What do you think is the nuke school passing percentage and why?

[Preciousblue1965]

You're kidding here...right?

Ok, I'll bite.  What "hull design" do you think is done to redistribute weight when a few hundred pounds of cabinets are moved?

Instead of a hull redesign we could just do away with the "food for freedom" policy now in place and send the "huskier" guys to subs for list control.  Ok that was just mean. 

[HydroDave63]

Instead of a hull redesign we could just do away with the "food for freedom" policy now in place and send the "huskier" guys to subs for list control.  Ok that was just mean. 

[crusemm]

I'm aware of how we get the ship to dive, thank you. But removing tons upon tons of weight in favor of smaller, more current technology requires compensation. You also have to account for the fact that this compensation needs to be evenly distributed throughout the ship...so if you take out huge rod control cabinets for something smaller, you need to also do something forward to make sure the ship trims properly.

Once did a major DMP where all of said equipment was replaced with different equipment (replaced analog rod control with type II I&C and microprocessor SGWLC).  At the end of said repairs, guess what we did to compensate? redistributed approx 500 lbs of lead weights and brought on about a 1000 lbs of new lead weights.  Tokk the Naval Architects about a week to do the calculations and vet them, and  the Bubba's about 2 days to do the work.  Only took so long because it was QA out the wazoo and had to be triple checked.  No "hull redesign". No big deal.  Navy doesn't use new stuff for all of the reasons stated above; Long approval process, stringent and lengthy testing process, going with a known quantity vice new tech (i.e risk averse), etc.  I can tell some stories about "new tech" that didn't last 2 months in the harsh environment of a submarine engineroom, and this is after all of the said testing was done.   :->So,  , I think that topic is done, if not though, here's a few more.    , now I gotta get back to  and other important things like  .

So,  , and have a Day
-Matt

[co60slr]

Once did a major DMP where all of said equipment was replaced with different equipment (replaced analog rod control with type II I&C and microprocessor SGWLC).  At the end of said repairs, guess what we did to compensate? redistributed approx 500 lbs of lead weights and brought on about a 1000 lbs of new lead weights.   

So, when you remove 500 lbs from the engineroom, all you have to do is add 500 lbs of ballast to the MBT???


You sure they didn't replace the entire hull during that DMP?    

[Gamecock]

Ask any dolphin wearing officer on your boat how we get the ship to dive.   The answer isn't a hull re-design.

So, when you remove 500 lbs from the engineroom, all you have to do is add 500 lbs of ballast to the MBT???


You sure they didn't replace the entire hull during that DMP?    

Once did a major DMP where all of said equipment was replaced with different equipment (replaced analog rod control with type II I&C and microprocessor SGWLC).  At the end of said repairs, guess what we did to compensate? redistributed approx 500 lbs of lead weights and brought on about a 1000 lbs of new lead weights.  Tokk the Naval Architects about a week to do the calculations and vet them, and  the Bubba's about 2 days to do the work. 

We have two winners....

By the way.....Naval Architects are some really smart guys

[S3GLMS]

     Something to get on thread topic.  I looked into the Graduation rate from My class in 1988 at NPS and it shows a first week light side class total of 705 students.  In my service record it shows 440 graduates 24 weeks later.  Some of those students were rolled back to other classes and a few went on to officer programs, but most were academic or personnel reliability program (PRP)failures.  I saw a similar rate in 1989 as a SPU reviewing student records as they came into prototype.  Then in 1990 things really started to change, we really started feeling the pump versus filter phenomenon as prototypes were getting less available due to age (S1G Decomm, S8G Waterbrake Broken, S1C decom plans, D1G COH for over a Year, MARF in a 2+ Year refuel, and the first two float-o-types were not ready yet in Charleston).  As I trained students through part of 1991 I noticed that less and less were failing out at Power school.  Other friends of mine who went back to prototype after I rotated to the fleet were giving me the same information. 
     
     There is no doubt that attrition and performance in NFAS and NPS were treated a lot differently in the past.  Just looking through my boot camp slass photo, 21 nukes and only 5 made it to the fleet.  The program was not made for people with tout the drive to be able to finish what you started.  The program was not about "helping" students make it through.  The "help" was provided but performance standards and academics were not sacrificed for any one student.  You had to put the hard effort in and meeet the requirements on every test and class in the program or you were facing an academic board. 

