BWR questions

[Fermi2]

HPCS and HPCI are two different things. I forgot you are at a BWR 6!!!

LPCI and LPCS are different systems at all BWRs at least from BWR 3 on up.

LPCI technically isn't a system. It's a Mode of RHR. reaching back here but at a BWR the modes of RHR were LPCI, Suppression Cooling, Suppression Spray, Drywell Spray, Shutdown Cooling and the Infamous Fuel Pool Cooling Assist which we successfully avoided everytime it got brought up at Fermi. The one time I know of that we did try it the pipes shook horribly and we turned the reactor cavity into the color of mud.

Fermi had LPCI Loop select too, which outside of ADS was one of the prime growing grounds for inane test questions.

[Nuclear Renaissance]

Aren't you the guy that guaranteed Fukushima was an explosion from main generator gas and guaranteed that they weren't in Severe Accident Guides and said there was absolutely no way they'd be needing to be doing primary containment flooding?

[Fermi2]

They did explode Main Generator Gas and no I never stated they wouldn't need Containment Flooding WHICH BTW is an EOP step at Fukushima not a SAG.

Aren't you the guy who has no practical experience at a BWR and hasn't qualified Shift Manager? Do you need the concept of Support System explained to you?

Frigging NUBs

[Higgs]

[Nuclear Renaissance]

They did explode Main Generator Gas and no I never stated they wouldn't need Containment Flooding WHICH BTW is an EOP step at Fukushima not a SAG.

Aren't you the guy who has no practical experience at a BWR and hasn't qualified Shift Manager? Do you need the concept of Support System explained to you?

Frigging NUBs

these are all yours, and every single one has proven to be wrong:

that looks more like a turbine building explosion to me that blew away the blowout panels on the refueling floor. wanna bet they released hydrogen from the generator and it went poof?

check out the explosion, looks exactly like a generator h2 release.

i'll guarantee they are not flooding containment.

once they covered the core none of that was credible.

and they did cover the core.

the explosion emanated outside containment and it looks like the blowout panels did their job.

there is no mechanism for getting hydrogen inside the secondary containment and a internal drywell explosion is impossible.

[Starkist]

these are all yours, and every single one has proven to be wrong:

You're really using his assumptions based on misinformation provided by the Japanese and american media to debunk his entire technical expertise???

O.o

You can lose that source from the CST to HPCI, and as long as you put HPCI on the suppression pool it is operable. It does not work the other way around. When in all your experience have you ever declared a CST "inop"? CST is not required for HPCI or RCIC operability.

And yes, I looked it up, at my plant tech specs require 125,000 gallons in CST >= 18ft.

3.5.2-2; rev 3.

Your plant has different tech specs then mine I believe. O.o

[Nuclear Renaissance]

3.5.2-2; rev 3.

3.5.2 is a shutdown spec. CST level is allowable as an alternative to suppression pool level when cold.

[Starkist]

3.5.2 is a shutdown spec. CST level is allowable as an alternative to suppression pool level when cold.

ah I see, right you are.

I did  see this chart though, can you explain it to me? I reads as if its monitored all the time, but the only other place I can find it is the shutdown portion and RCIC.

Table 3.3.5.1-1

d. Condensate Storage
Tank Level - Low


applicable modes : 1, 2, 3,
4(c), 5(c)

where c is : When HPCS is OPERABLE for compliance with LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown," and aligned to the condensate
storage tank while tank water level is not within the limit of SR 3.5.2.2.



3.3.5-2 states you need to declare RCIC inoperable when CST is low as well. But you have 7 days to fix that issue.

[DDMurray]

New question... More of a "industry wide" question...

Looking at reports, and vermont yankee being the predominant offender here, how exactly does tritium leak out of the plant. Im not understanding how it can happen. The only thing slightly possible I could understand is a leak from RPCCW into service water, but RPCCW is at a lower pressure, at least at my plant.
Also, following that up, cesium, strontium, and yttrium being found offsite. those are fission products, wouldnt that be indicative of a fuel element failure? O.o I understand the fuel defects having uranium outside the cladding, but is that enough to allow a measurable amount of radiation leakage outside of the plant? Or is this merely fear mongering by the media?

From NRC website:
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1033/ML103350632.html
http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/vy/vy-groundwater-issue.pdf
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1013/ML101390117.pdf
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1013/ML101390116.pdf

[Starkist]

From NRC website:
http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/vy/vy-groundwater-issue.pdf
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1013/ML101390117.pdf
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1013/ML101390116.pdf

cool, thanks

[Nuclear Renaissance]

Incorrect. Are you familiar with the concept of a TS required SUPPORT System?

Twice in fact. When HPCI swapped to the suppression pool due to an instrument failure and we declared it inoperable due to loss of the CST as a TS required SUPPORT function. Both times backed up absolutely correct by Licensing.

Browns Ferry did it too about 2.5 years ago.

When have you ever been in a position where you had to MAKE that decision?


You might also reference 3.5.2 where the CST is a TS Required SOURCE for OPDRVs.

Frigging NUBs.

Just because the operating crew errs conservative and licensing says 'yes' to the answer you're looking for, doesn't make it so. For your precedence, I can offer precedence from my site where the HPCI CST suction had a stem separation, and once it was fully aligned to the suppression pool it was operable. Tech Specs ensures the plant can minimally react per the safety analysis, and if the safety analysis doesn't credit it, then Tech Specs doesn't need it. The only credit for the CST is for an alternative source to the suppression pool during cold shutdown condition.

I bring up Fukushima because just the same, when people offer facts that counter Broadzilla – even counter arguments that turned out to be accurate – he devolves to name calling and bluster about why he is better than the other poster. It's childish, and makes it difficult to have a constructive thread.

[jams723]

Just because the operating crew errs conservative and licensing says 'yes' to the answer you're looking for, doesn't make it so. For your precedence, I can offer precedence from my site where the HPCI CST suction had a stem separation, and once it was fully aligned to the suppression pool it was operable. Tech Specs ensures the plant can minimally react per the safety analysis, and if the safety analysis doesn't credit it, then Tech Specs doesn't need it. The only credit for the CST is for an alternative source to the suppression pool during cold shutdown condition.

I bring up Fukushima because just the same, when people offer facts that counter Broadzilla

– even counter arguments that turned out to be accurate – he devolves to name calling and bluster about why he is better than the other poster. It's childish, and makes it difficult to have a constructive thread.

Licensing does not say yes just because Ops makes a call. It is our job to ensure the report ability is accurate. We report the facts not conservative calls. If those sites made the call and Licensing agreed... That means for their TS and bases the call was correct.

[Fermi2]

Sorry, again you don't know the definition of SUPPORT system do you?

jams, hey man. A bit incorrect. Licensing will look at subsequent analysis and retarct a report but can never overturn an Ops Operability call.

[jams723]

Broad, nope, not what I meant.  I agree that Ops has the call (and the responcibility) What I tried to point out that Licensing was involved and a part of the process. If during the reportability determination, we found facts that put the original operability in doubt then that would be comminicated to Ops potentially to produce a revised operability (yes, by Ops).  That way we do not make a report that has to be retracted. All that assuming we have enough time... And with HPCS it would be a 8 hour report so there would be time.

Hey got a compliment from the Assistant Ops Manager. He said I was not a pipe. Heck of a compliment to me!