What do you think is the nuke school passing percentage and why?

[Styrofoam]

What do you think is the nuke school passing percentage and why?

[MacGyver]

What do you think is the nuke school passing percentage and why?

50 / 50

You either pass or you don't!   







Seriously, in my day it was less than 10%, ymwv.

[jshinevar]

ummm... it's got to be pretty high now... I think the two largest things to keep you from making it through these days are alcohol and being fat.  hahahahaha.

[Estis]

ummm... it's got to be pretty high now... I think the two largest things to keep you from making it through these days are alcohol and being fat.  hahahahaha.

So it's still a pump, not a filter then? I know forum posts in previous years constantly bemoaned the "pump over filter" mentality of nuke school, but I was getting the impression from more recent posts that NNPP has been tightening things up a bit...

[Preciousblue1965]

All I can say is based on my experience, circa 2003-2006 is this:

Average 25-30 students per class, with a new class starting every 2 months, which means 6 classes every year for 3 years.

Thus approx. 540 students in 3 years and I only saw two fail out of prototype due to academics in the total of 3 years.

Assuming that is about par for each crew(5 crews), that gives about 2700 students per prototype times 4 prototypes gives us a failure rate of 40 per 18800 students over a three year period.  So you do the math for the percentage.

Note:  This is a very rough estimate, does not account for Power School failures, class size adjustments due to maintenance shutdowns, and other factors that I can't recall right now.  Of course I could be wrong.

[co60slr]

So it's still a pump, not a filter then? I know forum posts in previous years constantly bemoaned the "pump over filter" mentality of nuke school, but I was getting the impression from more recent posts that NNPP has been tightening things up a bit...

Yes, the purpose of the NNPP training pipeline is to put qualified operators in the Fleet.   (I'm certain that there are operators currently underway that hope to have a Nuclear Detailer that is able to send a new operator to relieve them someday).  Since a pump, by definition is a device that adds energy to a system, then yes, for once and for all, it's a pump.

In my experience, some of the people making the "I'm here to screen students out of MY Program" declarations should not ever have been operators themselves.  Luckily, many of them were later not promoted to E-7 or O-4, as the case warranted.   Again, Darwin always wins...just not always in the timeline you desire.

So, as a NPS or Prototype Instructor, your ADM has sent you a nuclear operations candidate.  It's your job to "add energy" and get him ready for the Fleet.   By doing so for even the slower of training candidates, you're developing your own skills as a future manager and leader, who can't always just "filter" (i.e., fire) everyone you don't like. 

Regardless, I have NEVER heard of someone getting "pumped" all the way to the Fleet and then transferred off their ship/boat in 12 months after being unable to get qualified.   It seems that even the most passionate "pump versus filter" debaters do like to get relieved in the end.

[Preciousblue1965]

Regardless, I have NEVER heard of someone getting "pumped" all the way to the Fleet and then transferred off their ship/boat in 12 months after being unable to get qualified.   It seems that even the most passionate "pump versus filter" debaters do like to get relieved in the end.

While I won't say I saw a person get canned after 12 months, I do know first hand of the following story:

A newly arrived EM3 arrives on USS Ustafish(CVN ##) and is sent to qualify BNEQ(Basic Nuclear Engineering Qualification) a.k.a all the systems.  He is also given the basic Log Recorder Phone Talker qual card.  After several months, said EM3 has still not qualified either of those and is coming up on his "drop dead date" for his quals.  He fails to qualify BNEQ and his basic watch station.  The RO interviews said EM3 to find out what the problem is.  After the interview was over, this EM3 was given a Shaft Alley Patrol qual card and told that that was the ONLY watch  that he would ever qualify on the ship(SAP being the first watch we give to undesignated boot camp types assigned to RX dept). 

Come to find out, one of his former instructors from Proto transfered onto the ship a few months later and informed us that they tried everything to get the kid dropped due to academics, but to no avail.  So there is some precedents there for bad operators getting to the fleet and then getting the can.

[Gamecock]

Come to find out, one of his former instructors from Proto transfered onto the ship a few months later and informed us that they tried everything to get the kid dropped due to academics, but to no avail.  

Obviously they didn't try everything.....

If the kid did not have the aptitude, then the staff did a disservice to the sailor by not aggressively pursuing disenrollment from the program.  He could have gone on to be a productive sailor in a non-nuclear rating.

[HydroDave63]

"Fleet needs more A-Gang!!"

[Preciousblue1965]

Obviously they didn't try everything.....

If the kid did not have the aptitude, then the staff did a disservice to the sailor by not aggressively pursuing disenrollment from the program.  He could have gone on to be a productive sailor in a non-nuclear rating.

I have to disagree, it takes an insane amount of effort to get a kid disenrolled from the program(at least it did 4 years ago).  We had kids fail their comp twice only to have the test "regraded" by a civilian and he magically gets a just passing grade.  Had students couldn't pass a final watch, until they put the student with an ELT SPU on a casualty watch in which the casualties never affected the watch station(all he had to do was log the event and take his hourly logs).  We had an entire chain of command recommend that a student be dropped, only to get it denied by the top Training Manager.  The two we did get dropped from the program basically failed on purpose by giving up completely(got no progress over two week period and joined square root club on a test and retest) and basically told the TM they wanted to fail out. 

So it isn't staff not aggressively pursuing disenrollment as it is civilians that are trying to keep numbers up and refusing to let a student get academically disenrolled(pretty easy to not care the quality of students when once they are gone you don't have to deal with them again).

[haverty]

90%.

Why?

easy ->



In all seriousness... there are guys here that are painfully stupid, and it takes us dragging them tooth and nail all the way through their qualifications. But as said before, when its 0615, and Im getting relieved... I dont really care who is relieving me. I would love to see some more discretion, but in the end, they have a system, and it works fine.

[co60slr]

In all seriousness... there are guys here that are painfully stupid, and it takes us dragging them tooth and nail all the way through their qualifications. But as said before, when its 0615, and Im getting relieved... I dont really care who is relieving me. I would love to see some more discretion, but in the end, they have a system, and it works fine.

Seriously?  You're going to post this after you ask for help with a General Discharge?   What would your "stupid shipmates" say about your on-watch panic attacks, NJP, and General Discharge?

I agree.  The system does work fine.

[DDMurray]

90%.

Why?

easy ->



In all seriousness... there are guys here that are painfully stupid, and it takes us dragging them tooth and nail all the way through their qualifications. But as said before, when its 0615, and Im getting relieved... I dont really care who is relieving me. I would love to see some more discretion, but in the end, they have a system, and it works fine.