     I saw once in 2 years at prototype that a civillian over ruled an "AC" Board recommendatino and allowed a student to pass.  As expected it turned out Bad.  We heard from the fleet about three months later that the guy was denuked for blazing logs on shaft alley watch on the Big E.  The crew on the ship was mad at us, the staff at prototype, and we felt bad but had absolutely no power to do anything about it once the COC made the decision.  The standards worked then, and in my opinion, they performed an important function for the type of job we were being sent to do on a ship.  Once you left power school that formal classroom experience was essentially over and you did not have time to revisit that again especially on the ship, so you had to stand alone in knowledge from NPS to get qualified and do the ultimate job you were trained for at the controls and valves in the plant, without being a risk.

     The fact that less students fail today may be good.  I am sure it saves the navy money in costs for training and recruitment.  But it also has changed the fleet a little too I am sure, speaking as a former MM.  It seemed like every command I saw back in the day there were at least two people in A-Div that had failed out of the NUke Program.  On the nuclear ships this made them really valuable to the crew and they had a lot more formal trianing than the new fireman coming in from A-school, in a lot of cases and this was a huge boost to the conventional side of the rating.  So I do not know what impact that has had on all the rating mergers and training of crewmwmbers when ther are less Nuke school failures to move ouot to the conventional side of the fleet as ready made PO3's.

  Just my view on the topic, mileage may vary , I could be wrong etc.

[DDMurray]

@S3GLMS:
I agree with the heart of your comments.  In another thread, there was a big discussion about this.  In summary, I believe that we reached a point where recruiting and retention were on a collision course to risk undermanning the fleet.  ADM Bowman addressed this in the famous "Grassy Knoll Speech."  I had just reported for my second tour at NNPTC at that time (around spring 1998).  When I left NPS in July 1993, the message was, "Weed them out early, we don't want to risk sending a problem to the fleet."   When I arrived in March 1998, the message was, "Give students every chance to pass because the fleet needs them."  Several policies were implemented that changed how we made exams to make the target average higher.  More students were given second chances following military performance issues.  The natural result of this was that more students made it through, and in some case, passed the problems to the fleet.

I'm not sure how many attrited after reporting to their first command, but towards the end of my career, it seemed like there were a whole plethora of reasons first termers were not making it past initial quals.  I think it's unfair to attribute all of these to the "lowering of standards", but I'm also sure it's a contributor.

[Preciousblue1965]

 

Allow me to rant a little here about what I perceive to be a contributing issue to all of this.

In recent years, there has been a great push from those elected to get everyone to go to college, whether they really belong there or not.  It used to be that in order to go to college, you had few options:  Have money already or go really in debt via loans, be REALLY smart and get scholarships, be athletically inclined and get scholarships, or join the service and get the GI bill.  This ensured that there were plenty of qualified candidates that weren't super smart, but still above average, available to be put into the Nuclear Program in order to get the money for college.   

Fast forward to recent decade and now the government is throwing money around to anyone who has an inkling of going to college.  So now those that have above average intelligence have money for college without having to join the Navy, and generally don't fail out of college(assuming they are able to avoid partying themselves out of college).  So now the only ones left for the NNPP are those who party too hard, those that still can't manage to get into college(slighly less than average students), or those that don't fit into either of the other two categories such as those who join for family reasons, sense of service, etc.

So now we are starting off with a lower level of candidates to begin with before they even go to MEPS.  We are still trying to get the same results from substandard stock and it is causing a change in how things are done. 

My solution, do away with all the money from the Government for college such as lottery scholarships.  Of course this is going to be very unpopular, especially with those dang long hairs in California, but I enjoy making them mad. 

[haverty]

In all seriousness if you'd let somebody relieve you at 0615 who wasn't fit to stand watch, you are likely in the wrong business.

In all seriousness, if a chief reactor watch made it through the brief with the eoow and ppws without being fit to stand watch, something else was wrong. Stop reading in too much or putting words in my mouth. Enough with this holier then though crap. (Braced for smite)


On topic, I'm curious... what was the attrition rate at prototype back in the day?

[crusemm]

Back in the day 89-90 prototype attrition was very low, usually sue either to a physical inability to do the work, or intentional academic failures.  I would say <5%.  However, NNPS was very high, 30%-50% is what I remember for some classes.  The prototype attrition was so low because NNPS had already weeded out those with reliability / integrity issues, poor time management skills, and the other problem children.

[Gamecock]

On topic, I'm curious... what was the attrition rate at prototype back in the day?

