How would you fix the NNPP

[DDMurray]

PB- over two years since your initial post. Thanks for hanging in there.

Your workload observation is spot on.  I saw the results of a study that basically said our junior Sailors on an SSN in upkeep spend greater than 50% of their time waiting.  I believe there are many factors that influence this, but discounting the survey will not fix anything.  When I was a squadron EDMC, you could easily tell an above average boat from the rest by walking through about 8:15 a.m.  On the good boats, the boys were working on their work lists.  On the rest there was a line waiting for the EDO/SDO to finish with a meeting and/or relief report so that then they could start getting permission to commence work.  When conditions throw a wrench in their plans the stronger Chief has fall-back work to keep his guys busy.

Disagree with you on procedural compliance.  If you think it's bad in the Navy, it's worse in civilian nuclear power.  During my time in the Navy, my biggest blunders were caused by complacency because I was performing a routine task for the upteenth time so I didn't verify the initial conditions correctly.  There are many procedures that lend themselves to performing more than one step at a time or tweaking valves to maintain parameters without a specific step to do so.  We can go far too.  I remember an outside organization (not NRRO) hitting one of our boats for not using Point-Read-Operate on an R-134 keypad.  When I question the auditor, he stuck to his guns.  He's now an LDO.

[Preciousblue1965]

PB- over two years since your initial post. Thanks for hanging in there.

Your workload observation is spot on.  I saw the results of a study that basically said our junior Sailors on an SSN in upkeep spend greater than 50% of their time waiting.  I believe there are many factors that influence this, but discounting the survey will not fix anything.  When I was a squadron EDMC, you could easily tell an above average boat from the rest by walking through about 8:15 a.m.  On the good boats, the boys were working on their work lists.  On the rest there was a line waiting for the EDO/SDO to finish with a meeting and/or relief report so that then they could start getting permission to commence work.  When conditions throw a wrench in their plans the stronger Chief has fall-back work to keep his guys busy.

Disagree with you on procedural compliance.  If you think it's bad in the Navy, it's worse in civilian nuclear power.  During my time in the Navy, my biggest blunders were caused by complacency because I was performing a routine task for the upteenth time so I didn't verify the initial conditions correctly.  There are many procedures that lend themselves to performing more than one step at a time or tweaking valves to maintain parameters without a specific step to do so.  We can go far too.  I remember an outside organization (not NRRO) hitting one of our boats for not using Point-Read-Operate on an R-134 keypad.  When I question the auditor, he stuck to his guns.  He's now an LDO.

Now that I think about it, I think my position stems from the way the procedures where witten at my last duty station.  It took 4 different books to cover everything that was required for an engineroom startup, the procedure jumped back and forth like a choose-your-own-adventure novel, and they were poorly written to top it all off.  On my first ship, the procedures were all contained in one section for a given piece of equipment.  When you stated up the Main Engines, you only had to go to the Main Engine section vice hunting down the MLO system, then the seawater system, then condensate, etc.  I too have had some hiccups do to complacency.  I just think that some people go overboard with it.  Circle X was a big thing at my last command, they expected you to do circle x procedures that only had 4 steps and involved two valves.  Of course my last command was NPTU so it was a unique beast in and of itself. 

[spekkio]

The BS Factor Part 2:  Let your people do what they know how to do.  I understand procedural compliance is a cornerstone of the program, but don't go overboard with it.  You don't need to reference the procedure EVERYTIME to do something you have done 100s of times before and only involve 3 or 4 valves.  Also don't enforce rules that aren't rules.  I dont' know how many times there were hits on drills that started out "contrary to good engineering practices....".  So me the Engineering Practices manual, otherwise it shouldn't be a hit.  The Circle X method is a good tool, but it isn't something that is required, so don't enforce it like it is.

A-gang blows sans inboard. Upon being asked by the CO what procedure they were following to blow sans, the two operators looked at each other and said "sir, we do this all the time...we don't use a procedure."

Now picture that with a nuclear incident.

[Preciousblue1965]

A-gang blows sans inboard. Upon being asked by the CO what procedure they were following to blow sans, the two operators looked at each other and said "sir, we do this all the time...we don't use a procedure."

Now picture that with a nuclear incident.