In all seriousness if you'd let somebody relieve you at 0615 who wasn't fit to stand watch, you are likely in the wrong business.

[spekkio]

The problem isn't the standard at prototype; it's the lack of senior enlisted personnel in operational ships when everyone gets out after 6-8 years. The same guys who are struggling to make it through prototype are being mentored in the fleet by a guy who's only been on the boat for a couple years himself. Then when a major problem or maintenance evolution comes up no one in the division has seen/done it before, things get a little rough.

Nothing makes up for experience, and making it harder to pass through training on a plant that doesn't exist in the fleet isn't going to solve anything.

[Yaeger]

I'm sure everyone has had 'that guy' in their division where they're not trusted to do anything by themselves. All it does is create more work for the people that CAN pull their own weight.

I've always thought the pump is a necessary evil to meet the needs of increased operational requirements, more budget cuts, and more oversight. Oftentimes you don't need a outstanding worker, just a warm body to fill a spot on a watch-bill while the rest of the watch team picks up the slack.

[Preciousblue1965]

I'm sure everyone has had 'that guy' in their division where they're not trusted to do anything by themselves. All it does is create more work for the people that CAN pull their own weight.

I've always thought the pump is a necessary evil to meet the needs of increased operational requirements, more budget cuts, and more oversight. Oftentimes you don't need a outstanding worker, just a warm body to fill a spot on a watch-bill while the rest of the watch team picks up the slack.

Yes but if the Navy were to upgrade to the today's technology, they could easily chop down the necessary people by close to half using automation and computer controls.  So upgrade equipment, lessen the need for "warm bodies", allow for high attrition rate without sacrificing operational readiness of the fleet, reestablish standards commensurate with what would be expected for the nature of nuclear operations. 

[Yaeger]

Yes but if the Navy were to upgrade to the today's technology, they could easily chop down the necessary people by close to half using automation and computer controls.  So upgrade equipment, lessen the need for "warm bodies", allow for high attrition rate without sacrificing operational readiness of the fleet, reestablish standards commensurate with what would be expected for the nature of nuclear operations. 

True, but I don't think the Navy is ever going to spend significant resources when what they have is reliable, tested, and still effective. I used to serve aboard a 688 in E-div, they chopped out our workbench to make room for newer gear. I spent over 4 years sitting on the floor doing all of my training, maintenance, and other paperwork. I think the priority will always be maximum mission readiness with the lowest cost, regardless of newer/better technology, quality of life, and training out in CivPAC.

The same is true with the pipeline, why throw away a large investment by the Navy when the system is designed to continually protect him/her from serious mistakes?

I think there's a dartboard in some Admiral's office somewhere, where he can toss the dart and decide what's an acceptable risk/reward scenario.

[spekkio]

There are several challenges to updating the technology in the plant:

1) The old stuff is proven to work. The Nuclear Navy knows its advantages and shortcomings. Why change something when it's working already?

2) Newer technology is typically smaller and lighter than older technology. How are submarines going to compensate for the lost weight in order to dive? The answer might be a hull redesign, which requires an entirely new class of ship. Good luck getting Congress to sign off on that when the SSN force is having trouble pitching their mission when they can't appreciably contribute to the ground wars in any way that another platform can't.

3) Before anything hits the fleet, it goes through years of R&D before starting to be built. The Virginia's are just hitting the fleet now, and they're being built with 90's technology. That's why they have a photonics mast displayed on a low-res screen where your vision is actually worse than a traditional periscope. In 2010, you could put an iphone on a pole and get better resolution, but the Navy can't do that.

[HydroDave63]

There are several challenges to updating the technology in the plant:

1) The old stuff is proven to work. The Nuclear Navy knows its advantages and shortcomings. Why change something when it's working already?
True

2)  How are submarines going to compensate for the lost weight in order to dive?
Same way as it has always been done, as in flooding volume and those funny curved tank thingies in the ballast tanks. Just sayin'

3)   In 2010, you could put an iphone on a pole and get better resolution, but the Navy can't do that.
Ever seen the infrastructure and evolutions the yardbirds have to go through to deal with the older pre-electronic optics mast? Besides, I doubt the iPhone is rated to XXX feet of depth in salt water, rad-hardened electronics, etc. It's easy to criticize, but at least have a truly working alternative, please.

[DDMurray]

There are several challenges to updating the technology in the plant:

1) The old stuff is proven to work. The Nuclear Navy knows its advantages and shortcomings. Why change something when it's working already?

2) Newer technology is typically smaller and lighter than older technology. How are submarines going to compensate for the lost weight in order to dive? The answer might be a hull redesign, which requires an entirely new class of ship. Good luck getting Congress to sign off on that when the SSN force is having trouble pitching their mission when they can't appreciably contribute to the ground wars in any way that another platform can't.

3) Before anything hits the fleet, it goes through years of R&D before starting to be built. The Virginia's are just hitting the fleet now, and they're being built with 90's technology. That's why they have a photonics mast displayed on a low-res screen where your vision is actually worse than a traditional periscope. In 2010, you could put an iphone on a pole and get better resolution, but the Navy can't do that.

Have you ridden a 774 class?  To say their photonics are worse than periscopes is not true.  That's like saying the old tagout system was better than SOMS.

The effects on buoyancy/list/trim is calculated for all modifications to submarines.  One of the problems with much of the newer equipment is the heat they produce and their reliability in harsh environments.

The nuclear navy has whole teams dedicated to improving their equipment.  The leap to the 774 class was pretty big- forward and aft.  That is a big risk to take.  Downplaying recent advances does not tell the whole story.  Now if we could just get modern technology to clean and paint, then we'd have something.

[Gamecock]

2) Newer technology is typically smaller and lighter than older technology. How are submarines going to compensate for the lost weight in order to dive? The answer might be a hull redesign, which requires an entirely new class of ship. Good luck getting Congress to sign off on that when the SSN force is having trouble pitching their mission when they can't appreciably contribute to the ground wars in any way that another platform can't.

Ask any dolphin wearing officer on your boat how we get the ship to dive.   The answer isn't a hull re-design.

[retired nuke]

Ask any dolphin wearing officer on your boat how we get the ship to dive.   The answer isn't a hull re-design.

Shouldn't take an officer - that system (at least the simple explanation) was part of my dolphins too.....   

[gim73]

Shouldn't take an officer - that system (at least the simple explanation) was part of my dolphins too.....   

Ask a nuke and he could tell you at LEAST a dozen ways to sink the boat, each more complicated than the next. 