True story....

When I classed up from MM A school at NFAS in Orlando back in 1990, we were sitting in a big room.


We were told to look left...then look right.

Then we were told that one of those guys would not make it through NFAS.

They were right.

All told, Less then half my NFAS class made it to the fleet as nukes.

Cheers,
GC

[MMM]

In all seriousness, if a chief reactor watch made it through the brief with the eoow and ppws without being fit to stand watch, something else was wrong. Stop reading in too much or putting words in my mouth. Enough with this holier then though crap. (Braced for smite)


On topic, I'm curious... what was the attrition rate at prototype back in the day?

I don't know what ship you're on, but in 16 years and three ships, the only time we do prewatch briefs was before major evolutions, so it's quite possible to have somebody come down to relieve who isn't fit to take the watch. Sometimes it's just that you've pulled into a foreign port, some guys on duty are sick and son't want to screw people out of hard earned liberty, sometimes they're just generally stupid, but it does happen.

[co60slr]

When I classed up from MM A school at NFAS in Orlando back in 1990, we were sitting in a big room.

We were told to look left...then look right.

Then we were told that one of those guys would not make it through NFAS.

They were right.

All told, Less then half my NFAS class made it to the fleet as nukes.

80s and early 90s was an interesting era for Navy Nukes as we approached the end of the cold war.  My NPS class had an enormous throughput (500+ in each class I think) and many of us where "held back" after each step due to class sizing issues.  From the start of boot camp to prototype graduation date, I spent 25 months in the training pipeline.  I don't recall the attrition rate being very high though.  Early was higher...perhaps due to the recruiting process not adequately screening people out.  As I went though 20 years though...people dropped out along the way at each step.  I've seen CPOs "wig out" and get denuked...some with a few Sub COs.

Also, a perspective for our OP is that there are different types of attrition.  While academic is most commonly referred to, other people "take the exit ramp" along the way for a variety of reasons:  drug testing, medical issues, security clearance issues, officer commissioning programs, etc.    I don't know what constitutes "attrition" for the official metric, but perhaps it's irrelevant to the discussion. 

Integrity.  Someone above mentioned that prototype should have flushed that out early.  While a challenging academic environment will certainly challenge everyone's integrity (including the Instructor's trying to get students to pass...[long story censored], I saw many people from E-4 through O-5 have their Integrity challenged along the way.  Some people have a very high integrity and always take the high road.  Some people like to cut corners will eventually get caught (see previous discussons on my Nuclear Darwin theory).  I'm not sure there are any absolutes out there other than this:  as a supervisor don't EVER put your people in a situation that forces them to test their Integrity (e.g., "get this impossible job done before you can go home today after working 24 hours yesterday and have duty again tomorrow").   That's a whole different thread.

The challenging aspect of being a nuclear operator is that for your entire career, you could be the next one out. Once you get your "license" at Prototype graduation (or later from the NRC), you'll have to continue to work hard to keep that license (e.g., requal, continuous training exams, etc).  Also, we're all one medical officer's signature away from being disqualified as well...where the older you get, the more likely something is to pop up.   You just never know.

[spekkio]

We have two winners....

By the way.....Naval Architects are some really smart guys

So you replaced one big, old, clunky system with another big, slightly less old, clunky system and use that as evidence that you don't need a hull redesign?

Hmm, I wonder why the Seawolves and VA's even exist. I suppose we could've just refit all the 688's and saved Uncle Sam some cash.

As for graduation rate, we lost over 20% of our nuclear power school class and another 20%-ish in prototype, and that was in the 21st century. The more things change...

At the same time, I don't think being able to regurgitate the proof for the Helmholtz equations, neutron lifetime equations, and calculate the voltage out across a bunch of SCR's has any bearing on how well someone can operate a nuclear power plant, but that's just me.

[co60slr]

I don't know what ship you're on, but in 16 years and three ships, the only time we do prewatch briefs was before major evolutions, so it's quite possible to have somebody come down to relieve who isn't fit to take the watch. Sometimes it's just that you've pulled into a foreign port, some guys on duty are sick and son't want to screw people out of hard earned liberty, sometimes they're just generally stupid, but it does happen.

The point is that during a watch relief process, it's your job to NOT turn over to someone that is sick, still drunk, hungover, etc.  "Fit for Duty" isn't a sliding scale that changes in International waters.  And no...we don't need any "sea stories" here on this topic.  