Ok, I agree that I may have gone a little too far with that one, thus the modified post later on.  There has to be some common sense associated with nuclear power at some point and a bit of trust that operators have a certain degree of understanding about how things work otherwise just put a bunch of trained monkeys on watch.  There is just as much  over rediculous requirements as there is about people failing to follow procedures.  Just trying to bring some common sense into the NNPP but we all know that is akin to 

[spekkio]

I agree, somewhat. But I also almost had to write an incident report the other day on why an operator didn't accurately follow the precautions of a procedure after it was briefed and specifically covered NOT to do it. This is after he assured me that he has performed the evolution many times and knew what he was doing.

So yea...

As for all the salty guys saying that prototype needs to be harder, I wholeheartedly disagree. Prototype shouldn't even exist, but the bottom line is that the Navy nuclear training program has produced operators with a flawless track record as far as reactor accidents go, and it continues to do so. No Admiral is going to mess with that formula. From that perspective, NNPTC isn't broken, so you can't fix it.

The filter is when personnel are screened for Navy nuclear power prior to Naval service. People with high technical GPA's or high ASVAB scores have proven that they have the intelligence required to excel in the program, so now it's just a matter of properly motivating them.

[deltarho]

I agree, somewhat. But I also almost had to write an incident report the other day on why an operator didn't accurately follow the precautions of a procedure after it was briefed and specifically covered NOT to do it. This is after he assured me that he has performed the evolution many times and knew what he was doing.

I've seen this type of thing happen too many times.  In my not so humble opinion, the pre-evolution brief was the root cause of the failure.  It was also a failure of leadership.

Training should be about what to do, reinforcing positive behaviors--not the opposite.  The ol' "perfect practice makes perfect" concept. We see that this principle is true and able to be used effectively in two-year-olds! 

If you want to keep your toddler from walking through a puddle, you don't say, "Don't walk through the puddle."  You will undoubtedly be putting those shoes off to the side to dry for a few days because there is no other option in his or her mind but to walk through the puddle.  To ensure success, you say, "Let's walk around the puddle."  The toddler will comply because there are no other options floating around in that noggin.

When you practice an instrument, you don't play the wrong notes in hopes that it will cause you to play the correct ones during the concert.

I wasn't there, but I dare say more emphasis was placed on what not to do than on what to do.  There is a place for discussing (a) lessons learned, (b) past incidents, and (c) current anomalies or limitations, for example; however, always end on the positive message.  Also, I realize that this individual said he had conducted the evolution many times, which is a recipe for complacency, and for the prideful person it sets up an environment that will not allow him to reach out for help.

So, at the critical--was it cut the blue wire or don't cut the blue wire?--moment, what do you think stuck out in his mind the most, the positive message or the negative message?  Moreover, the climate set up probably sent a message conveying that asking for help would be highly frowned upon, putting his value as an operator in question.

Just my opinion from the outside looking in...

[Neutron_Herder]

I've stayed away from this topic so far, but it's time.

This is a recently retired surface guy's opinion, and I know that the Submariners have a different kind of life due to manning.  That being said, here we go...

1)  I'm a big fan of technology, but having the Power School notes printed out on slides where you fill in the blank for the definition or whatever is a bunch of crap.  If you hear the information said aloud, see it on the board, and then most importantly write it down yourself it's going to "stick" better.  Don't get me wrong, I still have my A school notes and there are times when the writing becomes nothing more than a scribbly line as I fell asleep, but the stuff I was awake for I remembered!

2)  Slow down the rate of promotion a little...  Case in point:  When I was on the Washington in 1994 we had 73 people in RC Div... Of those 73 people 54 were qualified RO, and for the most part (there's always exceptions) were able to do everything required of them.  Just a few years later (1997?) I was on the CVN 75 and we had 17 E-6's in RC Div out of a total of about 55 people.  All of them were clamoring for a job in order to get promoted.  Out of those 55 people we were scrambling to be able to cover the minimum watch rotation required to maintain Reactor Department's duty rotation.  (5 section, so 20 ROs).  Which leads me to my third point...

3)  Nukes are different... deal with it!  Our job is to keep the reactor safe while being able to meet the operational goals set forth by our chain of command.  Our job is NOT to be the president, secretary, or treasurer of the CPO Mess (or the First or Second class association, for that matter).  Nor is it for us to be the command DAPA, CFS, Physical Fitness Coordinator, etc...  Bottom line:  If you have time to go do that stuff, then you're not doing a good enough job as a Nuke!