As for the iPhone... I wouldn't bring that flimsy thing on the boat to save my life.  I've seen some of the old school phones survive falls into the bilge and immersed in lube oil, and come out still working.  An iPhone would be broken a hundred times over before a typical refit was done, and don't even get me started about the effects of all that paint...

Not everyone is cut out for the nuke pipeline, and A-gang needs love as well.  Seriously, even the bottom half of nuke dropouts are better off than a good portion of humanity.  They have already proven that they can score in the top percentiles of testing.  Chances are that EM3 slacksalot will ride out his six years, use his GI bill and easily coast through college.  He might get fired at his first job for being a P.O.S. but that could happen to anyone.  Making his life miserable doesn't help you or him in the long run.  It might be that you surface guys can do this often, because I've heard similar stories just like this where somebody gets blacklisted from qualifying and spends the rest of his navy time doing mindless tasks.  That just doesn't fly in the submarine force.  I've worked with guys that barely made it through the pipeline.  There is more than one simple path to take.  Some of them are good at maintenance.  Others think great on their feet and can save your ass in a casualty.  Don't be too quick to dismiss somebody as a shitbag just because they don't know how to work the qualification checkout process and/or speak in front of a board.

[spekkio]

Ask any dolphin wearing officer on your boat how we get the ship to dive.   The answer isn't a hull re-design.

I'm aware of how we get the ship to dive, thank you. But removing tons upon tons of weight in favor of smaller, more current technology requires compensation. You also have to account for the fact that this compensation needs to be evenly distributed throughout the ship...so if you take out huge rod control cabinets for something smaller, you need to also do something forward to make sure the ship trims properly. Sometimes you can just put another tank in the middle of the space for the hell of it, sometimes you can't. When you can't, you need a hull redesign.

As for the iPhone... I wouldn't bring that flimsy thing on the boat to save my life.  I've seen some of the old school phones survive falls into the bilge and immersed in lube oil, and come out still working.  An iPhone would be broken a hundred times over before a typical refit was done, and don't even get me started about the effects of all that paint...

The iphone comment was a figure of speech. Jeez.

Besides, I doubt the iPhone is rated to XXX feet of depth in salt water, rad-hardened electronics, etc. It's easy to criticize, but at least have a truly working alternative, please.

We only employ optics near the surface, and it's relatively easy and cheap to make a material that's watertight for that depth.

Have you ridden a 774 class?  To say their photonics are worse than periscopes is not true.  That's like saying the old tagout system was better than SOMS.

I will admit that I haven't, but I also haven't heard a single good word about it from the officers who operate them regarding mission capability other than they like the fact that they don't have to dance with the one-eyed lady for hours on end. There are also a lot of extra limitations listed in the PEM about it that don't exist for the type 18, but perhaps there's some golden egg I don't know about.

[co60slr]

But removing tons upon tons of weight in favor of smaller, more current technology requires compensation. You also have to account for the fact that this compensation needs to be evenly distributed throughout the ship...so if you take out huge rod control cabinets for something smaller, you need to also do something forward to make sure the ship trims properly. Sometimes you can just put another tank in the middle of the space for the hell of it, sometimes you can't. When you can't, you need a hull redesign.

You're kidding here...right?

Ok, I'll bite.  What "hull design" do you think is done to redistribute weight when a few hundred pounds of cabinets are moved?

[Preciousblue1965]

You're kidding here...right?

Ok, I'll bite.  What "hull design" do you think is done to redistribute weight when a few hundred pounds of cabinets are moved?

Instead of a hull redesign we could just do away with the "food for freedom" policy now in place and send the "huskier" guys to subs for list control.  Ok that was just mean. 

[HydroDave63]

Instead of a hull redesign we could just do away with the "food for freedom" policy now in place and send the "huskier" guys to subs for list control.  Ok that was just mean. 

[crusemm]

I'm aware of how we get the ship to dive, thank you. But removing tons upon tons of weight in favor of smaller, more current technology requires compensation. You also have to account for the fact that this compensation needs to be evenly distributed throughout the ship...so if you take out huge rod control cabinets for something smaller, you need to also do something forward to make sure the ship trims properly.

Once did a major DMP where all of said equipment was replaced with different equipment (replaced analog rod control with type II I&C and microprocessor SGWLC).  At the end of said repairs, guess what we did to compensate? redistributed approx 500 lbs of lead weights and brought on about a 1000 lbs of new lead weights.  Tokk the Naval Architects about a week to do the calculations and vet them, and  the Bubba's about 2 days to do the work.  Only took so long because it was QA out the wazoo and had to be triple checked.  No "hull redesign". No big deal.  Navy doesn't use new stuff for all of the reasons stated above; Long approval process, stringent and lengthy testing process, going with a known quantity vice new tech (i.e risk averse), etc.  I can tell some stories about "new tech" that didn't last 2 months in the harsh environment of a submarine engineroom, and this is after all of the said testing was done.   :->So,  , I think that topic is done, if not though, here's a few more.    , now I gotta get back to  and other important things like  .

So,  , and have a Day
-Matt

[co60slr]

Once did a major DMP where all of said equipment was replaced with different equipment (replaced analog rod control with type II I&C and microprocessor SGWLC).  At the end of said repairs, guess what we did to compensate? redistributed approx 500 lbs of lead weights and brought on about a 1000 lbs of new lead weights.   

So, when you remove 500 lbs from the engineroom, all you have to do is add 500 lbs of ballast to the MBT???


You sure they didn't replace the entire hull during that DMP?    

[Gamecock]

Ask any dolphin wearing officer on your boat how we get the ship to dive.   The answer isn't a hull re-design.

So, when you remove 500 lbs from the engineroom, all you have to do is add 500 lbs of ballast to the MBT???


You sure they didn't replace the entire hull during that DMP?    

Once did a major DMP where all of said equipment was replaced with different equipment (replaced analog rod control with type II I&C and microprocessor SGWLC).  At the end of said repairs, guess what we did to compensate? redistributed approx 500 lbs of lead weights and brought on about a 1000 lbs of new lead weights.  Tokk the Naval Architects about a week to do the calculations and vet them, and  the Bubba's about 2 days to do the work. 

We have two winners....

By the way.....Naval Architects are some really smart guys

[S3GLMS]

     Something to get on thread topic.  I looked into the Graduation rate from My class in 1988 at NPS and it shows a first week light side class total of 705 students.  In my service record it shows 440 graduates 24 weeks later.  Some of those students were rolled back to other classes and a few went on to officer programs, but most were academic or personnel reliability program (PRP)failures.  I saw a similar rate in 1989 as a SPU reviewing student records as they came into prototype.  Then in 1990 things really started to change, we really started feeling the pump versus filter phenomenon as prototypes were getting less available due to age (S1G Decomm, S8G Waterbrake Broken, S1C decom plans, D1G COH for over a Year, MARF in a 2+ Year refuel, and the first two float-o-types were not ready yet in Charleston).  As I trained students through part of 1991 I noticed that less and less were failing out at Power school.  Other friends of mine who went back to prototype after I rotated to the fleet were giving me the same information. 
     