You're finishing up a duty day, it's 0630, and your relief FINALLY shows up, only for you to know he's still drunk from the great liberty port outing.   What do you do?  What do you do knowing that there's no one else to relieve you, you have 8 hours of RC DIV maintenance to do before you can finally go home to see the wife?

I have seen guys get into "hot water" for not being Fit for Duty on watch and the person who allowed him to relieve got questioned pretty hard as well.  When that questionable FFD situation results in a plant problem, there are normally 100 questions at the "critique".  Whether your relieve or not, whether you tell your CPO or not, whether you tell the EOOW/EDO or not...completely up to you.

The "correct answer" is irrelevant, since we all know it.  The interesting point is that this type of scenario WILL happen to you during your career where you'll be forced to choose the "high road" or the "easy way out".  Yes, human beings do both.  However, many job interview questions (and even Officer Candidate Recommendation Board questions) stem from situations like this.  "Tell us about a time where your Integrity was challenged.  What happened and what did you do?"   (Hint: I don't think "my integrity has never been challenged" is an acceptable answer).

[Gamecock]

At the same time, I don't think being able to regurgitate the proof for the Helmholtz equations, neutron lifetime equations, and calculate the voltage out across a bunch of SCR's has any bearing on how well someone can operate a nuclear power plant, but that's just me.

That's because you lack the proper program perspective.  You seem awful bitter to be just a JO.  Hopefully, you'll grow up before you become a DH, or you'll move on.

Cheers,
GC

[Gamecock]

Hmm, I wonder why the Seawolves and VA's even exist. I suppose we could've just refit all the 688's and saved Uncle Sam some cash.

SSN-21 class exists to win the Cold War....Done.....those boats were too expensive, though very good.

VA Class exists to replace aging SSN-688 class fleet....but, in case you missed it, we as a navy are strapped for cash.

So, we do not necessarily need the latest and greatest gadgets, which drive the costs of new construction through the roof.  So, there is the dilemma we now face.  What is good enough given the current and projected threat level.  I know you said in a previous post that the SSN fleet is lacking a mission.  I can tell you that from a more senior level that combat commanders are asking for more SSN support, not less.  We don't have enough SSNs to do all the things that combat commanders want. 

Hull re-design would costs $$$$$$ in R+D costs, not to mention that a first of its kind construction cost would also be astronomical.  Shipyards don't liketo build new things for cheap.  Its all about risk for them.

[Yaeger]

When are women submariners expected to start going through the pipeline to start manning the boomers for the Navy's new push?

[Styrofoam]

When are women submariners expected to start going through the pipeline to start manning the boomers for the Navy's new push?

Google is fun!  

http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/04/29/women.submarines/index.html

[Yaeger]

Oh cool, I didn't know they already started power school, thank you.

[crusemm]

SSN-21 class exists to win the Cold War....Done.....those boats were too expensive, though very good.

GC, I'll agree with you about the expensive part, that's what you get when the Navy only buys three of something and six spares.  When those six spares run out in the first 5 years, the contractors suddenly find that it is extremely expensive to make new ones---i.e monopoly pricing.  However I disagree with the second part of that statement.  They may be able to perform their mission well, but they are so damn hard to keep running, I can't call them good.  It's a lot like having a race car that requires a complete engine rebuild after every trip you take to the grocery store.
Just my opinion---I could be wrong
-Matt

[spekkio]

That's because you lack the proper program perspective.  You seem awful bitter to be just a JO.  Hopefully, you'll grow up before you become a DH, or you'll move on.

Cheers,
GC

I'm not bitter at all. I'm simply responding to the plethora of the "back in my day we had to walk 5 miles to school... up hill both ways... in the snow" type posts and the people who think that the solution to "fixing" NNP is a harder training pipeline.

I did perfectly fine in both power school and prototype, but I have yet to utilize any of the above knowledge in my daily operations of the plant. So this is not a rant from someone who thought power school was too hard. I just don't think that increasing the standard in making people learn how to design a reactor is going to necessarily make them operate said reactor any better.

Like I said, the real problem I see in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership. That means you have very junior chiefs and first classes who are filling roles that people who have twice their experience should be filling, and part of their job is to train the new guys. I'm quite sure this is, at least partially, the result of decades worth of poor retention and competition from a lucrative position at a civilian plant. The high standard is still there, there just isn't the manpower around to fill it.

