks. I'm sure the Navy would love to have the standard this high for all its Sailors, but with the nuclear Navy being under-manned currently, who's going to operate the plants?

[Fermi2]

The standards of knowing theory establish the work habits and basic fundamentals for operating. You just hit the problem. Since they aren't held to any sort of standing in their early phases they end up with no integrity and no operating ethic.

[spekkio]

I don't think that one necessarily has to do with the other, though. I don't think operators who violate procedures are necessarily too stupid for the program, nor do I think that (in most cases) they misunderstood what they were supposed to do. In some cases, such as the PVO incident, the operator understood that there was a 99.999% chance that no contamination would be found, which, paired with a desire to get out of work early, led him to skip a step he deemed unimportant because he understood the plant.

As for integrity, I don't think that dead horse can be beaten anymore than it's already being done, but people still decide to take shortcuts. Perhaps it's the understanding of the plant that leads operators to be frustrated at how cumbersome the requirements can be to get anything done, thus prolonging already long work days? This frustrating then leads to the temptation to cut corners.

[Fermi2]

BS, it's indicative of the slow erosion of standards of excellent nuclear Operation that the Navy has suffered over the last 15 years or so.

[crusemm]

My personal opinion is that BZ's A (lowering standards) has led to spekkio's B (frustration leads to cutting corners).  Have standards slipped, hell yes.  Is there about twenty times too much oversight hell yes.  The slipping standards lead to increased oversight which leads to frustration and a feeling of well, we're screwed anyway, lets just cut this corner so we can get out a little early, leads to getting caught, leads to increased oversight ad nauseum into death spiral.  I personally think that sometime in the late 80's, early 90's there was a shift away from personal accountability, find the problem and fix it, get on with business to find the scapegoat, add another layer of supervision, Write a more detailed procedure to address every little thing, and don't ask the operators to think anymore.  Until, here we are, death spiral.

[RDTroja]

That's a cultural problem manifested on the deckplates,....

Everybody thinks they're too smart for the program,....

Years and years of primary and secondary education programs telling little kiddies that just because they breathe they are worth something,..

    that intelligence and knowledge are intrinsic virtues as opposed to earned commodities,..

    that what went before you is not to be respected, learned and built upon, but is inherently
    flawed and unworthy of your pure, youthful intellect and virtue,..

    that the world would just coast along with nothing but green fields and fuzzy
    bunnies if the curmudgeons of society would just recognize the balance and harmony you
    bring to the planet simply by your own special existence,..

Navy nuke can be overmanned, at least from a budget perspective. The fix is easy enough, dump the senior guys into the civilian world and free up that money for lower cost junior personnel, how else do you explain the RIFS of the 1990's?!?!?!

(sic)

Bull's eye.

[Marlin]

I don't know how things work in the civilian world, but theoretically you wouldn't need very bright people to operate Naval plants at all.

The nuclear Navy has a procedure that specifically details what to do for almost every feesible circumstance... "Turn this" "Turn this, aye" "Turning this" "Turning this, aye" "This is turned" "This is turned aye." If it doesn't specifically detail the procedure, then you need to ask someone with 10-20+ years of experience (eg, the edmc, eng, or the captain) what to do. It really doesn't take a genious to read a procedure, do it, repeat. Most of the incident reports arise from people failing to live up to this strict adherence, like when a qualified PVO operator suddeny decides radcon isn't important when removing a primary valve cap.

Very sad... if we followed procedures blindly and something went wrong we would have been charged with "Malicious Compliance" or "neglect". Why did they bother with so much training if you only had to follow a "cook book"? You have a very pessimistic view of plant operation.

[spekkio]

It's nothing personal , and I appreciate that you articulated the current opinion. Hopefully you see the angst in the rebuttals here isn't the old "you'll never be as good as we once were", but rather "there were foulups in our day, we were lucky they didnt get us killed, the rules are there for a reason, and it's your @$$ at risk now so use the rules and procedures and operating experience to your benefit."

You're preaching to the choir. I'm aware that procedures and precautions are there for a reason. If the 0.01% took over and there was significant contamination found (after who knows how many man hours were wasted cleaning up the resulting large spill from his negligence), he could've endangered the entire crew.

My point is that the Navy's answer to mistakes like these is more supervision... which leads to a more cumbersome process to get work done and overall lower morale.

BS, it's indicative of the slow erosion of standards of excellent nuclear Operation that the Navy has suffered over the last 15 years or so.

We'll have to agree to disagree. You could require a 4.0 in nuke school, and I still guaruntee that operators will feel compelled to cut corners or sometimes *gasp* make mistakes like normal humans do.

Very sad... if we followed procedures blindly and something went wrong we would have been charged with "Malicious Compliance" or "neglect". Why did they bother with so much training if you only had to follow a "cook book"? You have a very pessimistic view of plant operation.

My tone might be pessimistic, but the nuclear Navy preaches and trains 100% verbatim procedural complience. There is no other way. The fact that they are giving operators the theoretical knowledge to understand why is a gift, but I don't think it's necessary to know it at a 4.0 level to be proficient at operating.

[Gamecock]

[Marlin]

My tone might be pessimistic, but the nuclear Navy preaches and trains 100% verbatime procedural complienciance. There is no other way. The fact that they are giving operators the theoretical knowledge to understand why is a gift, but I don't think it's necessary to know it at a 4.0 level to be proficient at operating.

Passing is 2.8 or 3.0 right? Understanding what happens in the plant when you turn a valve or flip a switch is probably important don't you think. If the standard was 4.0 the pump would be a filter wouldn't it? I think you are missing the big picture.