     There is no doubt that attrition and performance in NFAS and NPS were treated a lot differently in the past.  Just looking through my boot camp slass photo, 21 nukes and only 5 made it to the fleet.  The program was not made for people with tout the drive to be able to finish what you started.  The program was not about "helping" students make it through.  The "help" was provided but performance standards and academics were not sacrificed for any one student.  You had to put the hard effort in and meeet the requirements on every test and class in the program or you were facing an academic board. 

     I saw once in 2 years at prototype that a civillian over ruled an "AC" Board recommendatino and allowed a student to pass.  As expected it turned out Bad.  We heard from the fleet about three months later that the guy was denuked for blazing logs on shaft alley watch on the Big E.  The crew on the ship was mad at us, the staff at prototype, and we felt bad but had absolutely no power to do anything about it once the COC made the decision.  The standards worked then, and in my opinion, they performed an important function for the type of job we were being sent to do on a ship.  Once you left power school that formal classroom experience was essentially over and you did not have time to revisit that again especially on the ship, so you had to stand alone in knowledge from NPS to get qualified and do the ultimate job you were trained for at the controls and valves in the plant, without being a risk.

     The fact that less students fail today may be good.  I am sure it saves the navy money in costs for training and recruitment.  But it also has changed the fleet a little too I am sure, speaking as a former MM.  It seemed like every command I saw back in the day there were at least two people in A-Div that had failed out of the NUke Program.  On the nuclear ships this made them really valuable to the crew and they had a lot more formal trianing than the new fireman coming in from A-school, in a lot of cases and this was a huge boost to the conventional side of the rating.  So I do not know what impact that has had on all the rating mergers and training of crewmwmbers when ther are less Nuke school failures to move ouot to the conventional side of the fleet as ready made PO3's.

  Just my view on the topic, mileage may vary , I could be wrong etc.

[DDMurray]

@S3GLMS:
I agree with the heart of your comments.  In another thread, there was a big discussion about this.  In summary, I believe that we reached a point where recruiting and retention were on a collision course to risk undermanning the fleet.  ADM Bowman addressed this in the famous "Grassy Knoll Speech."  I had just reported for my second tour at NNPTC at that time (around spring 1998).  When I left NPS in July 1993, the message was, "Weed them out early, we don't want to risk sending a problem to the fleet."   When I arrived in March 1998, the message was, "Give students every chance to pass because the fleet needs them."  Several policies were implemented that changed how we made exams to make the target average higher.  More students were given second chances following military performance issues.  The natural result of this was that more students made it through, and in some case, passed the problems to the fleet.

I'm not sure how many attrited after reporting to their first command, but towards the end of my career, it seemed like there were a whole plethora of reasons first termers were not making it past initial quals.  I think it's unfair to attribute all of these to the "lowering of standards", but I'm also sure it's a contributor.

[Preciousblue1965]

 

Allow me to rant a little here about what I perceive to be a contributing issue to all of this.

In recent years, there has been a great push from those elected to get everyone to go to college, whether they really belong there or not.  It used to be that in order to go to college, you had few options:  Have money already or go really in debt via loans, be REALLY smart and get scholarships, be athletically inclined and get scholarships, or join the service and get the GI bill.  This ensured that there were plenty of qualified candidates that weren't super smart, but still above average, available to be put into the Nuclear Program in order to get the money for college.   

Fast forward to recent decade and now the government is throwing money around to anyone who has an inkling of going to college.  So now those that have above average intelligence have money for college without having to join the Navy, and generally don't fail out of college(assuming they are able to avoid partying themselves out of college).  So now the only ones left for the NNPP are those who party too hard, those that still can't manage to get into college(slighly less than average students), or those that don't fit into either of the other two categories such as those who join for family reasons, sense of service, etc.

So now we are starting off with a lower level of candidates to begin with before they even go to MEPS.  We are still trying to get the same results from substandard stock and it is causing a change in how things are done. 

My solution, do away with all the money from the Government for college such as lottery scholarships.  Of course this is going to be very unpopular, especially with those dang long hairs in California, but I enjoy making them mad. 

[haverty]

In all seriousness if you'd let somebody relieve you at 0615 who wasn't fit to stand watch, you are likely in the wrong business.

In all seriousness, if a chief reactor watch made it through the brief with the eoow and ppws without being fit to stand watch, something else was wrong. Stop reading in too much or putting words in my mouth. Enough with this holier then though crap. (Braced for smite)


On topic, I'm curious... what was the attrition rate at prototype back in the day?

[crusemm]

Back in the day 89-90 prototype attrition was very low, usually sue either to a physical inability to do the work, or intentional academic failures.  I would say <5%.  However, NNPS was very high, 30%-50% is what I remember for some classes.  The prototype attrition was so low because NNPS had already weeded out those with reliability / integrity issues, poor time management skills, and the other problem children.

[Gamecock]

On topic, I'm curious... what was the attrition rate at prototype back in the day?

True story....

When I classed up from MM A school at NFAS in Orlando back in 1990, we were sitting in a big room.


We were told to look left...then look right.

Then we were told that one of those guys would not make it through NFAS.

They were right.

All told, Less then half my NFAS class made it to the fleet as nukes.

Cheers,
GC

[MMM]

In all seriousness, if a chief reactor watch made it through the brief with the eoow and ppws without being fit to stand watch, something else was wrong. Stop reading in too much or putting words in my mouth. Enough with this holier then though crap. (Braced for smite)


On topic, I'm curious... what was the attrition rate at prototype back in the day?

I don't know what ship you're on, but in 16 years and three ships, the only time we do prewatch briefs was before major evolutions, so it's quite possible to have somebody come down to relieve who isn't fit to take the watch. Sometimes it's just that you've pulled into a foreign port, some guys on duty are sick and son't want to screw people out of hard earned liberty, sometimes they're just generally stupid, but it does happen.

[co60slr]

When I classed up from MM A school at NFAS in Orlando back in 1990, we were sitting in a big room.

We were told to look left...then look right.

Then we were told that one of those guys would not make it through NFAS.

They were right.

All told, Less then half my NFAS class made it to the fleet as nukes.