[co60slr]

Like I said, the real problem I see in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership. That means you have very junior chiefs and first classes who are filling roles that people who have twice their experience should be filling, and part of their job is to train the new guys. I'm quite sure this is, at least partially, the result of decades worth of poor retention and competition from a lucrative position at a civilian plant.

As an Officer, you have to be careful of publicly blaming the Enlisted community for all of your problems.  There's two deeper issues to your observation, which is simply a symptom...as you suggest with the retention numbers.

First, if your wardroom recognizes that you have a weak goat locker, then put away the movies and cribbage boards and get out into the plant.  In your previous posting about the "almost incident report", you (i.e., Officer) could have recognized the weaknesses in your guys and stayed there to watch and ask questions.  (Especially if the evolution was something that could result in a formal problem report).  You don't need to have 20 years of experience to be an effective leader.   In fact, I've met many in the Navy with 20+ that should have left LONG before they did.   So, while we can banter about "the problem", senior enlisted/officers should work together on their ship to solve the problem.   A Chief's job is no where near the Goat Locker (contrary to an increasingly popular opinion in the 21st century), and an Officer's job isn't only on the Conn playing with the periscope.

So, this is your issue, not mine.  But since you're publicly complaining, I'm left wondering what leadership you're applying to the problem in your case.  You might consider sharing some "real life" experience with all these kids you give officer commissioning advice to in other threads and give them a taste for how it's not all about wearing a fancy uniform and impressing the ladies as Hollywood might suggest.  Nuclear Managers (military and commercial) face tough issues...starting with personnel.  I seriously doubt your CO has allowed you to say to him what you've told us in this forum.  "But Captain...they won't LISTEN to me!  I told them to leave the [really important reactor control switch] in the [really important] position, but they didn't do it."  Yep...it was your fault and if you're a weak leader, then your CO likely chewed on your Department Head as well.  Yep...his fault to for not fixing you.

Note: A problem reporting document is to share "lessons learned" with your peers to help them prevent similar mistakes.  You said you "almost had to write one".  One solution (i.e., how to fix the NNPP topic) is to make these reports less punitive and more accessible across the Fleet.  If you are concerned with nuclear experience, you would have volunteered to write this report instead of saying "Whew, that was a close call".

The role of design knowledge helps your young nukes who might otherwise cut corners, not cut those corners.  Us nukes are like kids in this manner...I'm not going to do it because you "ordered me to", I want to know WHY it has to be done this way.  For example, overpressurizing the primary plant is more severe at colder temperatures and later in core life.  Why?  Is that irrelevant knowledge for your reactor operators?  Also, given what I've been taught about metallurgy, a submarine hull cannot be extended indefinitely via "refits".  There are submarine officers in Washington, DC that spend a LOT of time with life cycle engineering principles of "can this old submarine still dive". 

If a nuclear manager (officer, enlisted, civilian) doesn't care about the "whys" behind things and doesn't care if their Reactor Operators understand reactor kinetics equations, then I honestly don't see much hope for their nuclear career.  (Hint: that was a root problem at TMI in 1979).  The entire NNPP is built around the simple fundamental principle of "questioning to the void".  It works when an inexperienced manager is leading inexperienced people, and it works really well if you understand the design "whys" behind things.   

So, is this all just my rant and opinion?  Ask the USS HAMPTON CO (circa 2007).  He spoke as you did, he had weak enlisted personnel...many of them were reassigned, but guess who still got fired?
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/4479

If you don't find your anchors and shoulder boards a bit heavy as you go to work, you're in the wrong business.

Co60

[spekkio]

CO, you make some very valid points. I will address some of the assumptions you have made, though:

First, if your wardroom recognizes that you have a weak goat locker, then put away the movies and cribbage boards and get out into the plant.  In your previous posting about the "almost incident report", you (i.e., Officer) could have recognized the weaknesses in your guys and stayed there to watch and ask questions.  (Especially if the evolution was something that could result in a formal problem report).

Per the EDM, I had to control the evolution from maneuvering while the EDPO supervised at the scene. This wasn't something I authorized inbetween hands of cribbage with a bad movie playing in the wardroom. We conducted a brief and specifically covered the pertinent precaution and how to follow it. The operator still had a brain fart, despite having performed the evolution many times. This is why I didn't actually take any heat from the CoC when I had to explain what happened to the Eng and CO.

