Like I said, the real problem I see in the fleet nuclear power is the lack of quality senior enlisted leadership. That means you have very junior chiefs and first classes who are filling roles that people who have twice their experience should be filling, and part of their job is to train the new guys. I'm quite sure this is, at least partially, the result of decades worth of poor retention and competition from a lucrative position at a civilian plant.
As an Officer, you have to be careful of publicly blaming the Enlisted community for all of your problems. There's two deeper issues to your observation, which is simply a symptom...as you suggest with the retention numbers.
First, if your wardroom recognizes that you have a weak goat locker, then put away the movies and cribbage boards and get out into the plant. In your previous posting about the "almost incident report", you (i.e., Officer) could have recognized the weaknesses in your guys and stayed there to watch and ask questions. (Especially if the evolution was something that could result in a formal problem report). You don't need to have 20 years of experience to be an effective leader. In fact, I've met many in the Navy with 20+ that should have left LONG before they did. So, while we can banter about "the problem", senior enlisted/officers should work together on their ship to solve the problem. A Chief's job is no where near the Goat Locker (contrary to an increasingly popular opinion in the 21st century), and an Officer's job isn't only on the Conn playing with the periscope.
So, this is your issue, not mine. But since you're publicly complaining, I'm left wondering what leadership you're applying to the problem in your case. You might consider sharing some "real life" experience with all these kids you give officer commissioning advice to in other threads and give them a taste for how it's not all about wearing a fancy uniform and impressing the ladies as Hollywood might suggest. Nuclear Managers (military and commercial) face tough issues...starting with personnel. I seriously doubt your CO has allowed you to say to him what you've told us in this forum. "But Captain...they won't LISTEN to me! I told them to leave the [really important reactor control switch] in the [really important] position, but they didn't do it." Yep...it was your fault and if you're a weak leader, then your CO likely chewed on your Department Head as well. Yep...his fault to for not fixing you.
Note: A problem reporting document is to share "lessons learned" with your peers to help them prevent similar mistakes. You said you "almost had to write one". One solution (i.e., how to fix the NNPP topic) is to make these reports less punitive and more accessible across the Fleet. If you are concerned with nuclear experience, you would have volunteered to write this report instead of saying "Whew, that was a close call".
The role of design knowledge helps your young nukes who might otherwise cut corners, not cut those corners. Us nukes are like kids in this manner...I'm not going to do it because you "ordered me to", I want to know WHY it has to be done this way. For example, overpressurizing the primary plant is more severe at colder temperatures and later in core life. Why? Is that irrelevant knowledge for your reactor operators? Also, given what I've been taught about metallurgy, a submarine hull cannot be extended indefinitely via "refits". There are submarine officers in Washington, DC that spend a LOT of time with life cycle engineering principles of "can this old submarine still dive".
If a nuclear manager (officer, enlisted, civilian) doesn't care about the "whys" behind things and doesn't care if their Reactor Operators understand reactor kinetics equations, then I honestly don't see much hope for their nuclear career. (Hint: that was a root problem at TMI in 1979). The entire NNPP is built around the simple fundamental principle of "questioning to the void". It works when an inexperienced manager is leading inexperienced people, and it works really well if you understand the design "whys" behind things.
So, is this all just my rant and opinion? Ask the USS HAMPTON CO (circa 2007). He spoke as you did, he had weak enlisted personnel...many of them were reassigned, but guess who still got fired?
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/4479If you don't find your anchors and shoulder boards a bit heavy as you go to work, you're in the wrong business.
Co60