80s and early 90s was an interesting era for Navy Nukes as we approached the end of the cold war.  My NPS class had an enormous throughput (500+ in each class I think) and many of us where "held back" after each step due to class sizing issues.  From the start of boot camp to prototype graduation date, I spent 25 months in the training pipeline.  I don't recall the attrition rate being very high though.  Early was higher...perhaps due to the recruiting process not adequately screening people out.  As I went though 20 years though...people dropped out along the way at each step.  I've seen CPOs "wig out" and get denuked...some with a few Sub COs.

Also, a perspective for our OP is that there are different types of attrition.  While academic is most commonly referred to, other people "take the exit ramp" along the way for a variety of reasons:  drug testing, medical issues, security clearance issues, officer commissioning programs, etc.    I don't know what constitutes "attrition" for the official metric, but perhaps it's irrelevant to the discussion. 

Integrity.  Someone above mentioned that prototype should have flushed that out early.  While a challenging academic environment will certainly challenge everyone's integrity (including the Instructor's trying to get students to pass...[long story censored], I saw many people from E-4 through O-5 have their Integrity challenged along the way.  Some people have a very high integrity and always take the high road.  Some people like to cut corners will eventually get caught (see previous discussons on my Nuclear Darwin theory).  I'm not sure there are any absolutes out there other than this:  as a supervisor don't EVER put your people in a situation that forces them to test their Integrity (e.g., "get this impossible job done before you can go home today after working 24 hours yesterday and have duty again tomorrow").   That's a whole different thread.

The challenging aspect of being a nuclear operator is that for your entire career, you could be the next one out. Once you get your "license" at Prototype graduation (or later from the NRC), you'll have to continue to work hard to keep that license (e.g., requal, continuous training exams, etc).  Also, we're all one medical officer's signature away from being disqualified as well...where the older you get, the more likely something is to pop up.   You just never know.

[spekkio]

We have two winners....

By the way.....Naval Architects are some really smart guys

So you replaced one big, old, clunky system with another big, slightly less old, clunky system and use that as evidence that you don't need a hull redesign?

Hmm, I wonder why the Seawolves and VA's even exist. I suppose we could've just refit all the 688's and saved Uncle Sam some cash.

As for graduation rate, we lost over 20% of our nuclear power school class and another 20%-ish in prototype, and that was in the 21st century. The more things change...

At the same time, I don't think being able to regurgitate the proof for the Helmholtz equations, neutron lifetime equations, and calculate the voltage out across a bunch of SCR's has any bearing on how well someone can operate a nuclear power plant, but that's just me.

[co60slr]

I don't know what ship you're on, but in 16 years and three ships, the only time we do prewatch briefs was before major evolutions, so it's quite possible to have somebody come down to relieve who isn't fit to take the watch. Sometimes it's just that you've pulled into a foreign port, some guys on duty are sick and son't want to screw people out of hard earned liberty, sometimes they're just generally stupid, but it does happen.

The point is that during a watch relief process, it's your job to NOT turn over to someone that is sick, still drunk, hungover, etc.  "Fit for Duty" isn't a sliding scale that changes in International waters.  And no...we don't need any "sea stories" here on this topic.  

You're finishing up a duty day, it's 0630, and your relief FINALLY shows up, only for you to know he's still drunk from the great liberty port outing.   What do you do?  What do you do knowing that there's no one else to relieve you, you have 8 hours of RC DIV maintenance to do before you can finally go home to see the wife?

I have seen guys get into "hot water" for not being Fit for Duty on watch and the person who allowed him to relieve got questioned pretty hard as well.  When that questionable FFD situation results in a plant problem, there are normally 100 questions at the "critique".  Whether your relieve or not, whether you tell your CPO or not, whether you tell the EOOW/EDO or not...completely up to you.

The "correct answer" is irrelevant, since we all know it.  The interesting point is that this type of scenario WILL happen to you during your career where you'll be forced to choose the "high road" or the "easy way out".  Yes, human beings do both.  However, many job interview questions (and even Officer Candidate Recommendation Board questions) stem from situations like this.  "Tell us about a time where your Integrity was challenged.  What happened and what did you do?"   (Hint: I don't think "my integrity has never been challenged" is an acceptable answer).

[Gamecock]

At the same time, I don't think being able to regurgitate the proof for the Helmholtz equations, neutron lifetime equations, and calculate the voltage out across a bunch of SCR's has any bearing on how well someone can operate a nuclear power plant, but that's just me.

That's because you lack the proper program perspective.  You seem awful bitter to be just a JO.  Hopefully, you'll grow up before you become a DH, or you'll move on.

Cheers,
GC

[Gamecock]

Hmm, I wonder why the Seawolves and VA's even exist. I suppose we could've just refit all the 688's and saved Uncle Sam some cash.

SSN-21 class exists to win the Cold War....Done.....those boats were too expensive, though very good.

VA Class exists to replace aging SSN-688 class fleet....but, in case you missed it, we as a navy are strapped for cash.

So, we do not necessarily need the latest and greatest gadgets, which drive the costs of new construction through the roof.  So, there is the dilemma we now face.  What is good enough given the current and projected threat level.  I know you said in a previous post that the SSN fleet is lacking a mission.  I can tell you that from a more senior level that combat commanders are asking for more SSN support, not less.  We don't have enough SSNs to do all the things that combat commanders want. 

Hull re-design would costs $$$$$$ in R+D costs, not to mention that a first of its kind construction cost would also be astronomical.  Shipyards don't liketo build new things for cheap.  Its all about risk for them.

[Yaeger]

When are women submariners expected to start going through the pipeline to start manning the boomers for the Navy's new push?

[Styrofoam]

When are women submariners expected to start going through the pipeline to start manning the boomers for the Navy's new push?

Google is fun!  

http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/04/29/women.submarines/index.html

[Yaeger]

Oh cool, I didn't know they already started power school, thank you.

[crusemm]

SSN-21 class exists to win the Cold War....Done.....those boats were too expensive, though very good.

GC, I'll agree with you about the expensive part, that's what you get when the Navy only buys three of something and six spares.  When those six spares run out in the first 5 years, the contractors suddenly find that it is extremely expensive to make new ones---i.e monopoly pricing.  However I disagree with the second part of that statement.  They may be able to perform their mission well, but they are so damn hard to keep running, I can't call them good.  It's a lot like having a race car that requires a complete engine rebuild after every trip you take to the grocery store.
Just my opinion---I could be wrong
-Matt

[spekkio]

That's because you lack the proper program perspective.  You seem awful bitter to be just a JO.  Hopefully, you'll grow up before you become a DH, or you'll move on.