Collateral duties for Nukes have gone overboard.  You now have people making Chief and their only concern is what collateral duties they need to pick up to make SCPO.  They're missing (or blatantly ignoring) the basic tenet of being a Nuke...  Keep the plant safe!

Maybe my opinion's a little too biased towards the Nukes and not towards "Big Navy", but oh well.  I'm sure I've missed all sorts of "what if" kind of scenarios too...  Honestly I don't care.   If the Navy Nuclear Power Program is to be successful they need to look back on what made them so successful in the first place and endeavor to return to it.

Sorry for the longish post, I actually held back...  but I made my (probably contested) point!!

Jay

[spekkio]

You make many good points that I agree with. However,

I wasn't there...

Which is why you didn't hear the part where we covered that "we will avoid violating this precaution by doing ...."

It's one of those cases where the operator had a brainfart by not acknowledging the nuance between throttle open and fully open, and the on-scene supervisor was too trusting or complacent if you will. But had the on-scene supervisor not been there and the Navy gave the level of 'trust' that preciousblue advocates, things would have been a lot worse.

[Gamecock]

I've stayed away from this topic so far, but it's time.

This is a recently retired surface guy's opinion, and I know that the Submariners have a different kind of life due to manning.  That being said, here we go...

1)  I'm a big fan of technology, but having the Power School notes printed out on slides where you fill in the blank for the definition or whatever is a bunch of crap.  If you hear the information said aloud, see it on the board, and then most importantly write it down yourself it's going to "stick" better.  Don't get me wrong, I still have my A school notes and there are times when the writing becomes nothing more than a scribbly line as I fell asleep, but the stuff I was awake for I remembered!

2)  Slow down the rate of promotion a little...  Case in point:  When I was on the Washington in 1994 we had 73 people in RC Div... Of those 73 people 54 were qualified RO, and for the most part (there's always exceptions) were able to do everything required of them.  Just a few years later (1997?) I was on the CVN 75 and we had 17 E-6's in RC Div out of a total of about 55 people.  All of them were clamoring for a job in order to get promoted.  Out of those 55 people we were scrambling to be able to cover the minimum watch rotation required to maintain Reactor Department's duty rotation.  (5 section, so 20 ROs).  Which leads me to my third point...

3)  Nukes are different... deal with it!  Our job is to keep the reactor safe while being able to meet the operational goals set forth by our chain of command.  Our job is NOT to be the president, secretary, or treasurer of the CPO Mess (or the First or Second class association, for that matter).  Nor is it for us to be the command DAPA, CFS, Physical Fitness Coordinator, etc...  Bottom line:  If you have time to go do that stuff, then you're not doing a good enough job as a Nuke!

Collateral duties for Nukes have gone overboard.  You now have people making Chief and their only concern is what collateral duties they need to pick up to make SCPO.  They're missing (or blatantly ignoring) the basic tenet of being a Nuke...  Keep the plant safe!

Maybe my opinion's a little too biased towards the Nukes and not towards "Big Navy", but oh well.  I'm sure I've missed all sorts of "what if" kind of scenarios too...  Honestly I don't care.   If the Navy Nuclear Power Program is to be successful they need to look back on what made them so successful in the first place and endeavor to return to it.

Sorry for the longish post, I actually held back...  but I made my (probably contested) point!!

Jay

I concur.....very good post.

[JsonD13]

(5 section, so 20 ROs). 

What kind of watch rotation is that (A damned good one IMHO)??  As an ELT on the Chucky V we were on 6 and 6's with 5 section duty.  It would be a better deal for all nukes if all we were expected to do was our one primary duty (be nukes).  The problem is the higher ups in the CoC who have no tolerance for people that dont take on collateral duties.

[DDMurray]

I think the comments on collateral duties require a deeper discussion.  I think this goes back to the evaluation system and over-inflated marks, which goes back to a command culture where we rank guys who look good on paper vice actually observing their performance.  The selection boards are tasked with picking the most-qualified candidates.  With everyone "the best" at their primary duty, they are left with splitting hairs over who had the most influential collateral duty.

