nuke plants, non-nuke plants and the navy

[Madcow43]

I just got out of the navy (I was a nuke) after 9 years, and went to work at a non-nuke plant.  Initially I really liked working there, but after a while some things started really getting to me.  Operators on the night shift will often go somewhere and sleep, sometimes even while they are the only ones in the control room.  Material problems and other abnormalities are ignored until something actually breaks.  I was wondering if all plants in the civilian world are like this as well, and it is something I will need to get used to, or if I am just at a bad plant. 

[JustinHEMI05]

I just got out of the navy (I was a nuke) after 9 years, and went to work at a non-nuke plant.  Initially I really liked working there, but after a while some things started really getting to me.  Operators on the night shift will often go somewhere and sleep, sometimes even while they are the only ones in the control room.  Material problems and other abnormalities are ignored until something actually breaks.  I was wondering if all plants in the civilian world are like this as well, and it is something I will need to get used to, or if I am just at a bad plant. 

Nuke plants are definitely not like that. Some used to be (mine for example), but not anymore.

Justin

[Khak-Hater]

Material problems and other abnormalities are ignored until something actually breaks.

It's important to remember that operation to failure is a totally acceptable maintenance methodology unless there is some negative repercussion associated with the failure. 

When I first got out of the Navy, I worked at a DOE nuclear facility where they didn't practice preventative maintenance.  The Maintenance Manager only focused on corrective maintenance.  The new Facility Engineer was an ex-Navy Nuke who wanted to develop and implement a PM program for the facility.  He clashed continuously with the Maintenance Manager who thought that PM for PM's sake only wore the components out faster.  He asked what risk or cost was associated with the component failure before he'd agree to doing PM on it.

The answer was that they were both right, in some cases there are risks [e.g., nuclear accident] or costs [direct or opportunity] associated with component failures.  In other cases there aren't (e.g., how many of us replace light bulbs in our homes before they burn out?)  In the Navy and/or nuclear power, we did PMs on a lot of things because of risks and opportunity costs.  In many civilian nonnuclear applications, run to failure is the most efficient method. 

As far as dudes sleeping at work, is it a management expectation that they don't do this?  If so, it sounds like a management problem.  When the cost of ignoring the problem becomes big enough, then they'll need to fix it.

My advice is to look at the things that are bothering you and ask why are they that way and who should care.  If everyone but you seems fine with it, but you're having trouble adapting, then you should probably move on to a place with a culture more in line with your expectations.  It doesn't mean that you or they are good or bad.  It just means that there may be better places for you to work. 

Good luck,

mgm

[Marlin]

When I first got out of the Navy, I worked at a DOE nuclear facility where they didn't practice preventative maintenance.  The Maintenance Manager only focused on corrective maintenance.  The new Facility Engineer was an ex-Navy Nuke who wanted to develop and implement a PM program for the facility.  He clashed continuously with the Maintenance Manager who thought that PM for PM's sake only wore the components out faster.  He asked what risk or cost was associated with the component failure before he'd agree to doing PM on it.

I have seen this culture clash at a couple of DOE sites. I have heard all about those damn Navy Nukes (myself excluded naturally  ) who came in to change how business was done, in particular in the Conduct of Operations area. The old timers who were use to developing skills and technique to operate and produce only saw the limitations of verbatim procedural compliance and the ConOps/management people had a little trouble with the level of tool box knowledge that could not be captured procedurally that had been used for years.

[Madcow43]

Thanks for all the replies.  It gives me some things to think about.  I figure I can give it a while longer before I decide if this is where I want to be or if I should start looking at nuke plants again. 

[Already Gone]

You won't necessarily find a big difference if you move to a nuke.  Sure, there is no cable TV in the control room of a nuke.  There won't be many guys taking a nap at the board.  But the culture of maintaining equipment all comes down to the cost-benefit.  You'll find an awful lot of stuff that is rotting in place because it was cheaper and easier to replace it with some module on a skid or the bed of a truck.

And the opposite is also true.  You'll find a LOT of time and money being wasted on making the most perfect-looking whatzit that does nothing important except that it looks good.  I have seen nukes spend tens of thousands of dollars to protect the finish on floors that could be repaired for a few hundred to a thousand, just because the patches wouldn't look as good.

They blow MILLIONs of bucks making the offices look nice and putting the NLO's into uniforms, while letting the steam leaks and roof leaks destroy the structures and machinery.  Yet other plants use trailers and tents for offices but the machinery wants for nothing.

It all comes down to how much the management values their investment and what standards they will accept.  ConEd let ALL their plants and infrastructure go to hell, and they still do.  RG&E had turbine floors that you could see your reflection in, both at the nuke and at the dirt-burner.