Cheers,
GC

I'm not bitter at all. I'm simply responding to the plethora of the "back in my day we had to walk 5 miles to school... up hill both ways... in the snow" type posts and the people who think that the solution to "fixing" NNP is a harder training pipeline.

I did perfectly fine in both power school and prototype, but I have yet to utilize any of the above knowledge in my daily operations of the plant. So this is not a rant from someone who thought power school was too hard. I just don't think that increasing the standard in making people learn how to design a reactor is going to necessarily make them operate said reactor any better.

Like I said, the real problem I see in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership. That means you have very junior chiefs and first classes who are filling roles that people who have twice their experience should be filling, and part of their job is to train the new guys. I'm quite sure this is, at least partially, the result of decades worth of poor retention and competition from a lucrative position at a civilian plant. The high standard is still there, there just isn't the manpower around to fill it.

[co60slr]

Like I said, the real problem I see in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership. That means you have very junior chiefs and first classes who are filling roles that people who have twice their experience should be filling, and part of their job is to train the new guys. I'm quite sure this is, at least partially, the result of decades worth of poor retention and competition from a lucrative position at a civilian plant.

As an Officer, you have to be careful of publicly blaming the Enlisted community for all of your problems.  There's two deeper issues to your observation, which is simply a symptom...as you suggest with the retention numbers.

First, if your wardroom recognizes that you have a weak goat locker, then put away the movies and cribbage boards and get out into the plant.  In your previous posting about the "almost incident report", you (i.e., Officer) could have recognized the weaknesses in your guys and stayed there to watch and ask questions.  (Especially if the evolution was something that could result in a formal problem report).  You don't need to have 20 years of experience to be an effective leader.   In fact, I've met many in the Navy with 20+ that should have left LONG before they did.   So, while we can banter about "the problem", senior enlisted/officers should work together on their ship to solve the problem.   A Chief's job is no where near the Goat Locker (contrary to an increasingly popular opinion in the 21st century), and an Officer's job isn't only on the Conn playing with the periscope.

So, this is your issue, not mine.  But since you're publicly complaining, I'm left wondering what leadership you're applying to the problem in your case.  You might consider sharing some "real life" experience with all these kids you give officer commissioning advice to in other threads and give them a taste for how it's not all about wearing a fancy uniform and impressing the ladies as Hollywood might suggest.  Nuclear Managers (military and commercial) face tough issues...starting with personnel.  I seriously doubt your CO has allowed you to say to him what you've told us in this forum.  "But Captain...they won't LISTEN to me!  I told them to leave the [really important reactor control switch] in the [really important] position, but they didn't do it."  Yep...it was your fault and if you're a weak leader, then your CO likely chewed on your Department Head as well.  Yep...his fault to for not fixing you.

Note: A problem reporting document is to share "lessons learned" with your peers to help them prevent similar mistakes.  You said you "almost had to write one".  One solution (i.e., how to fix the NNPP topic) is to make these reports less punitive and more accessible across the Fleet.  If you are concerned with nuclear experience, you would have volunteered to write this report instead of saying "Whew, that was a close call".

The role of design knowledge helps your young nukes who might otherwise cut corners, not cut those corners.  Us nukes are like kids in this manner...I'm not going to do it because you "ordered me to", I want to know WHY it has to be done this way.  For example, overpressurizing the primary plant is more severe at colder temperatures and later in core life.  Why?  Is that irrelevant knowledge for your reactor operators?  Also, given what I've been taught about metallurgy, a submarine hull cannot be extended indefinitely via "refits".  There are submarine officers in Washington, DC that spend a LOT of time with life cycle engineering principles of "can this old submarine still dive". 

If a nuclear manager (officer, enlisted, civilian) doesn't care about the "whys" behind things and doesn't care if their Reactor Operators understand reactor kinetics equations, then I honestly don't see much hope for their nuclear career.  (Hint: that was a root problem at TMI in 1979).  The entire NNPP is built around the simple fundamental principle of "questioning to the void".  It works when an inexperienced manager is leading inexperienced people, and it works really well if you understand the design "whys" behind things.   

So, is this all just my rant and opinion?  Ask the USS HAMPTON CO (circa 2007).  He spoke as you did, he had weak enlisted personnel...many of them were reassigned, but guess who still got fired?
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/4479

If you don't find your anchors and shoulder boards a bit heavy as you go to work, you're in the wrong business.

Co60

[spekkio]

CO, you make some very valid points. I will address some of the assumptions you have made, though:

First, if your wardroom recognizes that you have a weak goat locker, then put away the movies and cribbage boards and get out into the plant.  In your previous posting about the "almost incident report", you (i.e., Officer) could have recognized the weaknesses in your guys and stayed there to watch and ask questions.  (Especially if the evolution was something that could result in a formal problem report).

Per the EDM, I had to control the evolution from maneuvering while the EDPO supervised at the scene. This wasn't something I authorized inbetween hands of cribbage with a bad movie playing in the wardroom. We conducted a brief and specifically covered the pertinent precaution and how to follow it. The operator still had a brain fart, despite having performed the evolution many times. This is why I didn't actually take any heat from the CoC when I had to explain what happened to the Eng and CO.

You don't need to have 20 years of experience to be an effective leader.   In fact, I've met many in the Navy with 20+ that should have left LONG before they did.   So, while we can banter about "the problem", senior enlisted/officers should work together on their ship to solve the problem.   A Chief's job is no where near the Goat Locker (contrary to an increasingly popular opinion in the 21st century), and an Officer's job isn't only on the Conn playing with the periscope.

I agree, but somehow I find that the goat locker, at least in our engineroom, tends to be very high on knowledge but low on leadership. I don't know if this is due to inexperience in having many chiefs themselves or something that is a symptom of a bigger Navy problem.

Now, I'm not saying that the issue is exclusive to senior enlisted leadership...the Navy has more than its fair share of bad officers as well. Retention problems there create a situation that anyone with a pulse will get a DH tour.

So, this is your issue, not mine.  But since you're publicly complaining,

I'm not complaining, I'm stating a simple fact that the chiefs and PO1's in the nuclear Navy are very junior. There isn't a chief in our engineroom that has more than 10 years of service (besides the EDMC, who is an outstanding leader IMO and does not uphold any of the E-9 stereotypes people joke about), and most of the PO1's have less than 6 years of at sea experience.

I'm left wondering what leadership you're applying to the problem in your case.  You might consider sharing some "real life" experience with all these kids you give officer commissioning advice to in other threads and give them a taste for how it's not all about wearing a fancy uniform and impressing the ladies as Hollywood might suggest.  Nuclear Managers (military and commercial) face tough issues...starting with personnel.  I seriously doubt your CO has allowed you to say to him what you've told us in this forum.  "But Captain...they won't LISTEN to me!  I told them to leave the [really important reactor control switch] in the [really important] position, but they didn't do it."  Yep...it was your fault and if you're a weak leader, then your CO likely chewed on your Department Head as well.  Yep...his fault to for not fixing you.