Look at NNPTC.  I was once counseled that everyone there was screened and cream of the crop so ranking boards basically said that everyone was "the best" at their primary duty.  So in order to rank sailors, we had to look at what they did outside their primary duty.  So as an instructor teaching two sections of students I had at least six hours of my time devoted to teaching and covering study halls.  In my other two hours I graded homework and prepared for teaching.  In general my day was full most of the time.  Then there was the internal monitoring guy.  He administered the RPS subject once every six weeks and scheduled monitoring throughout his day such that he had plenty of free time.  This guy had all kinds of collateral duties and was frequently one of the top-ranked Chiefs/PO1s.  I know this duty is now one of the collateral duties; but it always chapped my a$$ that somebody who had minimal impact on student success (our primary duty) could be considered more valuable than the guys who interacted with students on a daily basis.

[Neutron_Herder]

The evaluation system was one of the reasons I decided to not stick around anymore.  I was told the same thing that you were about rankings.  Every person of the same rank at the command was assumed to have the same level of knowledge, so we were all ranked the same.  The numbers within the FITREP didn't even mater...  They ranked the candidates first, and then fill in the numbers so that the averages line up with your numerical ranking within the department, command, etc.

I really don't know when all of this started to come about, I truthfully never really paid attention to any of the "Big Navy" stuff.  I know the push right now is for nukes to become an "active" part of the command, but that really doesn't work too well when the rest of the command can't do anything to help you.

Unfortunately it's too late for the FITREP system.  The Navy has managed to turn this system into the same kind of inflated worthlessness that existed with the old eval system.  Guess they'll have a new one coming out soon with a "6.0" scale!

No matter what they do, someone is always going to find a way to inflate the numbers.  Sad, but true.

[Neutron_Herder]

What kind of watch rotation is that (A damned good one IMHO)??  As an ELT on the Chucky V we were on 6 and 6's with 5 section duty.  It would be a better deal for all nukes if all we were expected to do was our one primary duty (be nukes).  The problem is the higher ups in the CoC who have no tolerance for people that dont take on collateral duties.

That is 6 and 6 on 5 section duty.

Two plants with 2 SROs in each plant...

[Neutron Whisperer]

The evaluation system was one of the reasons I decided to not stick around anymore.  I was told the same thing that you were about rankings.  Every person of the same rank at the command was assumed to have the same level of knowledge, so we were all ranked the same.  The numbers within the FITREP didn't even mater...  They ranked the candidates first, and then fill in the numbers so that the averages line up with your numerical ranking within the department, command, etc.

I really don't know when all of this started to come about, I truthfully never really paid attention to any of the "Big Navy" stuff.  I know the push right now is for nukes to become an "active" part of the command, but that really doesn't work too well when the rest of the command can't do anything to help you.

Unfortunately it's too late for the FITREP system.  The Navy has managed to turn this system into the same kind of inflated worthlessness that existed with the old eval system.  Guess they'll have a new one coming out soon with a "6.0" scale!

No matter what they do, someone is always going to find a way to inflate the numbers.  Sad, but true.

Don't know how long ago you're description of the EVAL system is, but I've heard what you're saying a few times before.  Agree, it was a bogus method.  Here's the current instruction:
http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/A1FA25A4-D292-4F83-9490-0010944D5565/0/161010.pdf

I think it's more sophisticated and does the guys better justice.  Only been involved in writing my guys' EVALs for about 2 years, but I've always worked with a Chief who made them meaningful.


Agree with the thoughts on too rapid of advancement.  I'm at 10 years and expect to make Chief next year (passed my EWS/EDPO board today, the only thing I think that's holding me back), and I feel like only now am I really capable of doing the job well.  There is a problem now in the fleet with sub ETs being so undermanned that the brand new RC Div Chiefs are making big mistakes due to inexperience.  (I know this a 3-day conversation on why there aren't enough nukes in the first place.)

I've seen a lot of guys get promoted at their 6 or 7 year mark thinking that they're not all hosed up but not really ready, that their next division (and the fleet) would be better served with them doing some more time as an LPO.  That's what LPOs are now a lot of the time: guys who reported onboard as an E4 and made their way up to E6, now the LPO.

I'm a "sea-returnee first class" coming from instructor duty, I make my job on the boat look easy.  Done it all before.  Imagine if there was 40% of the department with my experience vice there only being one other ELT, one other electrician, and one other mechanic who has done a previous sea tour.

[spekkio]

I've stayed away from this topic so far, but it's time.