You don't need to have 20 years of experience to be an effective leader.   In fact, I've met many in the Navy with 20+ that should have left LONG before they did.   So, while we can banter about "the problem", senior enlisted/officers should work together on their ship to solve the problem.   A Chief's job is no where near the Goat Locker (contrary to an increasingly popular opinion in the 21st century), and an Officer's job isn't only on the Conn playing with the periscope.

I agree, but somehow I find that the goat locker, at least in our engineroom, tends to be very high on knowledge but low on leadership. I don't know if this is due to inexperience in having many chiefs themselves or something that is a symptom of a bigger Navy problem.

Now, I'm not saying that the issue is exclusive to senior enlisted leadership...the Navy has more than its fair share of bad officers as well. Retention problems there create a situation that anyone with a pulse will get a DH tour.

So, this is your issue, not mine.  But since you're publicly complaining,

I'm not complaining, I'm stating a simple fact that the chiefs and PO1's in the nuclear Navy are very junior. There isn't a chief in our engineroom that has more than 10 years of service (besides the EDMC, who is an outstanding leader IMO and does not uphold any of the E-9 stereotypes people joke about), and most of the PO1's have less than 6 years of at sea experience.

I'm left wondering what leadership you're applying to the problem in your case.  You might consider sharing some "real life" experience with all these kids you give officer commissioning advice to in other threads and give them a taste for how it's not all about wearing a fancy uniform and impressing the ladies as Hollywood might suggest.  Nuclear Managers (military and commercial) face tough issues...starting with personnel.  I seriously doubt your CO has allowed you to say to him what you've told us in this forum.  "But Captain...they won't LISTEN to me!  I told them to leave the [really important reactor control switch] in the [really important] position, but they didn't do it."  Yep...it was your fault and if you're a weak leader, then your CO likely chewed on your Department Head as well.  Yep...his fault to for not fixing you.

I really can't go into details without airing dirty laundry, but I have been very proactive about the issue.

Note: A problem reporting document is to share "lessons learned" with your peers to help them prevent similar mistakes.  You said you "almost had to write one".  One solution (i.e., how to fix the NNPP topic) is to make these reports less punitive and more accessible across the Fleet.  If you are concerned with nuclear experience, you would have volunteered to write this report instead of saying "Whew, that was a close call".

Training was conducted with the entire engineroom about the incident.

The role of design knowledge helps your young nukes who might otherwise cut corners, not cut those corners.  Us nukes are like kids in this manner...I'm not going to do it because you "ordered me to", I want to know WHY it has to be done this way.  For example, overpressurizing the primary plant is more severe at colder temperatures and later in core life.  Why?  Is that irrelevant knowledge for your reactor operators?  Also, given what I've been taught about metallurgy, a submarine hull cannot be extended indefinitely via "refits".  There are submarine officers in Washington, DC that spend a LOT of time with life cycle engineering principles of "can this old submarine still dive".

A valid point, but it's also their responsibility to ask the question if something doesn't make sense. There's always someone who can explain it to them, and the T-manuals also do a good job.  

If a nuclear manager (officer, enlisted, civilian) doesn't care about the "whys" behind things and doesn't care if their Reactor Operators understand reactor kinetics equations, then I honestly don't see much hope for their nuclear career.  (Hint: that was a root problem at TMI in 1979).  The entire NNPP is built around the simple fundamental principle of "questioning to the void".  It works when an inexperienced manager is leading inexperienced people, and it works really well if you understand the design "whys" behind things.

I can see what you're saying, and I should probably rephrase what I said earlier: there are aspects of the NNP training program that are integral to understanding how to operate a plant. Things like basic heat transfer, temperature limits, and how reactivity behaves are all very important concepts. On the other hand, though, there are parts of the program that are patently ridiculous. For one test, I had to memorize the Navy definition of RAM and ROM. So when you say that you want to make the program "harder," are you advocating for more of this senseless stuff or holding people to a higher standard of the important stuff?

[co60slr]

So when you say that you want to make the program "harder," are you advocating for more of this senseless stuff or holding people to a higher standard of the important stuff?

Excellent post. You don't answer to me though...your clarification for your young audience here is more important.  "A day in the life of a Nuclear Officer".  Nice.

I don't think the Program (military or commercial) needs to be harder, but this is a tough issue.  Our regulators (NR and NRC) have to have a system in place such that we never let our guard down.  As such, you're left with the feeling that "we can never win".   However, by keeping the reactor safe...far from problems outside of even design margins, then we've won.

Co60