I really can't go into details without airing dirty laundry, but I have been very proactive about the issue.

Note: A problem reporting document is to share "lessons learned" with your peers to help them prevent similar mistakes.  You said you "almost had to write one".  One solution (i.e., how to fix the NNPP topic) is to make these reports less punitive and more accessible across the Fleet.  If you are concerned with nuclear experience, you would have volunteered to write this report instead of saying "Whew, that was a close call".

Training was conducted with the entire engineroom about the incident.

The role of design knowledge helps your young nukes who might otherwise cut corners, not cut those corners.  Us nukes are like kids in this manner...I'm not going to do it because you "ordered me to", I want to know WHY it has to be done this way.  For example, overpressurizing the primary plant is more severe at colder temperatures and later in core life.  Why?  Is that irrelevant knowledge for your reactor operators?  Also, given what I've been taught about metallurgy, a submarine hull cannot be extended indefinitely via "refits".  There are submarine officers in Washington, DC that spend a LOT of time with life cycle engineering principles of "can this old submarine still dive".

A valid point, but it's also their responsibility to ask the question if something doesn't make sense. There's always someone who can explain it to them, and the T-manuals also do a good job.  

If a nuclear manager (officer, enlisted, civilian) doesn't care about the "whys" behind things and doesn't care if their Reactor Operators understand reactor kinetics equations, then I honestly don't see much hope for their nuclear career.  (Hint: that was a root problem at TMI in 1979).  The entire NNPP is built around the simple fundamental principle of "questioning to the void".  It works when an inexperienced manager is leading inexperienced people, and it works really well if you understand the design "whys" behind things.

I can see what you're saying, and I should probably rephrase what I said earlier: there are aspects of the NNP training program that are integral to understanding how to operate a plant. Things like basic heat transfer, temperature limits, and how reactivity behaves are all very important concepts. On the other hand, though, there are parts of the program that are patently ridiculous. For one test, I had to memorize the Navy definition of RAM and ROM. So when you say that you want to make the program "harder," are you advocating for more of this senseless stuff or holding people to a higher standard of the important stuff?

[co60slr]

So when you say that you want to make the program "harder," are you advocating for more of this senseless stuff or holding people to a higher standard of the important stuff?

Excellent post. You don't answer to me though...your clarification for your young audience here is more important.  "A day in the life of a Nuclear Officer".  Nice.

I don't think the Program (military or commercial) needs to be harder, but this is a tough issue.  Our regulators (NR and NRC) have to have a system in place such that we never let our guard down.  As such, you're left with the feeling that "we can never win".   However, by keeping the reactor safe...far from problems outside of even design margins, then we've won.

Co60

[DDMurray]

In all seriousness, if a chief reactor watch made it through the brief with the eoow and ppws without being fit to stand watch, something else was wrong. Stop reading in too much or putting words in my mouth. Enough with this holier then though crap. (Braced for smite)


On topic, I'm curious... what was the attrition rate at prototype back in the day?

WRT your response to my response, I'll leave it at, "I see".

WRT to NPTU attrition, it used to be very low.  In my class (8502), I think we lost two guys at S3G.  Total pipeline attrition used to be about 50%, if I recall correctly.

[MMM]

When I went though NPTU (9504) I think we lost about 5 people. One was incompentent on watch, the others went out drinking (underage) the night before graduation and got caught.

NNPTC was a lot rougher, I think we lost 25%, my section was almost 50%, although mostly due to bad decision making/integrity. A couple were medical and there were a few academic.

[Neutron_Herder]

I was in class 9002, and I don't think we lost any enlisted people during prototype at S3G...  I can remember the staff complaining about how it was a pump and not a filter.

'A' school and NNPS were a different story though.  We had about 50% of the people that started 'A' school graduate from Power School.  Not all of it was due to academic failures, but most of them were.

[DDMurray]

Like I said, the real problem I see in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership. That means you have very junior chiefs and first classes who are filling roles that people who have twice their experience should be filling, and part of their job is to train the new guys. I'm quite sure this is, at least partially, the result of decades worth of poor retention and competition from a lucrative position at a civilian plant. The high standard is still there, there just isn't the manpower around to fill it.

Let me re-phrase for you:  "From my limited experience I believe the real problem in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership, because the JOs and DHs are so clueless, a lack of backup from experienced enlisted leaders has been the cause of many critiqueable events."

From my experience, due to the poor initial training and lack of motivation of JOs many of the managerial/admin tasks have been passed down to the Chief Petty Officers such that they have to spend so much time on admin that they do not spend enough time on the deckplates.
Examples:  Fitness reports, training reports, maintenance records, log package reviews, personal awards.  The mantra, "Officers fight the ship, Chiefs run the ship," has been used as an excuse for officers to abdicate their primary duty, which is filling the role they have been assigned. 

[IPREGEN]

Good post Marssim. I go back to class 7408, yes I'm still alive

60 people in my boot company- Orlando, about 4 set back / non swimmers / academic, one suicide attempt (got a Dear John letter")
MMA school - Great Lakes, every person made it except for the standard occasional hardship for family or the like
Nuke school - Mare Island, they dropped like Marines on a beach, roughly 35% went "to the fleet"
Prototype -A1W Idaho, only lost a few, they developed a case of not giving a crap because of the workload and hours, back then you would put in the hours until qualified, 16 hour Thursdays to only do 8 on Friday until "in hull", then 12's or more until qualified. But this is where we did see that all the book learning folks did not always do well in the physical plant
ELT Idaho- we all made it
Fleet, CGN-25, Bainbridge- everybody qualified, some just took longer

[spekkio]

Let me re-phrase for you:  "From my limited experience I believe the real problem in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership, because the JOs and DHs are so clueless, a lack of backup from experienced enlisted leaders has been the cause of many critiqueable events."

From my experience, due to the poor initial training and lack of motivation of JOs many of the managerial/admin tasks have been passed down to the Chief Petty Officers such that they have to spend so much time on admin that they do not spend enough time on the deckplates.

You can take it as an insult if you wish, but nuke chiefs and PO1's being junior is a fact, not an opinion. Very few, if any, other ratings have people getting promoted to E-5 (and sometimes E-6) before they even go to a sea command because they can pass some exams. Now Big Navy is only going to allot your division X E-6's, and 1 is only performing at the E-4 level because he hasn't been in a sea command. This is the same guy, if he scores high enough, who could make chief his first time up as long as he does his job and the nuclear Navy continues to have manning issues.