This is a recently retired surface guy's opinion, and I know that the Submariners have a different kind of life due to manning.  That being said, here we go...

1)  I'm a big fan of technology, but having the Power School notes printed out on slides where you fill in the blank for the definition or whatever is a bunch of crap.  If you hear the information said aloud, see it on the board, and then most importantly write it down yourself it's going to "stick" better.  Don't get me wrong, I still have my A school notes and there are times when the writing becomes nothing more than a scribbly line as I fell asleep, but the stuff I was awake for I remembered!

I strongly disagree. The test I performed the worst on in power school was the one where I spent my time re-writing notes. The point is, everyone is different. If you're the type of guy who needs to re-write something 10x for it to stick, then go ahead and do that during your study time. Don't waste class time forcing everyone to do it when it doesn't work for everyone.

2)  Slow down the rate of promotion a little...  Case in point:  When I was on the Washington in 1994 we had 73 people in RC Div... Of those 73 people 54 were qualified RO, and for the most part (there's always exceptions) were able to do everything required of them.  Just a few years later (1997?) I was on the CVN 75 and we had 17 E-6's in RC Div out of a total of about 55 people.  All of them were clamoring for a job in order to get promoted.  Out of those 55 people we were scrambling to be able to cover the minimum watch rotation required to maintain Reactor Department's duty rotation.  (5 section, so 20 ROs).  Which leads me to my third point...

I'm sure that the nuclear Navy would like to slow down promotion, but manning issues at the mid-upper enlisted ranks don't allow for that.

Perhaps hitting the fleet as an E-5 or being promoted to E-5 very shortly after needs to be looked at, but that is one of the selling points for people to join the nuclear pipeline in the first place.

[spekkio]

The first hot runner coming to these forums and describing how he's stuck at E-6 until his twelve year mark is going to get one big message (ad nauseum);

"Dude, we have such a better deal for you."

(sic)

So then raise the pro-pay and/or bonuses instead of making everyone instant E-5's/E-6's and 8 year chiefs. A guy who hits the fleet as an E-3 and gets promoted to E-6 through 12 years will not perceive the situation as 'stuck' the same way a guy who gets to the fleet as an E-5 and gets promoted to E-6 in only 3 years.

Rank kind of loses its purpose when you can't tell a person's experience or ability level by looking at it, and when you have people junior in rank but senior in experience/quals giving orders to people senior in rank but junior in experience.

[Fermi2]

Put me in charge.

[retired nuke]

Put me in charge.

Now that would help staffing....

[DDMurray]

Put me in charge.

I like it.  Think Joe Torre or Tony LaRussa managing my nephew's T-Ball team.   

[HydroDave63]

Put me in charge.

I like it.  Think Joe Torre or Tony LaRussa managing my nephew's T-Ball team.  

More like R. Lee Ermey

Admiral Broadzilla interviewing a candidate with low self-esteem and needing a waiver:

[co60slr]

Put me in charge.

Give us your best script for a "BZ style NR Interview"!  

Besides, you never know who might be lurking...especially on THIS subject thread!   The current Director is due to roll out soon....the incumbants' names are certainly "in the hat".  Better throw yours in quick...

You sure you want the pay cut though?  

(Oops...forgot an icon:   )

[LT Dan]

Besides, you never know who might be lurking...especially on THIS subject thread!   The current Director is due to roll out soon....the incumbants' names are certainly "in the hat".  Better throw yours in quick...

So, who do you think it will be? 

Nobody I know saw the current director coming....I for one would have bet the house on Grossenbacher.

2012....I know who I think it will be.

[HydroDave63]

As for Braodzilla NNPTC for blueshirts...

[Fermi2]

LOL I expected to see the Red Forman video posted again!

BTW No I wouldn't want the paycut, maybe I'd do it as a labor of love.

[co60slr]

So, who do you think it will be? 

Nobody I know saw the current director coming....I for one would have bet the house on Grossenbacher.

2012....I know who I think it will be.

It's an 8 year tour, so while the list starts out long (sub officers), the incumbants probably decline to throw their hat into the "ring of fire" in light of pending retirements.   

I've heard current SUBLANT; however, what do I know...I'm well into retirement now.  :-)   I have to get the majority of my gossip these days from "The Stupid Shall Be Punished".   ;-)