As for JO training, that is another can of worms and I certainly am not going to defend the Navy's process for preparing a new Ensign/LTJG to hit the fleet and excel in the role as a DIVO. Motivation? That is highly individualized, and generally speaking I find officers to be no more or less motivated than their enlisted counterparts.

[Gamecock]

Let me re-phrase for you:  "From my limited experience I believe the real problem in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership, because the JOs and DHs are so clueless, a lack of backup from experienced enlisted leaders has been the cause of many critiqueable events."

From my experience, due to the poor initial training and lack of motivation of JOs many of the managerial/admin tasks have been passed down to the Chief Petty Officers such that they have to spend so much time on admin that they do not spend enough time on the deckplates.
Examples:  Fitness reports, training reports, maintenance records, log package reviews, personal awards.  The mantra, "Officers fight the ship, Chiefs run the ship," has been used as an excuse for officers to abdicate their primary duty, which is filling the role they have been assigned. 

When I was a young ensign, I thought that the job of the chief was to train....and that training included the JO's.

I hope this thread does not degenerate into a chiefs vs. officer bash session

[MMM]

Hopefully if an E-6 is working at the level of an E-4, his COC will recognize that and award him the appropeiate evals, preventing him from making chief. I know I've seen it done a couple times. Substandard E-6 shows up (who had been at sea before), acts like a 3rd class or FN, gets a really crappy eval, specifically low/average marks in Prof Knowledge and Leadership.

Although on the flip side, if that same E-6 leaves the command for a non-nuclear billet (i.e. recruiting), and happens to excel there, he could make chief, which sort of sucks.

[DDMurray]

You bring up a great point.  If the Chief trains the Ensign, what does the rest of the Wardroom do with the Ensign?  The Chief trains him in how the division supports the mission and gives him pointers on effective leadership, liking owning a problem instead of blaming it on the blue shirt.   The Chief also trains the Ensign that when the CO/XO/ENG puts out a plan, it is our plan; so that when we brief the boys, it's "Here's what we're doing," vice "The ENG/CO/XO said we have to...".   My guess is, the JOs will say the Chiefs are not doing this.  The Chiefs will say the JOs aren't interested in getting too deep into the division because they are only there to punch their "nuke ticket" so they can go forward and "learn to fight the ship".

The training of JOs and our junior enlisted are a couple of areas that are really hurting the NNPP.  Poor retention exacerbates both.  Every single person joins the NNPP voluntarily to be succesful.  Our screening process should ensure that those who start the pipeline finish.  Between NFAS/O-NPS and qualifying SIR/PNEO we are not keeping our best and brightest at a pace that ensures only the best reach the next level of leadership.  Knowing this, do our ISICs and TYCOMs grant our boats a little leeway?  No.  In fact, they demand that we do more with less.  Because of this, we work our people too many hours and force too many requirements/best practices down their throats.  

I'm not interested in a enlisted vs. officer debate either.  However, I will not stand by and let someone say, "...the real problem I see in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership...." and let it go by without a rebuttal.

[IPREGEN]

The Navy is just like anywhere else, good and bad leadership is part of life. But sometimes what is perceived as a bad organization is just evidence that that person making the noise is not a good fit for that type of environment. We had a couple of CO's that I thought were a little eccentric, but they displayed great leadership at crunch time. If you are not a good fit where you are then the simple solution is suck it up, finish your obligation and move on.

[NHSparky]

     Something to get on thread topic.  I looked into the Graduation rate from My class in 1988 at NPS and it shows a first week light side class total of 705 students.  In my service record it shows 440 graduates 24 weeks later. 

I hear ya--I was 8801 (grad in March 1988 from NPS.)  626 started, 474 finished.  We were actually above the average at the time.  I remember when I was in NFAS and 8704 graduated NPS, the grad rate was UNDER 50 percent for that class, and Admiral McKee himself came down to find out why.

I think the emphasis was on getting the non-hackers out early, hence one of the reasons (but hardly the only one) to shift over to NFAS versus the old BEE/A-school in Great Lakes format.

Long story short, slackers have ALWAYS gotten through the system, but in the current system they're caught and weeded out a lot earlier, or at least that's the appearance I'm getting.

As far as to WHY, I'd venture to say that DU/motiviational are as prevalent as purely academic reasons--and most of the academic ones are guys who just didn't want the program anymore and quit.

Bottom line, the number was around 45-50 percent of those who start made it back in my (your) day, and I wouldn't imagine that number has changed all that much.

[NHSparky]

Hopefully if an E-6 is working at the level of an E-4, his COC will recognize that and award him the appropeiate evals, preventing him from making chief. I know I've seen it done a couple times. Substandard E-6 shows up (who had been at sea before), acts like a 3rd class or FN, gets a really crappy eval, specifically low/average marks in Prof Knowledge and Leadership.

Although on the flip side, if that same E-6 leaves the command for a non-nuclear billet (i.e. recruiting), and happens to excel there, he could make chief, which sort of sucks.

Which was my last duty station before I got out.  CRF and submariners do not mix.  CRF and nuke submariners--that's even worse.

Then again, I never understood the mentality of the Chief Recruiter who had a AFQT of 29 AND WAS PROUD OF IT.  I wish I was kidding.

[deltarho]

In my prototype at Idaho, we had a guy make Paul Harvey news.  Nope, it wasn't flattering.  Seems that he decided to clean the dust off the star of a police car at the local Best Western where the officers were eating at the diner and the squid was going to the lounge--prelubricated.  For some reason he couldn't wait to get inside to relieve himself and saw that he could kill two birds with one stone: community service and an empty bladder.  The cops didn't have the same outlook.  Two days after the event, it was commented on by Paul Harvey on the radio and the next day he was 'splaining himself to the Captain of the base.  This was when the NPTU staff stuck their proverbial necks on the line and vouched for the sailor (by the way, he was an ET--shocking, I know!).  Although he lost 1/2 of two month's pay, and understand he had his reduction in rank suspended only because the Command Masterchief couldn't stop laughing during Captain's Mast...but that just may be a sandcrab story.

[Fermi2]

Class 8502 started with something like 600 sailors and graduated about 300 or so, out of that IIRC something like 225 made it through Prototype.

[Jechtm]

OOOOOh I see what you did there!

[DDMurray]

Class 8502 started with something like 600 sailors and graduated about 300 or so, out of that IIRC something like 225 made it through Prototype.

I was in 8502.  Small world.